501.BB Palestine/10–2247
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
| Participants: | Mr. Shertok, Jewish Agency |
| Mr. Epstein, Jewish Agency | |
| Mr. Henderson, NEA | |
| Mr. Mattison, NE |
Mr. Shertok opened the conversation by expressing gratitude for the United States position in supporting the majority report of UNSCOP.
[Page 1197]He stated that lie had come down to Washington to maintain his contacts with the Department of State. He wanted us to know that it had been decided that Mr. Epstein would return to Washington from New York. I assured him that we were always glad to see Mr. Epstein.
Mr. Shertok asked whether it would be possible to elaborate further on the United States proposal with regard to a U.N. Constabulary. I informed Mr. Shertok that this had been put forward by our delegation as a suggestion, not as a detailed plan, and that in our opinion this was a matter which could most properly be elaborated within the U.N. Sub-committee.
Mr. Shertok advanced as his tentative thinking, and not that of the Jewish Agency, that the U.N. force would probably be only a token force with the moral authority of the U.N. behind it, and that the actual police force be recruited and maintained by the separate states. He felt that the Jewish State would be able to handle this but might need equipment from outside sources.
Next Mr. Epstein mentioned that they were considerably disturbed by rumors that were prevalent that would-be immigrants to Palestine embarking from Rumanian ports were, in fact, communist agents. I informed Mr. Epstein that we too had heard such rumors, but were not inclined to place too great credence in them.
When Mr. Shertok admitted that endeavors were being made to introduce large numbers of Rumanian Jews and Jews fleeing from the Soviet Union into Palestine I expressed concern lest the emphasis on aiding these Jews to get to Palestine might interfere with plans for the relief of Jewish DP’s in Germany. I said that the Jewish Agency had been apparently so deeply interested in the fate of these Jewish refugees in Germany that I was surprised to see the efforts of the Agency directed towards Jews from Rumania, Bulgaria, Russia, etc. Mr. Shertok replied rather warmly that the Jews from the Black Sea area were also displaced persons fleeing from hunger, other hardships and from Soviet domination. I said that what Mr. Shertok said with regard to the Jews of the Black Sea areas might apply with equal force to most of the inhabitants of that area. We were sorry for all these peoples but we had a special responsibility for the DP’s in Germany and would regret it if Palestine would be filled up with Black Sea Jews before the DP’s in Germany were given an opportunity to go there. Mr. Shertok said that the Agency could not be unsympathetic to any unhappy Jews anxious and ready to go to Palestine.
Mr. Shertok then stated that he understood that Abdullah of Trans-Jordan was renewing efforts to obtain United States recognition.1 The Jewish Agency saw no objection to such recognition, but hoped that if [Page 1198] it were done that we would make clear that we did not expect Abdullah to use his troops against Palestine. I thanked Mr. Shertok for his expression of views and stated that they would be given full consideration.
Mr. Shertok then said that the last point which he wished to take up was the fact that there seemed to be considerable uncertainty among certain Latin American States as to which way they would vote on the UNSCOP report. The Arab Delegations seemed to be creating the impression that the United States had not really meant what it had said in supporting the majority report. Would it not be possible for the United States Delegation to correct this impression with certain South American countries, and state that we would consider it a friendly act to follow our lead and vote for the majority report?
I informed Mr. Shertok that we were extremely anxious that any solution of the Palestine problem be a United Nations solution, and that we not give the impression that it was an “American solution”. The advantages to all parties concerned were readily apparent. Any attempt by the American Delegation to “corral” votes for the majority plan by “armtwisting” tactics would inevitably lead to the impression that that plan was an American plan. If any Latin American delegation had doubts about the American position it was free to approach our delegation. They would undoubtedly receive assurance of our sincerity in supporting the position outlined by Mr. Johnson.
- For information on the attitude of the United States toward recognition of Transjordan, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, p. 798.↩