Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BB/10–2947

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

secret

[Washington,] October 20, 1947.

Following a brief visit to the Delegation in New York City and conversations at Lake Success with various Delegates and newspapermen, the conviction grows on me that we must take a more decisive line with regard to Palestine.

I have in a previous memorandum² outlined the reasons why I think that, irrespective of parliamentary dialectics, the British are bound and determined to pull out of Palestine. It is true that last Spring they requested the General Assembly to advise them as to the the future government of that country and that now they have changed the emphasis by saying that they are not willing to be responsible for the government of Palestine except in carrying out a solution acceptable both to the Arabs and to the Jews, which is the same thing as saying that if someone can square the circle or find the fifth dimension they are willing to stand by a little longer. I think in view of the fixed British intention to withdraw from Palestine, which has been reflected in a Cabinet decision which in turn reflects an overwhelming popular opinion in the UK, that for us to debate parliamentary points and suggest that a new resolution be placed before the Assembly which would change the emphasis from advising the British on the Government of Palestine to proposing outright a scheme of government for that country would involve us in tedious debate and arrive at no more advantageous result than to illustrate further the complexity of the Palestine problem.

Last Saturday in conversation with Dr. Evatt, he three times referred to the “American Plan” favoring the majority report of the Special Committee on Palestine. My demurrer that this was not an “American Plan” and that the joint Swedish-American resolution had been introduced merely as a convenience to the Committee and at his own suggestion in no way altered the Australian Foreign Minister’s view that the U.S. was the exponent of an “American Plan” for Palestine the essentials of which were partition into a Jewish and an Arab State.

Dr. Evatt suggested that the best line of approach would be to appoint a subcommittee to work out details of the majority report before testing the sentiment in full committee as to whether or not the majority report should be favored in principle. Dr. Evatt thought that this would avoid double debate.

I think that the procedure suggested by the Chairman is most unwise. Unless the principle of partition is accepted in first instance it will be fruitless to elaborate the details of a solution along the lines of the majority report. At the same time it was apparent to me at Lake Success that the Arabs are increasingly confident that even if the ad hoc committee on Palestine accepted the Majority Report as the basis of its recommendations they could muster sufficient voting strength to defeat a detailed plan for the partition of Palestine at the Plenary Session.

[Here follow two paragraphs setting forth Mr. McClintock’s observations concerning various delegations at the United Nations.]

As the facts of the situation exist (which is not the same as saying what the facts ought to be) these conclusions are evident:

1. There is an “American Plan” favoring the partition of Palestine.

2. The “American Plan” can possibly obtain a majority vote in the Palestine Committee but it will fail of receiving a two-thirds majority vote at the Plenary unless a more active line is taken by the U.S. Delegation.

3. If the Partition Plan fails of acceptance at this assembly we shall be involved in a most unpleasant mess.

[Here follows a paragraph of further observations by Mr. McClintock.]

It may be urged that failure of the Assembly to accept the partition scheme by a two-thirds majority would leave the case open for solution by our “switch position” or by some form of compromise more or less along the lines laid down in the minority report of the special Palestine Committee. I think, however, that in view of certain Jewish pressure which may be exerted on many delegations if the partition scheme is not accepted, and in light of the fact that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have come out in favor of the partition plan, there is no possibility whatever that such a compromise scheme would receive the necessary two-thirds vote of the Assembly.

In light of these conclusions it seems to me that we have only one course: firmly to support the majority plan for partition of Palestine and to see that it is passed at this Assembly.

This firm course should be modified and mollified not only by the territorial adjustments which we will propose as amendments to the majority plan but also by a constructive effort to help the Arabs. I was impressed, in talking with Ambassador George Wadsworth, by his remark that the Greater Syria scheme³ would be a successful antidote to the discomfort of the Arabs in a partitioned Palestine, if Abdullah of Trans-Jordan were not to benefit thereby and if in consequence Greater Syria were a Republic with its capital at Damascus. Such an enlarged Syria would, in the Ambassador’s opinion, be able to absorb the Arabs of Palestine and leave a Jewish State in the Holy Land whose lineaments on the map look less like a crazy quilt than does the map of the majority report. As a second suggestion Ambassador Wadsworth said that, if the Iraq irrigation project ever materialized, land could be offered to the Palestine Arabs infinitely richer and more attractive than the stony hills of Judea on which they now scrabble for existence.

