891.6363/8–1447: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
752. Soviet Ambassador Sadchikoff, who recently returned to Tehran from Moscow called on Qavam two days ago under instructions and insisted that the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement of April 4, 1946, be presented to the Majlis promptly for ratification without change. Sadchikoff told Qavam “The Soviet Cabinet has decided that the agreement should stand as originally signed and that the Majlis will ratify it”, according to Qavam, who related the conversation to me today. Sadchikoff handed Qavam a written proposal embodying the original agreement and adding a provision that following Majlis ratification a detailed convention would be drawn up within three months setting up the Joint Petroleum Development Corporation.
Qavam replied that there was no possible chance that the original terms would be accepted by the Majlis and that friendly relations between Iran and USSR would not be improved by insisting on formal Majlis action. Qavam suggested that Sadchikoff ask his Government for authority to enter into further negotiations which Qavam expressed willingness to undertake. Sadchikoff refused saying that the matter had been thoroughly considered by the Soviet Cabinet, every member of which had agreed upon his instructions. Qavam said that if the Soviet position was irrevocable he had no recourse but to submit the proposal and would do so, even though merely to have it rejected. Sadchikoff said that if it was rejected his Government would immediately demand an oil concession in northern Iran on the same terms of the British concession in the south.
Qavam replied that when the AIOC concession was originally granted in 1901, Iran was under an absolute monarch who could do anything he wanted and that similarly when the AIOC concession was renewed in 1932, the Majlis was under control of a ruler who could obtain any ratification he desired. Qavam said he could not possibly force the present Majlis today to ratify another concession along AIOC lines. The conversation terminated with Qavam’s statement that he would take matter under consideration.
Qavam asked me what I thought of the Soviet Government’s action. I said that at first thought it seemed to me the Soviet Government had made the situation much easier for Iran. If Sadchikoff had shown willingness to negotiate, the Iranian Government might have been faced with long and difficult negotiations during which heat might well have been generated. At best the long existing uncertainty would have [Page 932] continued. Since Moscow insisted on the agreement being submitted without change it seemed to me he had no choice but to do so as he had promised last year. We all knew the Majlis would reject it. Such action might create tenseness at the moment but would clarify the atmosphere permitting attention to be directed subsequently to more productive matters. I expressed confidence that the USSR had already come to the realization that it would not be able to obtain any kind of oil agreement with Iran and was maneuvering to save face and to obtain as much propaganda value as possible out of the situation. I thought the demand for a concession on same terms as the British would be intended purely as a propaganda move and (I doubt that any Communist state could actually undertake to operate a commercial enterprise in accordance with many of the British terms) the maneuver might have some short-range propaganda advantages to the Soviets since a refusal by Iran to grant to USSR the same terms Britain has, would make Iran appear unneutral. Moreover, Soviets probably hoped that their maneuver might at least make the British oil position in Iran more difficult to maintain if the Soviets could not get one themselves.
It seems questionable to me that threatened Soviet maneuver will ever be carried out. When time comes to act, it will be most difficult for the USSR to demand a concession on the same terms as the British concession which Soviet spokesmen in Iran and elsewhere have so frequently castigated as the worst type of capitalistic exploitation. It seems to me at least on first examination that Soviet decision to press for ratification without change and to threaten if refused to demand the same terms as the British is a serious diplomatic blunder.
Sent Department 752; repeated London 88.
Department pass Moscow 82.