891.00/6–1647: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
urgent
511. Embassy’s 506, June 14, to Moscow 62. During course of a conversation with Qavam June 14 Prime Minister also spoke of serious financial difficulties of Iranian Govt and its inability to meet its minimum daily requirements not to mention needs for social improvements so necessary to prevent spread of Communist influence. He asked specifically whether the US Govt could (1) grant to Iran free of charge the military supplies being negotiated for in Washington at present and (2) support at the proper time Iran’s application for credits from International Bank. The latter request was prompted by recent press reports that the US would not support Iranian application.
In connection with military supplies Qavam referred to our action in Turkey and expressed conviction that Iran was in greater danger of attack than Turkey. His reasons for this belief are: (1) Iran’s military weakness, (2) Soviet anger over Iranian procrastination in the oil question, (3) the fact that Soviet control of Iran and Persian Gulf area would be of great strategic value to USSR since it would deprive the Western Powers of the closest bases from which the Baku fields could be attacked and at the same time would bring the oil resources [Page 915] of the Persian Gulf under Soviet domination and (4) most important the fact that Soviets have become convinced following Truman Doctrine1 that US would support Greece and Turkey militarily if attacked but that USSR might occupy Iran without provoking a world war. Qavam pointed out that prior to Truman Doctrine each member on UN could rely on the equal protection of the US in view of our declared determination to support UN and to prevent aggression anywhere. However, following our specific references to Greece and Turkey other states not mentioned could not avoid feeling somewhat less certain about our support than previously. He thought the Soviets undoubtedly would now concentrate on [Iran?] where our policy had not been quite so explicitly and publicly manifested.
I pointed to frequent statements by the President and yourself, especially the unmistakable implications of your Harvard speech2 which have made it abundantly clear that our determination to support the UN has in no way been weakened but rather strengthened and implemented by the Truman Doctrine. The Prime Minister repeated that he felt certain the time had come for a further manifestation concerning Iran to make it clear to Iranians but more particularly to the Kremlin that we would regard with equal seriousness an attack on Iran as on Turkey. Our support might take the form of granting military supplies free as we were doing to Turkey or special representations to Moscow regarding Iran (Embassy’s 506) but he hoped very much we would do both.
I went over the same ground last evening during a long conference with the Shah, who expressed the same fears and desire as Qavam. The Shah emphasized that our aid to Greece and Turkey seemed largely designed to strengthen their armed forces to resist or avoid aggression and he felt that strengthening the Iranian Army would be of value to us for the same reason. The greater Iran’s power of resistance the more USSR would hesitate to send troops across the border. If Iran could be occupied by one division the Russians might do so but if several divisions were required the Kremlin might hesitate.
It is difficult for me to evaluate the correctness of Iranian opinion that a Soviet attack on Iran is likely, but the fears of many Iranian officials in this regard are undoubtedly considerable. I must agree, moreover, that from the Iranian Govt’s point of view and perhaps from the Kremlin’s some representations to Moscow on our part regarding Iran would be salutary at this juncture and might possibly arrest any ideas of aggression against Iran as may be developing in [Page 916] Moscow. Suck representations to be effective here should be made public shortly after presentation.
As regards the granting of military supplies I told both Qavam and the Shah that I thought it highly desirable to go ahead with the signing of the military credit agreement under the provisions already drafted in Washington. Any suggestions now regarding more lenient terms of any kind would merely cause delays and failure of the agreement to be signed promptly would be misinterpreted. I pointed out that a grant of supplies would require Congressional action impossible to achieve at this time in any case. Both Shah and Qavam agreed but asked me to present their request to Washington for whatever consideration possible.
A denial by Dept of the report current here that we have already decided to oppose the International Bank credit would be most helpful.
Sent Dept 511; Dept pass Moscow 64.