I asked the Ambassador if he would formulate his views in a draft statement which might be used, if not in open debate, at least in private during high level conversations with Delegations in New York.

I think also, in the direction of modifying the rigor of the majority report so far as the Arabs are concerned, a close look should be taken at the workability of the proposed economic union of the Arab and Jewish States. Last week I requested Mr. Mattison⁴ to ask the economic side of the Department to give us a critique of this section of the majority plan. In New York I heard considerable talk to the effect that the Jews did not like the economic union idea and that the Arabs thought it unworkable. If neither side wants economic union there might be some possibility of improving this aspect of the report by developing economic plans which would be more effective in the long run in providing both new states with livelihood.

I cannot refrain, on concluding this unconscionably long memorandum, from repeating what to me seems to be the only practicable solution which can be reached at the present time.

The British have said in effect they will withdraw from Palestine as quickly as possible. I am told by a very experienced foreign correspondent who travelled with UNSCOP on its wanderings in the Holy Land and in Europe that the British can get between 60,000 and 70,000 troops out of Palestine within six months but that totally to evacuate their present forces and civil service personnel will require at least a year. If this is true it would seem to me that if the Assembly recommended that the Jewish and Arab States be constituted as of July 1, 1948 the British would perforce have to be the administering authority during this much shortened transitional period.

As a sop to the Arabs I would propose that there be no Jewish immigration into Palestine in the interim period. After all, the Jews have been waiting 2000 years to get back to Palestine and they certainly can wait eight months before resumption of immigration on a controlled but increased scale.

As for the security aspects of such a solution, I have the feeling that there will result an uneasy but nevertheless actual balance of power as between the Jewish and Arab States. Mr. Nat Barrows of the Chicago Daily News, whose judgment I value, tells me that the present Palestinian Constabulary consists of 25,000 excellent troops divided as to origin between the Arab and Jewish races. It seems to me that this body could be allocated on a racial basis to the two new States and could almost automatically form Jewish and Arab Constabularies under separate commands. This would relieve us of the potential embarrassment which our constabulary suggestion still involves. I am told that in the Jewish State the Jewish Settlement Police are an able outfit, that the Commandos of the Irgun and Stern Organizations are exceedingly tough and well trained and that, in sum, the Jewish military strength is considerable. Opposing this strength it would seem that the Arabs also can muster forces which would make up in fanaticism and courage what they might lack in training in modern warfare.

If the numbers of the present constabulary were reinforced by these elements of military strength in the two separate states and then, if from outside, pressure were brought on both states to keep the peace, the balance of power I visualize might well result. By outside pressure I contemplate not only remonstrance by the United Nations either by the Assembly, the Interim Committee, or the Security Council, but also immediate and affirmative action by the U.S. Government to prevent our own Jews from sending additional supplies of war to their brethren in the new Jewish State. Assurance to the Arab Governments that we would take such action on condition the Arabs for their part keep the peace would, it seems to me, have effect.

The foregoing suggestion is submitted in full realization of the fact that there is no solution for the Palestine problem which will please both the parties at issue or which will, at least in the immediate future, make it possible for the Holy Land to live up to its name.

1. Addressed also to Mr. Henderson.
2. To Mr. Rusk, dated October 16; it set forth three alternative policies, in view of “the fixed British determination to wash its hands of Palestine”, namely a United Nations trusteeship; a “Trieste-type of Government designed to fulfill the obligations of the temporary administering authority until such time as the Jewish and Arab States are established”, i.e., centering on a Governor with wide powers, appointed by and answerable to the General Assembly; and a “recommendation by the Assembly that the transitional arrangements of the Majority Plan be telescoped and that the Arab and Jewish States be constituted de jure immediately.” (501.BB/10–2947)
3. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 738 ff.
4. Gordon H. Mattison, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.