Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

Remarks by Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson at his Press Conference of October 31, 1947¹

October 31, 1947

Well, gentlemen, the statement I made on behalf of our delegation this morning² is in the nature of a suggestion because of the nature of the sub-committee. It is not in any sense a final decision either by the United States or by the sub-committee and certainly not of the Ad Hoc Committee, which will have to make the final recommendation to the Assembly. It is merely a plan which we believe would offer a reasonable hope of success in implementing the partition recommendation of the majority of the Investigating Commission.

There are certain fundamental facts which are premises which we might remind ourselves of. It is perfectly clear from the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, that is the subject of all this discussion, and from statements that have been made by the representatives of various countries in the Ad Hoc Committee, in the open debate, that there is pretty general agreement all around with respect to an early termination of the mandate. It is also clear from statements made by a representative of Great Britain that the British Government regards the early termination of the mandate and withdrawal of its forces and administration as desirable. In fact, they have said they are going to get out.

Now, the majority report of the Special Committee on Palestine, as you will all remember, recommends a two-year transitional period before final independence of the two states becomes effective, and the date they gave for the beginning of that period is already past now—September, 1947—but they do recommend a two year transitional period.

We feel, however, and I have suggested it to this subcommittee, that it would be possible to shorten very materially the time between the effective date of the recommendations that the General Assembly may make and the real independence of the two states. Our delegation thinks that complete and early independence is not only feasible but for many reasons desirable. Furthermore, we believe that the date for independence can be fixed on a practical basis and geared in with the plans of the mandatory power for withdrawing its administration and the troops that are now there maintaining public order. It can be arranged so that the mandatory power can simultaneously with withdrawing its administration and troops turn over all governmental responsibility, including that for the maintenance of law and order, to the authorities for the new Jewish and Arab States.

This procedure would make it unnecessary for the General Assembly to provide in its recommendations for a transitional period under a trusteeship or any other arrangement, and it would make unnecessary the establishment of a special United Nations force for maintaining law and order during the interim period.

Of course, it is absolutely essential for a decision to be reached in the subcommittee on this point, because if the idea of having the mandatory turn over its sovereign powers and its administration responsibility of two independent states (is accepted by the subcommittee) the various provisions in the (UNSCOP) report which provide for transitional period machinery would have to be deleted or modified.

Now, we have also suggested that the General Assembly appoint a small and very competent commission with a High Commissioner at the head of it—we suggested that it might be composed of three top people—to go out to Palestine as soon as possible after the effective date of the Assembly’s action, to ‘act in an advisory and guiding capacity with the leaders of the groups who will become independent states, or with the independent states, on this hypothetical date of July 1st (1948). Also, to work in collaboration with the British authorities still in Palestine and who, until the termination of the mandate, are still responsible for its government and for the maintenance of law and order. We believe that a small commission composed of men chosen for their personal qualifications, demonstrated by experience and public record, can give the most effective assistance to the leaders of the Arab and Jewish groups who are going to have to form governments in those states. It also can act as a sort of catalytic agent without the mandatory. We believe, too, that if this plan were adopted the British government, as a good member of the United Nations, would help in every practical way possible. It would certainly be in their interest to do so and to have a peaceful transition.

The date of July 1, 1948 was thrown out as a suggestion. That is the earliest date suggested in any of the plans, I believe. One of the resolutions put into the Ad Hoc Committee mentioned September, 1949. I forget which country put that in, but our suggested date, in the absence of any knowledge on our part of the precise date when the mandatory will withdraw, would seem to fit in with the practical possibility when we know that there are many thousands of British troops and a heavy governmental machinery there that cannot be removed in a day.

We think, too, that this Commission which would go out there should be sent out as the representative and agent of the General Assembly. It naturally could not have any greater powers than the General Assembly itself has. Its powers would be that of recommendation. However, the self-interest, as we see it, of all the parties concerned would, it seems to us, have an impelling effect on the possibility of usefulness of this commission. If a definite date for independence is set, and both the Jewish and the Arab leaders and their peoples know that on that date they are going to become responsible for order in their own house, we think that it would be a very strong motivation for their getting to work and for seeking wise and experienced and unbiased advice, which is offered to them with the greatest possible good will by the United Nations. We feel also that, knowing that the mandatory is leaving, they will be wise enough to profit from the counsel and suggestions of the heads of the mandatory states.

Now, in regard to the questions of public order, which is one of the first questions raised by anybody in consideration of this plan, I would like to make it perfectly clear that according to our thinking with respect to our plan the two states themselves will be absolutely sovereign on the effective date of their independence and they themselves will be responsible for the maintenance of their own public order. Naturally, the most impelling motive they will have will be their own self-interest. During this period the United Nations Commission also would have the responsibility for formulating a recommendation for the setting up of a United Nations trusteeship, or whatever other plan might be finally adopted, for the government of the city of Jerusalem and the contiguous territory within such limits as might be finally recommended. We do not know yet what will be the precise territorial limits of any of these three states, that is the Arab, the Jewish, and the free territory of Jerusalem.

Now, I have no doubt that every one of you can think of possible difficulties that may arise, as all the rest of us have thought of, and if I can help in any way by giving you some idea of the way our delegation has speculated on these difficulties and in what way they might be met—if I can, I will be glad to answer your questions.³

One other thing I had in mind to say. The question also arises of what body this United Nations group would be responsible to, and I think that the very terms of our proposal give the answer. It is responsible to the General Assembly. If another situation should arise, however, where there will be a real threat to international peace and security, the jurisdiction of that particular situation might well pass to the Security Council. We do not feel, however, that it is possible at this stage for our delegation, least of all, or for the committee or for the General Assembly, to anticipate by any kind of present action every possible difficulty that may arise. The most we can do is to lay down a plan which we hope is fair, and we want to be fair to everybody concerned, even if it does not give everybody everything they ask for. With a certain amount of good will and with some wise counsel on the part of competent people, the difficult transition period will be bridged and the two states become viable, both politically and economically, in a very short time. We feel strongly that the placing on the shoulders of the Jewish and Arab leaders in their states the full responsibility for their own future will be in some ways the best guarantee of its success. That may be too hopeful a statement, but as long as someone else is responsible, the people who are most concerned are not likely to progress as rapidly in their thinking and actions as when they must bear the entire responsibility themselves for those actions.

1. Reprinted from press release 297 of the United States Mission to the United Nations (IO files).
2. Made during the ninth meeting of Subcommittee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee. The United Nations has not published an official record of the 35 meetings of the Subcommittee. The United States Mission furnished the Department with the substance of these meetings, beginning with telegram 1078, October 24, and ending with No. 1250, November 22. These telegrams are filed under 501.BB Summaries and 501.A Summaries.
3. A transcript of the questions and answers which followed Ambassador Johnson’s remarks was issued by the United States Mission in press release 299, October 31 (IO files).