501.BB Palestine/11–1447: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
u.s. urgent
561. For Austin and Johnson and Rusk. For your urgent attention following is text of statement handed me this morning by Sir John Balfour:
“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been considering the recent proposals of the working group on implementation set up by the first subcommittee of the Palestine Committee of the General Assembly.
They wish to make it absolutely clear that they will not allow the British administration or British troops in Palestine to be used either directly as the instrument of the United Nations for imposing a settlement not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs and therefore likely to provoke serious opposition in Palestine or in neighboring countries, or indirectly for the purpose of maintaining law and order while a United Nations Commission imposes such a settlement. They consider that it would be playing the Soviet Union’s game to allow British troops to be embroiled in repressive action in Palestine against either Jews or Arabs. However much H.M.G. might say that they were acting as agents of the United Nations, the hostility aroused would be directed only against them.
The use of British troops more or less in the role of mercenaries for the ostensible purpose of shooting at either side in the name of law and order, but in fact for the purpose of enforcing a settlement by force on one side or the other, is therefore not acceptable to H.M.G. Nor are they prepared to put their soldiers either under the command of a United Nations commission or of a foreign power. Their troops must remain under their own control and command.1
[Page 1263]H.M.G. are most anxious to remove all uncertainty about their basic position in this respect. It is that if a United Nations commission in Palestine were taking preparatory steps for an enforced settlement the British administration and British troops would not continue to exercise administrative responsibility or to maintain law and order, except for their own protection in the process of withdrawal.”
Balfour said he had been instructed to deliver foregoing message to me more or less at same time that Sir Alexander Cadogan delivered his statement at UN yesterday afternoon. It had however been impossible for me to receive him until this morning.
- According to a memorandum of conversation of November 17, by Mr. Knox, Mr. Beeley of the United Kingdom Delegation had informed him that day that “There would be cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Commission to an extent.… The cooperation would be such that the Arabs would be unable to charge that the United Kingdom was helping to carry-out partition. The United Kingdom during that period would not attempt to sabotage the work of the Commission or to make its task more difficult. The United Kingdom simply would take care to avoid any responsibility for any such partition policy. Therefore, the United Kingdom would consult with the Commission and give administrative notice of the progress of evacuation and inform the Commission in advance of areas it intended to evacuate. The United Kingdom would also attempt to allow for a smooth transition of administrative control over essential governmental services for the sake of the population, but would not hold itself responsible for such transitional arrangements.” (IO files: US/A/AC.14/177)↩