891.6363/8–1547: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
759. Prime Minister has just sent his confidential representative Izaz Nikpey to tell me that Soviet Ambassador telephoned Qavam twice yesterday, in petulant and peremptory mood, speaking through Persian-speaking Soviet Embassy interpreter. First call was to ask why Qavam had not sent someone to Embassy to sign “new oil agreement proposed” by Sadchikoff on August 12 (Embassy’s 752, August 14). Qavam replied that he had agreed to take Soviet suggestions under advisement but had not understood that any new agreement had [Page 933] been proposed. Qavam pointed out that Sadchikoff’s “new agreement” embodied exact terms of old and would not obtain Majlis approval. Sadchikoff repeated demand for prompt reference of proposals to Majlis.
Second call was to accuse Qavam of delaying tactics which Soviets would not permit. Sadchikoff repeated that Soviet Government had decided to insist on original terms and that there was therefore nothing for Iran Government to do but comply. Qavam repeated invitation to enter further negotiations and invited Sadchikoff to come to see him. Soviet Ambassador terminated conversation by saying he had conveyed his Government’s demands to Qavam and did not propose to come to see Foreign Minister on the subject again.
Nikpey remarked to me that Soviets were clearly determined and serious this time. Nikpey showed obvious evidences of fear, possibly reflecting attitude of Prime Minister. He made strong plea to me to encourage the Shah to support Qavam in this [omission] situation so that Qavam could take firm position in face of this Soviet attack. (Qavam’s supporters in Majlis although a majority have not yet been able to organize the Chamber and Qavam [omission] opposition on intrigues by the court).
I expressed confidence that Qavam himself could benefit by latest Soviet tactics and could solidify his position not only with the court but with all patriotic Iranians by taking firm and resolute action on Soviet oil question. I thought he had a clear responsibility as Prime Minister to let both Shah and Majlis know exactly what the Soviet representations had been. If he showed courage and determination his position would be greatly strengthened, if he showed fear or even uncertainty, I felt confident he was finished.
Sent Department 759; repeated London 90.
Department pass Moscow 85.