Office of the Historian

761.91/6–1447: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

secret
most immediate
Tehran, June 14, 1947—2 p. m.

506. During conversation with Prime Minister this morning, held at his request, he told me that Soviet officials in Moscow had recently warned Iranian diplomatic representative there that it would be “very dangerous for Iran” if the Iranian Government procrastinated regarding the Soviet oil proposal. The Prime Minister said that during an interview he gave correspondent of Le Monde (Paris paper) yesterday, he stated for publication that newly elected members of Majlis had already indicated that Majlis would not approve Soviet oil proposal if presented in present form, that failure of the bill to pass would be an indignity both to him and to the Soviet Govt, and that consequently lie would not submit the existing proposal to the Majlis. He said that further negotiations were therefore necessary before the proposal could be submitted to Majlis with any likelihood of passage.

The Prime Minister told me that he had no doubt this statement, when published, would create an explosion in Moscow. In view of recent Soviet activities in Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria and Mongolia the Prime Minister seemed genuinely afraid that Soviet reaction against Iran might extend even to invasion. He requested me specifically to ask my Government to inform the Soviet Govt at this time that the American Govt would support fully Iran’s right to make its own decisions with regard to the petroleum question and would “make a declaration of hostilities against Russia in case Iran, a member of the United Nations, should become the victim of aggression in this matter”. I told the Prime Minister I would report this request to my Government and ask for an early reply.

The Prime Minister’s request places in bold outline question which has been formulating in Iran ever since the Turkish Greek policy was [Page 914] announced. Iranian officials believe that American support for Greece and Turkey would extend even to armed hostilities if either of those countries were the victims of open Soviet aggression. They are not certain with regard to Iran and feel that their greatest danger lies in this uncertainty. If the Soviet Govt knew definitely that an attack on Iran would mean armed hostilities with the United States, they feel that the Soviet Union would not attack. They are afraid, however, that if any doubt on the subject is allowed to continue in the Kremlin, Iran, may become the victim of aggression.1

Dept pass to Moscow as 62.

Allen
  1. Telegram 509, June 15, from Tehran, reported that during the same conversation, Ambassador Allen informed Prime Minister Qavam that the “question of the opening of the Majlis was not a matter in which the US had any concern or interest one way or the other.” The Ambassador made this clear because of rumors in Tehran that the delay in the opening of the Majlis resulted from the American Embassy’s advice to the Prime Minister, assumedly out of fear that, the Majlis, if convened, might approve the Soviet oil concession.

    The Ambassador had already expressed his personal view to other Iranians that the Majlis should be convened promptly, since the continual delays in the elections and in the opening of the Majlis would bring into disrepute the Iranian Government’s profession of adherence to democratic processes (891.00/6–1547).

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