501.BB Palestine/10–2547
Mr. Fraser Wilkins to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)
Dear Gordon: I have this morning received your letter of October 30, 1947 in reply to my letter of October 25, 19471 with regard to the revisions proposed by the United States Delegation to the United Nations in Annex A—Detailed Position Analysis of Majority Plan of UNSCOP.
I should like to recall, in order properly to present the practical problem which faced the Delegation, that early in the week of October 19 I had several telephone conversations with Gordon Mattison with [Page 1223] regard to the course of developments respecting Palestine and that, thereafter, Dean Rusk visited New York. Following Dean Rusk’s arrival we prepared a draft telegram to London which attempted to frame a workable approach to the question of Palestine as it was developing at the United Nations. Dean Rusk returned to Washington with this draft telegram on October 22.
In the meantime, in anticipation of Sub-committee meetings which were scheduled to commence on October 27, the United States Delegation was confronted with the problem of revising its papers in support of a position which was in the process of being adopted by the Department, based on policies approved by the Secretary in New York.
During the afternoon and late into the night of October 24 the working group labored on the revision of Annex A, as stated in the draft telegram. This telegram with minor changes was approved by the Department and sent to London about noon October 25. During the afternoon of October 25 the working group went over the majority plan of UNSCOP and its revisions of Annex A in detail, paragraph by paragraph, with Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring. All of these revisions, with certain minor exceptions, were approved by Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring.
Gordon will remember that we talked with him by telephone during the morning of October 25 and that he told me that, as the Delegation was in closer touch with the situation in New York, the Delegation might put forward the suggested changes in Annex A, as revised by the Delegation, in Sub-Committee 1; and that it would be sufficient if the Delegation forwarded a copy of revised Annex A for such comment as the Department might care to make. In accordance with this telephone conversation, we worked on our papers during the evening of October 25 and on October 26, dispatching five copies of revised Annex A to the Department by courier on the evening of October 26.
With regard to the revisions of Annex A I should like, on behalf of the Delegation, to make certain comments respecting the basic assumption and major policy decisions as set forth in your letter of October 30.
With regard to basic assumptions, it seems to us that similar assumptions, with appropriate changes for detail, are also basic to the majority plan of UNSCOP. For example,
- 1)
- that the British or some other administering authority will remain in Palestine until September 1, 1949.
- 2)
- that they or someone else will implement the plan (UNSCOP dodged this issue.)
- 3)
- that leaders in both the proposed Arab and Jewish states will cooperate in the implementation of this partition so that by September 1, 1949 the governments of those states will be organized and in full operation.
It is our belief that the validity of each one of these assumptions is as questionable as the validity of the assumptions on which the Department’s telegram #4578 of October 25 is based.
With regard to over-all policy respecting Palestine, the Delegation’s line of action was established and approved, following discussions with the Delegation, by the Secretary. The Department’s telegram #4578 of October 25 is an expression of one aspect of this policy. The Delegation’s revisions of Annex A flow from the general policy and the expression of it in the Department’s telegram #4578 of October 25.
As you have noted, the New York revisions omit the majority report’s requirement that neither the Jewish nor the Arab state shall attain independence until it has given to the UN and incorporated in its constitution certain fundamental guaranties for the Holy Places and the protection of minorities, and until it has stated its adherence to the economic union for Palestine. It was the Delegation’s view that inasmuch as the plan envisaged termination of the Mandate and independence in Palestine as early as July 1, 1948, thereby eliminating the formal transitional period and the necessity for an administering authority other than the present British administration acting behind a UN Commission, it would be unnecessary and undesirable to stipulate conditions precedent to independence. It was believed unnecessary because if the UN recommended that a declaration be made and an undertaking be signed, the moral effect of such a UN recommendation would require the authorities in the Jewish state and the Arab state to act in accordance with the UN recommendation, and in addition it would be difficult for either de facto state to make application for membership in the UN if it had not made the declaration and signed the undertaking. It was believed undesirable because the establishment of conditions precedent to independence might not be possible of fulfillment during the short time envisaged prior to independence which might have had the effect of raising a constitutional bar to actual independence on July 1, 1948.
