867N.01/10–3047

The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to Mr. Eraser Wilkins, at New York

top secret

My Dear Fraser: With reference to your letter of October 25th1 transmitting the revisions of Annex A made by the U.S. Delegation’s Palestine group, we feel in NEA that those revisions have been premised upon certain basic assumptions which may or may not prove to be valid and that these revisions in essence incorporate major policy decisions with respect to the future of Palestine, with some of which decisions the Department was not previously familiar.

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The assumptions upon which the proposed revision of Annex A appear to be based seem to be the following:

(1) That the British will remain in Palestine until July 1, 1948. (2) That, if they so remain, they will be willing to implement the plan being developed in Sub-committee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine. (3) That leaders in both the proposed Arab and Jewish States will cooperate in the implementation of this partition plan so that by July 1, 1948, the governments of those States will be organized and in full operation. The validity of each one of these assumptions is highly questionable.

Two substantive changes proposed by the New York revision of Annex A would be so far-reaching in their effect upon the future of Palestine that they represent major policy decisions:

1.
The New York revisions omit the majority report’s requirement that neither the Jewish nor the Arab State shall attain independence until it has given to the U.N. and incorporated in its constitution certain fundamental guarantees for the Holy Places and the protection of minorities and until it has stated its adherence to the Economic Union for Palestine. Since independence is to come to Palestine automatically on July 1, 1948, it is entirely possible that one or both of the phoenix States born of partition will come into existence on that date without having fulfilled any of the conditions originally believed to be essential by the Majority of UNSCOP and previously approved on that basis by the Department.
2.
The New York revisions omit the majority report’s provisions that, in case only one of the proposed Palestinian States attains independence by establishing a provisional government and fulfilling the conditions required of it by the U.N., the problem shall be referred back to the U.N. Since the Economic Union, deemed by the UNSCOP majority to be absolutely essential to any partition plan, is dependent upon the existence of two Palestinian States, the existence of one State only in actual operation would render the entire plan for Economic Union void. The U.N. would have no further control over the situation since the hypothetical States would have become independent. Of course, this change in the UNSCOP majority plan appears to obviate the necessity for any decision upon implementation during a transitional period. In fact, it will probably mean that the issue will arise again in the U.N. as the result of the chaos which will ensue in Palestine after July 1, 1948.

One further comment of a minor nature: The New York revisions propose a Commission, selected by the General Assembly and headed by a High Commissioner, to act as the agent of the General Assembly in facilitating Palestine’s transition to independence. This would result in a situation whereby there would be two authorities running Palestine in the brief period up to July 1, 1948. No indication is given as to the relationship which will exist between the present Mandatory Power and the General Assembly Commission.

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In other words, confusion will be worse confounded even for the brief period in which Palestine will continue to have a single well-organized government.

As stated in the first paragraph these are the views of NEA, and not necessarily those of the whole Department. Perhaps there have been policy decisions upon which these revisions are based, of which we are not aware. If this is the case we would like to know the substance thereof, and would be glad to endeavor to obtain formal clarification of the Department’s views, if requested by the Delegation.

Sincerely yours,

Gordon P. Merriam
  1. Not printed.