740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1447

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

secret

I had an informal conversation with Dr. Wang50 during and after a dinner with only the two of us present.

Dr. Wang talked to me at length about the arrangements for the Pacific Peace Treaty. He expressed deep concern over any suggestion that the veto power be eliminated and gave these reasons:

The Far Eastern Commission had proceeded on the basis of the veto, that is, a two-third’s vote of the eleven powers represented, but the privilege of the veto to any one of the four great powers concerned. He felt that a departure from that would place China in a very critical situation regarding the Soviets. He explained that the Chinese had a treaty with the Soviets51 and they had their deep concern regarding Manchuria. Now if the veto were eliminated with the Chinese subscribing to the elimination he very much feared that the Soviets would interpret this, for their own convenience, as virtually canceling the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

In expressing his concern he emphasized the fact that the Chinese had no desire to exercise the veto nor thought of any occasion which might persuade them to do so. He was solely concerned over the reaction on the part of the Soviets as it would relate to the situation of China. He begged that I give this very careful consideration and said that he would delay talking to Vyshinsky52 until he had had another conversation with me.

I briefly discussed my reasons for sending General Wedemeyer53 to China, explaining to Dr. Wang that while I was at Moscow I had called on a number of officials and individuals in China for suggestions as to what we might do to be of assistance to China, and that none of the replies had offered any practical solution. In fact, almost all of them offered no solution at that time. Finally, I determined that something further must be done and I had selected Wedemeyer [Page 519] because of his known pronounced anti-Chinese Communist bias and his devotion to the Generalissimo, and also because of the Generalissimo’s expressed confidence in Wedemeyer. I felt that under these conditions and balanced by the fact that Wedemeyer’s high integrity would override any personal prejudice or leanings, he was the best person to send on the mission. I explained that I was merely endeavoring to find some practical means that could be taken by the United States Government to assist the Chinese Government.

Dr. Wang made no comment in reply. I further explained that Wedemeyer would reach Washington Tuesday or Wednesday and that after the State Department had had an opportunity to analyze his report, which I had not yet seen, I would get the papers here in New York and probably have General Wedemeyer up here or would see him down there. Then I might wish to talk to Dr. Wang. I stated that I was unaware of what the contents of the report would be and its recommendations; that Wedemeyer had given me a brief letter with a description of his experiences in Formosa. Beyond that I had no details other than were implied in his public statement. I did say that the comments regarding Formosa were tragic in the description of what the civil government had done and what the military leaders had done in the misrule of that country and the complete antagonism of the inhabitants.

Dr. Wang stated that there were two things I did which the Generalissimo would never forget nor would China throughout the years to come. One was the removal from China and Manchuria of three million Japanese and the other was not only the transportation of troops to Manchuria, but the preparation of these troops for service there, their equipment, their clothing and supplies, which I had energetically directed and arranged immediately upon my arrival in China. Beyond that he made no comment regarding my services in an effort to mediate.

  1. Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, attending the UN General Assembly.
  2. Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945.
  3. Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and Soviet representative at the United Nations.
  4. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Special Representative of President Truman in China and Korea, July–September, 1947.