860S.00/11–2247: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser (Joyce), at Trieste, to the Secretary of State
180. I see use of cable justified for following report, due to delays in courier service, and by fact developments in UK–US zone Trieste have reached point where decisions on policy level cannot longer be postponed without risking serious deterioration Anglo-American position here. British and American Military Intelligence agencies working with my British colleague and myself have just completed situation report, which will be discussed with Generals Airey and Moore, head AMG and chief planning staff, and will presumably be cabled by Airey to CCS within few days. This report will represent best thinking available here and its conclusions will be carefully considered and weighed in light of best information obtainable. What follows represents endeavor to present Department with highlights of administration UK–US zone by AMG. This material designed to provide background for Airey’s report which will cover mainly military and strategic considerations. I believe development of Communist strategy in France and Italy and present Yugoslav tactics vis-à-vis Trieste lend [Page 128] degree of urgency these reports and make desirable review Trieste position on high policy level Washington.
I. Military Governor’s Council.
- 1.
- Please refer General Airey’s communication dated October 16 addressed to Secretaries CCS and entitled “Organization of Military Government UK–US Zone FTT.” Airey considered AMG organization inadequate to meet new conditions following R Day and establishment FTT, and that firmer structure required to maintain integrity UK–US zone, to guarantee security of population and to provide standard of administration high enough to preserve Anglo-American prestige. This decision based upon (a) prospective long period before appointment of governor; (b) need for strong military government to resist increasing Slavo-Communist pressure both from without and within; and (c) necessity for maintaining morale and confidence of population. Airey discussed his plan for setting up council of government with me and requested I take up with General Moore as it involved replacement of American head AMG. Moore and I agreed completely with Airey and on October 21 head AMG was relieved and departed for US immediately.
- 2.
- AMG after R Day was floundering and AMG officers were being presented with multiplicity of problems of economic, political, fiscal and psychological nature, which, by training and experience, only very few were capable of even understanding, much less coping with. American head AMG was routine officer without, knowledge of civil affairs. He could with best intentions provide no leadership and morale within AMG was ebbing. There were interminable meetings, wooly thinking and wrong decisions were being taken on important policy issues on low levels. Airey was justifiably concerned and finally decided to set up “inner cabinet” to meet, briefly every morning and review developments, agree on policy on government level, and take firm decisions in situation where decisions must be made quickly. Airey presides as “Military Governor in Council” and council made up of Commanding General TRUST, British and American PolAds, American head AMG and chief planning and advisory staff, who is Regular Army British Colonel. British and American elements thus balanced on top level. The existence of council not publicized.
[Here follows part II. “American Element of AMG”.]