891.014/8–647: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
urgent
703. In conversation with Qavam yesterday held at his request, PriMin said he had received reliable reports that Soviets were increasing their forces on Azerbaijan frontier, including tank units. I said we had no confirmation of any such increases, but he insisted that his reports were authentic. He said he had already requested Soviet Charge to come to see him and would ask purpose of this concentration. I said I thought this was appropriate if he felt his information sufficiently well founded.
As regards Soviet oil question, PriMin told me in strictest secrecy (“only between you and me personally,” he said) that he had in mind a plan which would delay matter for perhaps two years. He would hire neutral geologists, perhaps from Sweden or Holland, to find out just where oil exists or is most likely to exist in northern Iran. He [Page 930] would tell the Soviets that the Majlis would not agree to any large concession area and that it was, therefore, necessary for Iran Govt to have exact technical information in advance so that any concession agreement entered into could be confined as nearly as possible to precise locality where oil wells would be. He felt confident that Soviets would, turn down any such proposal, but that Iran would be in a better position before the world if the Soviets were the ones to refuse. He said that even if Soviets accepted, his plan would prevent any Soviet personnel from entering Iran for petroleum purposes until precise area had been defined, which might take “very long time.” Qavam asked my views regarding his plan.
I said the American Govt’s position was that the question was within Iran’s sovereign right to decide, without outside influence or pressure from any source. As for my personal view, I did not believe it possible for Iran to enter into any agreement involving Soviet exploitation of petroleum in Iran which would adequately safeguard Iranian interests, since any such agreement would necessarily involve the eventual entry of Soviet personnel into Iran, and all such personnel would be political agents no matter whether oil drillers, scientists, or what, and no matter how small the concession area might be. Qavam nodded agreement, and said his plan would put off the entry of any Soviet personnel pending clarification of the world situation.
He said Soviet Ambassador, Sadchikoff, would return to Tehran next week, “at which time we will begin our battle.” He said he expected Soviets would insist upon the agreement as reached last year and that when he refused, they would change their characterization of him from the “wisest statesman of the Middle East”, as he was termed by radio Moscow in April 1946, to “the worst Fascist in the world.”
For the past two months Qavam’s closest associates have been coming to me with assurances that Qavam would handle the Soviet oil question in a “brilliant manner” when the time came. The plan Qavam outlined yesterday is evidently the one to which they have been alluding.
While I did not say so to Qavam, I am inclined to think there may be some merit to his plan if he does not go beyond his proposals as explained to me. However, I am somewhat uneasy lest he retreat under Soviet pressure.
Sent Dept 703; repeated London 84, Dept pass Moscow 76.