Defense Files: Telegram
The Commanding General of the British and United States Forces in Trieste (Airey) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
top secret
Trieste, 22 November
1947.
052/SEC (Taf 52). Further to Taf 45.
- 1.
- In view of the continued delay in appointment of a governor for the FTT and general uncertainty as to the future, I appreciate that the Jugoslavs now consider that they must obtain a share in the control of the Anglo-American Zone as a matter of paramount importance. They must realize that unless they do so AMG will continue to consolidate, US relief measures will take effect and Slav-Communist influence will lose ground.
- 2.
- For the same reasons I am convinced that it is equally important that no form of Jugoslav participation in the government of this zone should be allowed. The consequences have already been discussed in previous Tafs and I need only say now that in spite of continual review of the situation I see no reason to alter my views. The large number of official, semi-official and clandestine Jugoslav organizations already established in Trieste provide a sufficiently dangerous commitment.
- 3.
- The demand for the establishment of a tripartite hq in Trieste, recently presented to US and UK Governments, constitutes the second carefully thought out attempt to achieve the Jugoslav object. It is therefore most important to consider what course the Jugoslavs are likely to adopt in the event of the failure of this second attempt and to be ready with a clear cut policy and plan to counteract it.
- 4.
- At a meeting which took place yesterday in Capo d’Istria between economic delegations from the two zones it was apparent that the Jugoslav position had hardened and their delegation had clearly received a new brief to agree to nothing that implied that the two zones should remain separate. There was an attempt to engage AMG in a joint denunciation of trivial and harmless articles which had appeared in the leading Italian newspapers both newspapers in the UK/US Zone and more significant refusal to accept our description of the frontier as the “Inter-zone boundary” which they preferred to describe as “The ex-Morgan Line”. In adopting this attitude the Jugoslav authorities are no doubt attempting to build up their case against AMG before the Security Council. That their refusal to recognize the inter-zonal boundary may be the prelude to further attempt at direct action can not however be excluded. This might take the form of casual and intermittent but increasing penetration by small bodies of troops or it might follow the pattern of the night of 15th/16th September, [Page 127] carried, however, to its logical conclusion. In either event since penetration, if not immediately assisted [resisted] would undermine our whole position I feel that we must be prepared for some such attempt on the basis of the Jugoslav arguments referred to above. In this connection it is noteworthy that the Jugoslav detachment formerly stationed in zone “A” under the Duino Agreement now forms part of the contingent of 5,000 in the Jugoslav Military Zone. Any attempt to establish troops within our zone would therefore probably not start from the direction of the areas newly ceded to Jugoslavia, but from the Jugoslav Zone of FTT. In the light of their experience on the night of 15th/16th September the Jugoslavs would be less likely to enter the UK/US Zone by way of frontier road posts, but might cross between them. In view of the very short distance between the inter-zone boundary and the city of Trieste (5 miles) this presents me with a difficult military problem.
- 5.
- I have accordingly issued orders for the defense of Trieste in such an emergency based on the premise that any Jugoslav attempt to enter the UK/US Zone by force will be met as a last resort by force.
[
Airey
]