860S.00/11–1747: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

top secret

3693. Reference Trieste’s 162, November 6; Belgrade’s 2199, November 8; Trieste’s 167, November 12;1 all to Department. Views on Trieste [Page 125] settlement attributed to British Foreign Office have been discussed informally with staff of British Embassy here. Some are convinced that city’s eventual annexation by Yugoslavia is foregone conclusion. Others feel that partitioning is only ultimate solution but admit that it can not be prospected in immediate future. Their reasoning is that finalization of problem by division between Yugoslavia and Italy would be a greater bar to Yugoslav aspirations for city than present provisional status; they are apparently concerned about possibility of being pushed into sea and corresponding loss of face.

As do we, British here consider that US–UK initiative in proposing partitioning scheme now would be detrimental to our position vis-à-vis Yugoslavs and extremely harmful to our prestige in Italy. In fact, British generally feel that timing is of utmost importance and incline to view that any proposal should await impending major European developments. While aware that formal Yugoslav initiative would place the Italian Government in a difficult position, with Communist Party claiming credit for solution or attacking on nationalistic grounds if proposal rejected, British state they have no firm ideas as to ramifications involved in Italian initiative. In any event, rumors thus far indicate basic conditions of each side differ so materially on such important questions as boundaries, demilitarization and local government that bi-lateral accord between Italians and Yugoslavs is improbable.

Italian Foreign Office official has told us De Stefano2 (now in Rome) pressing Foreign Office for revision treaty clauses regarding Trieste along lines suggested by British, i.e., return Zone A to Italy and leave Zone B to Yugoslavs. This official continued that Italian Foreign Office has in mind initiating such proposal through some UN delegation but first desired know US opinion in the matter. He was told we would weigh the problem and discuss it later.

Inference is that British and Italians may have already discussed this problem, and we gather British Embassy Washington has at least informally broached it to Department. Before discussing it further with either Italians or British, would appreciate Department’s views on whole subject, and particularly on my firm contention that any association by us now with initiation of proposals wherever generated for partition of FTT would gravely prejudice our strengthening position in Italy. Next spring situation may of course have progressed sufficiently to enable us to review our stand.

Sent Department; repeated Trieste 92 and Belgrade 134.

Dunn
  1. Not printed; in it U.S. Political Adviser Joyce reported that after a long discussion with General Airey, British Political Adviser Sullivan withdrew his conclusions in his appreciation of the situation in Trieste as reported in telegram 162 (860S.00/11–1247).
  2. Mario Di Stefano, Minister in the Italian Embassy in Washington.