501.BB Palestine/11–1847
Memorandum Prepared for the Secretary of State 1
Subject: Forthcoming procedures and policy on Palestine
[Page 1265]I.
In the ad hoc Committee
It is apparent that in the next few days votes will be taken in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on
- 1.
- The report of Subcommittee 1 which has worked out details of the UNSCOP Majority Report favoring partition of Palestine, and
- 2.
- The report of Subcommittee 2 which has worked out details of the Minority UNSCOP report favoring a unitary state in Palestine.
It is recommended that the US Delegation vote for the report of Subcommittee 1 and against the report of Subcommittee 2.
In Plenary Session
The report of Subcommittee 1 will undoubtedly receive a majority of votes in the ad hoc committee and be submitted to a Plenary Session of the Assembly. In this case the US Delegation will vote for the partition plan. It is possible also that the report of Subcommittee 2 may receive a bare majority in the ad hoc committee and be submitted likewise to vote in Plenary Session.
It is recommended that the US vote against the report of Subcommittee 2, but that its representative state in so doing that if neither partition nor the unitary state proposals receive the necessary two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly the US will join with other Members of the United Nations in seeking to find some other solution for the problem of Palestine.
In this latter event the US should advocate the following procedures:
- 1.
- A new ad hoc committee on the Palestine problem, to which each Member of the United Nations would have the right to appoint one representative, should meet not later than January 15, 1948 and submit a compromise plan to a Special Session of the General Assembly, which should meet not later than April 1, 1948, the committee bearing in mind the need that its proposed recommendation should be able to receive a two-thirds majority vote.
- 2.
- The General Assembly at its present session should call on the Mandatory Power to continue to discharge its responsibility under the Mandate for the maintenance of the Government of Palestine and the preservation of peace and order in that country until the Special Session has had opportunity to make a recommendation to the Members on a solution of the Palestine problem.
- 3.
- The General Assembly should reaffirm its resolution of May 15, 1947 which stated “The General Assembly calls upon all governments and peoples and particularly on the inhabitants of Palestine, to refrain, pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, from the threat or use of force or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine.”
II.
It is possible that in view of the support given the partition plan by the US and the USSR this plan will receive the necessary two-thirds majority vote in this Session of the General Assembly. In such case there will probably be instantaneous outbreaks of violence in Palestine, accentuating in severity as the British forces withdraw and as the proposed UN Commission seeks to set up Jewish and Arab States.
This outbreak of hostilities as between Jews and Arabs or as between Arabs and any authority seeking to implement the recommendation of the Assembly will constitute such a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security as to place the question of Palestine before the Security Council. At that time it seems certain that a demand will be made that the Security Council undertake to implement the recommendation of the General Assembly for partition. The US, having been a protagonist of partition, would seem morally bound to acquiesce in such a demand that measures adequate to the situation be used for implementation.
The Soviet Union, also a protagonist of partition, would be likely to come forward with a suggestion that its troops be used in any UN effort to enforce implementation.
If the issue is thus raised before the Security Council, and the UK continues its present policy of washing its hands of the Palestine problem, and if the Arab States, as they threaten to do, resort to the use of armed force, two questions will urgently arise before this Government:
- 1.
- Whether US forces should be used in the contingency outlined above, or
- 2.
- The US should seek to discourage the use of force for
implementation in order to avoid
- (a)
- irreparable damage to the relations of the US and the Arab countries, and
- (b)
- affording an opportunity to the USSR to infiltrate militarily as well as politically into the Middle East.
- Sent by Messrs. Rusk and Henderson; drafted by Mr. McClintock.↩