As you have noted, the New York revisions omit the majority report’s provision that in case only one of the proposed Palestine states attains independence by establishing a provisional government and fulfilling the conditions required of it by the UN, the problem shall be referred back to the UN. It may be noted, however, that the Delegation retained the revised provisions in D regarding the undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit and that, in the broader sense, we strengthened this aspect of the partition plan by removing the 3rd paragraph of B.5 which, in the event only one state signed, referred the matter back to the UN. It as the Delegation’s belief that it is wiser to inform the Jewish and Arab authorities respectively in the areas of the Jewish and Arab states recommended by the GA that [Page 1225] they may be independent on July 1, 1948 than to make recommendations under which one of them may stall in order to keep the Palestine question before the UN. It is also the belief of the Delegation that, a “sit-down strike” by the authorities, for example, in the Arab state, should not prevent the independence of the Jewish state. It is realized that Economic Union is deemed essential in the majority plan of UNSCOP. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, many have doubts regarding its essentiality. The Jewish Agency, for example, frequently points out in discussions with regard to boundaries that the territorial division recommended by the UN will probably be permanent whereas the constitutional changes recommended by the UN may not necessarily endure. The Delegation believes in the principles of Economic Union and hopes that the UN recommendations in this respect will be accepted by both the Jewish and the Arab states; but it believes at the same time that the provisions for Economic Union should not be a condition precedent to independence. Both the Jewish and Arab states should be in a position voluntarily to adopt Economic Union. The Jewish Agency has already stated that it would accept Economic Union. The Arab High Commission has not, of course, discussed this detail because of its general opposition to the UNSCOP Report, but the Delegation believes that it should have the right of deciding whether it desired to participate in the Economic Union or whether it desired to make other arrangements for its economic well-being, for example, with the neighboring Arab states.
With regard to a United Nations Commission, it was the Delegation’s belief, as indicated in the Department’s telegram #4578 of October 25, that the UN Commission, headed by a UN High Commissioner, would be appointed to act as the agency of transfer in order to facilitate the transition to independence. The Delegation had no thought of suggesting that two authorities would be in existence for the administration of Palestine prior to July 1, 1948. The proposed UN Commission, headed by a High Commissioner, would have no administrative or political authority, but would be charged simply to advise Jews, Arabs and the mandatory power and to facilitate the independence of the Arab and Jewish states. The ultimate authority and responsibility in Palestine rests with the UK until the Mandate is terminated, whereupon it will be transferred instantaneously to the Jewish and Arab states. It was the Delegation’s belief that the UN Commission would represent the great moral authority of the UN in Palestine behind which and through which the UK could actually transfer the powers of government to the new states. It was our hope that London would recognize this facade which, in our view, would have the effect of removing the onus of actual partition to which the British have very reasonably objected. The exact relationship between the UK and the [Page 1226] UN Commission was not specified because it was felt that this suggestion by the Delegation, while understood by the Delegation, might more appropriately be developed by other members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine.
It is my hope, Gordon, that these observations will give you some indication of the trend of our thought in New York, and will serve to indicate the manner in which we tried to overcome (1) the apparent reluctance of any member of the UN, including the UN [UK], to act as administering authority in Palestine, and (2) the possibility that the discussions in the UN with regard to military implementation would lead to some type of force in which it would be necessary for American units to participate.
With regard to the last paragraph of your letter of October 30, Gordon told me on October 25, as previously indicated in this letter, that the Delegation might put forward the suggestions in Annex A, revised, as the Delegation was in close touch with the situation in New York, on the understanding that any basic objections which the Department might have would be communicated to the Delegation. It was for these reasons that we undertook the revision of Annex A based on the Department’s telegram #4578 of October 25 and that I acted as transmitting agent for the Delegation in sending the revised text by the first courier on October 26 following conversation with Gordon Mattison on October 25. Originally we planned to send it by teletype but because of the technical difficulties, such as “crossing through” and “underlining” of words indicating deletion and addition of text we believed transmission of five copies by courier was preferable for accuracy, understanding and distribution in the Department. It is my duty to add, I believe, that the Delegation has requested the Department’s view with regard to these and all other important changes which the Delegation has proposed in the various papers connected with Palestine and that we have endeavored to bring all papers into line with policies laid down by the Secretary, the Department, and the Delegation.
Sincerely,
- Not printed.↩