852.00/12–3047
The Chargé in Spain (Culbertson) to the Secretary of State
No. 4402
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegram No. 1047 of December 26, sent in response to the Department’s telegram No. 904 of December 19.1
It was with considerable hesitation that I finally let the reference telegram go; first, because I was not satisfied with its presentation and, second, because the suggestion of an attempt to obtain a cooperative effort on the part of the major Spanish factions probably looks like, and may be, daydreaming. Nevertheless, I am naive enough to think it has a possibility of modest success.
[Page 1100]The opposition elements inside and outside of Spain have been living in the false expectation that we and the other powers would unseat Franco and place them in control. None of these elements has ever seemed to figure out the mechanics of this change. In fact, they have probably never tried. They have lived on negative opposition to Franco and have kept in the forefront of international condemnation of Franco. In my estimation Don Juan has played more for international reaction and approbation than he has to the internal situation in Spain. Gil Robles and Prieto cling to the hope of positive international action against Franco. Visions of sanctions and sugar plums dance through their heads. The destruction of Franco has been so uppermost in their minds they have failed to see in the situation a possible development resulting in the destruction or near destruction of Spain herself, economically and possibly politically.
On Franco’s side, he has been cursed and condemned by all the world. No loophole has been left for him in any of the announced policies of the United States or other powers. With nothing but opposition to confront him, Franco has had two alternatives: one, to commit suicide or, two, to pull in and tighten the dictatorial reins. He is not going to commit suicide, unless it be in the form of pulling the temple down on himself and thus on the Spanish people.
Our policies, for whatever reason adopted, have failed and continue to fail to obtain material political and economic liberalization for the Spanish people. We say, quite rightly, that it is for the Spanish people to determine what they want. At the same time our policies tend to exclude those people who, for whatever the reason may be, support Franco and who are not prepared to plunge into the unknown.
I am not up much on Vatican attitude toward Spain but I am willing to wager that deep down the Vatican is going to be most reluctant to take any step which will open the door to the return of a situation such as existed under the Republic. I am sure that even those elements in the Spanish church which object to Franco would object to the Vatican taking such a step. The Vatican may move toward Monarchy. If it moved to tell Franco he must go at once, I can see division within the Spanish church. Were the Vatican to urge upon Franco, the Church and the Monarchy the need, in the general interest of Spain, for cooperative efforts, such action would eliminate, at least to some degree, the Vatican taking a step which might well develop or accentuate division, especially within the Church.
I doubt whether Prieto could be brought to the point of any kind of cooperation with the present regime, and I am inclined to think it would be a mistake even to try. Not only Franco but lots of people in Spain would find it difficult to accept Prieto. (Even the country laborer [Page 1101] who carried my gun on a partridge hunt last week expressed violent objection to Prieto.) There are, however, some men of the Left here in Spain, and after all they mean more in the future evolution of Spain than all of the exiled Republican leaders put together. One of those here in Spain (Señor Tomás Peire) has already expressed to an officer of the Embassy his growing conviction that cooperation with Franco seems to be the only remaining solution.
“Evolution” as opposed to “revolution” (last sentence, paragraph 7, Deptel 903 of December 18) should mean, as I see it from here, evolution of the present, from the present to a future improved governmental structure. If I see it correctly, cooperative effort in place of antagonism is the only possible solution and it is worth a try.
In order to obtain cooperation from the opposition, those gentlemen will have to swallow some pride and, at the start, subordinate some of their ideological thinking. I doubt whether that would be a very great task for Gil Robles, for instance.
Franco, on the other hand, is called upon to give a bird in the hand for two in the bush and he will at least want to see the color of the birds in the bush. If one glitters with gold and the other is the blue of friendliness, I think he will come along. No man is likely to refuse a friendly hand that would lift him from the international pit where Franco now rests, and this in spite of the fact that Franco seems to feel that he has been chosen by a higher power to lead Spain and the Spaniards out of the wilderness. I have a hunch he will come down to earth. He is very likely to do so if, in the face of an economic crash, real economic aid will be given to Spain and thus economic, as well as possible political, disaster can be avoided.
On the question of economic policy I feel I’ve got to stick my neck out by saying that the easing up of present economic and financial restrictions, as outlined in the ultimate paragraph of the Department’s telegram No. 903, will in my estimation have practically no effect (a) on the economic situation in Spain or (b) in bringing about evolution politically or governmentally. For that reason I suggested in the Embassy’s telegram No. 1047 the implementation of our policy by present willingness to consider direct governmental assistance. I appreciate that such action may be out of the realm of the practical from the standpoint of problems in Washington, but I suggest it as the practical one for Spain if we want to keep Spanish economy from going to pot.
Respectfully yours,
- Telegram 904, not printed.↩