501.BB Palestine/10–2147
Memorandum by Ambassador George Wadsworth to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)
Subject: Palestine: Important Arab Démarche Envisaging Possibility of Compromise Settlement.
1. Mr. Beeley, Palestine expert of the British delegation, phoned me this morning to ask that I make an appointment with him alone to enable him to discuss a matter of importance. We arranged to lunch together.
2. At lunch he began by saying that he had been charged by Nuri Pasha, head of the Iraqi delegation, with communicating through me to General Marshall the following important facts and suggestions relative to the possibility of Arab-American agreement on Palestine settlement:
Some ten days ago Nuri Pasha had approached Emir Faisal with his long-rumored proposal as to how the Arab States might contribute to the finding of “a plan of Palestine settlement-by-agreement”.
Their discussion dealt in fundamental fashion with both substance and procedure. Both were important to Nuri’s proposal. As to substance, it was based on what has been referred to as “cantonal settlement.” As to procedure, its sine qua non was Arab-American agreement at highest level.
[Page 1193]Nuri had persuaded Faisal that only King Ibn Sand: a) Possessed sufficient influence in the Arab World to induce the Palestine Arabs, under the leadership of the Mufti, to modify their present position; and b) Was in a position to conduct profitable negotiations in the matter with the United States Government.
Faisal was impressed by Nuri’s arguments and submitted the proposal to his father. Ibn Saud concurred, on condition that it and his intervention have the full, unequivocal support of all the Arab delegations and their firm commitment to abide by any agreement he might conclude.
With this reply in hand, Faisal and Nuri met with the heads of the other Arab delegations. The only other person present was Dr. Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister, in his capacity as co-head of the Iraqi delegation. No other Arab delegates have been taken into their confidence.
The unanimous consensus of the meeting was that the King’s conditions should be accepted and that Faisal and Nuri should lay the matter before General Marshall provided it could be ascertained in advance that he would wish to receive them. On this point Faisal recalled that, at the end of his last discussion with General Marshall on October 9,1 the Secretary had expressed a ready willingness to discuss at a later meeting any matters of importance to American-Saudi relations.
The present proposal was deemed to be such a matter. It was that, after preliminary discussion here with General Marshall, the American Government should charge its Minister at Jidda, Mr. Childs, with receiving King Ibn Sand’s personal assurances in the matter and with discussing it in detail with him.
3. Beeley then explained that this Arab démarche appeared to be based on the premise, with which he agreed, that no compromise Palestine settlement-by-agreement was possible by direct negotiation between Palestine Arabs and Palestine Jews but that, if such settlement could be reached between the Arab and American governments, they in turn could bring the two peoples to accept it.
Partition, they argued, was only a suggested solution-in-extremis which the Arab peoples would in honor bound be forced to resist. There were other possible solutions. “Cantonization” was one of these. It was in line with the findings of the 1946 Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry and with the ensuing Morrison–Grady discussions. It might not be too late for the American and Arab governments to consider it in the light of present circumstances.
4. In conclusion, Beeley explained why Nuri had preferred to charge him with this communication, rather than to make it directly to me. The reason was that, should General Marshall feel that the American [Page 1194] Government was so firmly committed to Partition as to preclude its discussing any other solution, it might be better were his démarche to be permitted to “die” as a subject of conversation between us (Beeley and myself) rather than that it should have been raised as a formal question between the Arab and American delegations.
If, on the other hand, General Marshall should wish the matter pursued, it would, of course, be entirely appropriate for me or Mr. Alling to approach Nuri and Faisal directly with a view to obtaining their direct confirmation and, he personally hoped, to arranging the suggested meeting.
Should the meeting be arranged, Beeley believed that Nuri and Faisal would wish to be accompanied respectively by Dr. Jamali and Saudi Minister Ali Reza (as interpreter).
5. Let me add the following personal comment touching on the background of this démarche:
Nuri has long been known to us who have worked in the Near East as an exponent of a “moderate” compromise solution. As long ago as 1937, to my personal knowledge, he had discussions in this sense with Dr. Magnes, the then Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, and others.
Further, in Nuri’s last conversation with me in Baghdad (early last July before he left Iraq to accompany the Prince Regent on a visit to London) he gave me clearly to understand that at some appropriate moment he hoped to review his efforts for compromise solution.
Later, in August, reports were rife in the Arab capitals, that Nuri (who is the main pillar of strength of the Hashimite dynasty and of the British position in Iraq) had discussed his “plan” when in London and had obtained informal British approval.
Finally, since the opening of this General Assembly, we have had several indications that some such démarche as this might in due course be made to us.
Consequently, I venture to suggest that this present démarche is not one induced solely by recent developments in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine but may well be the culmination of Nuri’s known long interest in the problem.
It is significant, too, that it is advanced jointly by highest Hashimite and Saudi representatives whose long-standing rivalries in the Arab World have been exacerbated of late months by Hashimite pretensions in the Greater Syria matter. Only vital common interest could so soon have brought them to this common démarche.
- Memorandum of conversation, October 9, not printed.↩