852.00/12–2647: Telegram
The Chargé in Spain (Culbertson) to the Secretary of State
1047. American policy toward Spain is based on opposition to Franco and his concept and practice of government. It looks to his [Page 1098] complete withdrawal. Comment on Deptel 903, December 18 would be easier if I knew whether Department prepared deal with Franco subject his adopting gradual, effective (not “window dressing”) economic political liberalization. (Last part paragraph 2 Embdesp 4337, November 251). Franco’s removal is question for determination Spanish people (or Spanish army) but fact is he is “in” and the “outs” are of two distinctly different breeds of cat—monarchists and left, each completely disorganized and each basically opposed each other vis-à-vis ultimate political control and means determining expressed will of people. This despite any eventual Robles-Prieto agreement. Since our published policy says Franco must go completely he will hang on and is not likely adopt substantial effective modifications government except possibly in immediate face economic disaster and then measures, if any, may well be too late. While majority Spaniards oppose Franco regime (not necessarily Franco himself) majority also fear results his precipitous removal and this passive support enough keep him in. If we, England et al, Vatican, monarchists, the left would adopt policy trying find, with Franco, cooperative solution in interests Spain and western countries. I think pressure would be so great Franco would liberalize and in time be eased out of power, particularly if we prepared accept restoration monarchy and monarchy prepared accept gradual transition from present complete Franco control to liberal democratic monarchy. I see trouble in abrupt transition.
If positive policy of cooperation feasible in place present kick-Franco-out-now-policy, US contribution to solution Spanish problem would be (a) sell all elements including Franco on practicability of cooperative solution and long term democratic results and (b) economic assistance, both governmental and private. (I recognize (a) not easy but believe possible.)
Increasing jitteriness here over economic situation indicates moment relatively opportune use economic assistance as leverage obtain modification and liberalization. Uncoordinated piecemeal private credits, probably in limited amounts because of risk involved, not likely have effect on economic policy and certainly none on political. My suggestion therefore we implement policy outlined reference telegram by willingness consider now governmental assistance coordinated with private credits.
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