867N.01/11–1447: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
3215. Despite lack info GA developments except from Soviet press and fragmentary radio news, we feel obliged register our conviction Soviet policy and tactics toward Palestine question are deliberately calculated to ensure unsettlement, rather than settlement, and to create maximum difficulties for British and Americans in Near East. While proposal for neutral, small-power interim commission appears highly desirable from our point of view, we consider it essential that body should be able operate freely under general directives, with its actions subject only to disapproval by Security Council unanimity (as in case ACC Austria) and not to unanimous approval. In latter case, USSR could be depended upon to obstruct and frustrate efforts to secure orderly and peaceful transition. While Soviet acceptance Palestine partition has seemed second-choice possibility since last May (Embgram A–843 August 251), surprisingly forthright support in current GA seems to us to reflect Kremlin decision that:
- (1)
- Both Europe and Asiatic colonial areas are at present more critical and considerably “softer” for Soviet exploitation than [Page 1264] “harder” Arab East, unshaken either politically or economically by war and enemy occupation, shielded by firm US stand in Greece, Turkey and Iran, bolstered by strong US and British interests and commitments and controlled by feudal anti-Communist ruling class, susceptible to limited political “deals” but unlikely to open doors to Soviet penetration.
- (2)
- In view weakness indigenous Communist movements, Jews and other minority groups provide Kremlin’s only immediately useful tool to “soften up” area for eventual straight Communist cultivation.
- (3)
- Support of UNSCOP majority
recommendation would place Soviet Delegation in optimum position
to secure “appropriate” implementing measures and ensure
adoption partition plan. This solution, though second-choice,
would serve Soviet interest in softening up area by:
- (a)
- Securing withdrawal of British and ensuring against their replacement by other great-power influence;
- (b)
- Launching unsettling and disruptive Jewish-Arab conflict which could be kept going indefinitely by covert Soviet aid and incitement to both sides through local Communist parties who will be heavily reinforced by Communist indoctrinated emigrants from Eastern Europe; thus threatening and damaging major US and British interests in an area where USSR has nothing to lose.
- (4)
- Soviet offense in Arab eyes would be minimized by prior endorsement partition by UNSCOP majority and USA and by Soviet record in support Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (already being propagandized, see Embtel 3205, November 131). Moreover, given shortness of man’s memory and flexibility of Soviet tactics, Kremlin could quickly recapture Arab good will by sudden reversal position if and when its interests should so dictate.
Dept pass Jerusalem 5, asking Jerusalem repeat Arab capitals.
Passed to London.