891.796/6–347: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
442. I called on Prime Minister Saturday to discuss again question of Iranian Airways, since American employees of company had determined to terminate their contracts immediately unless their dollar salaries were paid. Qavam agreed to permit company to purchase $5000 per month at official rate of exchange to pay American salaries.
During long conversation, held in presence of Ministers Finance Hajir and Minister Posts and Telegraph Nikpey, a significant political discussion took place. I explained American interests in Iranian aviation question as being not only to avoid failure of an enterprise with which American name was connected, but also to assist Iran to develop commercial aviation industry of its own. In latter connection, Minister Posts and Telegraph said greatest single cause for Iran Air[ways?] difficulties was unauthorized Soviet competition inside Iran. Qavam said he was not in position at present to ask Soviets to discontinue their unauthorized air activities here, since Soviets were quarrelling with him about many other things and he was disturbed lest USSR might take forceful action against Iran if Iran Government did not handle situation carefully. He referred to reports of Soviet troop concentrations in Caucasus and asked what US was prepared to do in case Iran was attacked. I reminded him that he had asked a similar question twice during past year and that each time I had been instructed to say that we would assist Iran to maintain its independence to extent Iran showed its own determination to do so. Qavam said we had never stated precisely and exactly what we were prepared to do. He referred to situation in 1902 [1911] when Russians gave 24-hour ultimatum to Persians, demanding expulsion of American Economic Mission headed by Morgan Shuster.1 When American Government did nothing, Russians sent own troops to expel Shuster. Qavam wanted to know whether we would act any differently now if similar situation arose. I replied that he was last person from whom I would have expected to hear an expression of doubt as to American policy since he, more than any Prime Minister in world, should be aware of determination of US to make United Nations succeed and to maintain respect for its principles. If our actions in Security Council on behalf of Iran had not convinced him, I was not certain anything could.
While conversation was maintained on friendly basis, Qavam was quite aware that I thought his doubts about American policy were not in good grace after the events of the past year. Discussion terminated [Page 913] with Qavam’s request to talk with me privately in near future regarding Soviet situation.
I am by no means certain that Qavam is genuinely afraid of Soviet aggression against Iran. It is more likely that he wants to keep alive local fear of such aggression for his own purposes. He would like to be considered the indispensable Persian who alone can maintain friendly enough relations with USSR to avoid an actual attack. In this way he retains his position as Prime Minister.
Sent Department 442, repeated London 65. Department pass to Moscow as 55.
- For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 679 ff.↩