501.BB/10–2947
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)1
NEA has been asked to comment on the attached memorandum to you from Mr. McClintock of SPA.2
In this memorandum the position is taken that the U.S. has but one course, which is to give full support to the partition plan for Palestine and see that it is passed at this Assembly. On the other hand, it is stated that the only practicable solution which can obtain a decision at this Assembly is to have the British administer Palestine until July 1, 1948, on which date the Jewish and Arab States would be constituted de jure, and that although trouble would ensue it might by various means be kept within bounds.
The first suggestion would have us not only support partition, which is what we are doing and presumably will continue to do, but also carry the banner for partition.
NEA is convinced that none of the palliative arrangements suggested in the detailed portion of the memorandum under consideration would have the least effect on the Arab attitude. If we carry the flag we shall inescapably be saddled with the major if not sole responsibility for administration and enforcement which, we gather, neither the Congress nor the American people are willing to undertake. NEA and, it is believed, important Departments of the Government are unwilling and unprepared to accept the losses to the U.S. position in the Middle East which would be bound to follow an aggressive partition policy.
[Page 1196]We are also convinced that the alternative suggestion is impracticable. The British will not carry on an interim administration of Palestine leading to partition. An unenforced partition would lead to outside intervention from the Arab States, the Soviet Union and, eventually, ourselves, in one form or another. A complete stoppage of immigration until next July would be impossible. An all-Jewish constabulary in a Jewish state containing nearly as many Arabs as Jews would be difficult to justify.
On the assumption that we are going to follow our present policy of supporting partition without waving the flag, we agree that partition will probably fail of a two-thirds vote. Our people in New York feel that time is working against partition as more and more of the delegates come to appreciate the difficulties. However, if partition fails, we do not see that the U.S. or any other country which has supported it would be inhibited from retreating to some compromise plan which would receive a two-thirds vote.
If worse came to worst and United Nations could not vote out any definitive solution, it would be in order to propose a temporary trusteeship with fairly substantial immigration, ending in a plebiscite in Palestine.3
- Sent through Carlisle H. Humelsine, Director of the Executive Secretariat in the Office of the Secretary of State.↩
- Dated October 20, p. 1188.↩
- The McClintock and Henderson
memoranda were sent to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Armour) on October 24 by the Deputy Director of
the Executive Secretariat (Reams). Mr. Armour, in a memorandum of
October 29 to Messrs. Humelsine and Reams stated: “I agree with the
position taken in Mr. Henderson’s memorandum that none of the
palliative arrangements suggested in SPA’s memorandum would have any effect on the Arab
attitude.
“I feel that our policy should be to continue our present position which, as I understand it, is to support partition but not to attempt to influence the attitude of the other delegations; in other words, not to carry on a crusade or to assume active leadership for partition as Mr. McClintock’s memorandum would clearly have us do.
“I see no reason to bother Mr. Lovett with this matter unless Mr. McClintock particularly desires to have his views brought to the Under Secretary’s attention.” (501.BB/10–2947)
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