Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

853B.7962/7–2647: Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

secret

Lisbon, July 26, 1947—noon.

582. For Reber. I was requested to call at Foreign Office yesterday afternoon by Dr. Faria, Director General of Political Affairs, He told me that great consideration had been given to our note of July 3 on the subject of the Azores, and that the Prime Minister and other members of the Portuguese Government were quite agreed to according US transit facilities for Army aircraft servicing American occupation forces in Germany and Japan. Before communicating a note formally to me, however, he desired to acquaint me with the position of the Portuguese Government. He then produced an unsigned document dated July 25 which reads in translation as follows:

• “1. Within the spirit of friendly understanding which has animated the Portuguese Government in its relations with the Government of the United States regarding the facilities granted in the Azores to American aviation, and having in mind the situation resulting from the expiration on December 2, 1947 of the agreement of May 30, 1946 the government is disposed to grant for a period to be determined upon, to North American airplanes of the ATG servicing occupation troops in Germany and Japan the right of transit through the Lagens airdrome.
• “2. It is known that the execution of the program resulting from the technical agreement negotiated between the military authorities of the two countries for the carrying out of the May 30th agreement is well advanced and it will be practically terminated on the date of the expiration of the latter agreement. For this reason all of the services of control, maintenance and technical aid should be turned over to and exclusively executed by Portuguese services of the Lagens base which will be in a position to render the necessary assistance.
• “3. In order to carry this out it is necessary that there be ceded, under whatever arrangement, the American material which is at present in Lagens and which material the United States Government undertakes to provide substitution or replacement.
• “4. The Government of the United States should take for its own account warehousing of aviation spare parts for the airplanes in transit and to maintain civil personnel for the maintenance of the airplanes in a number to be agreed upon.
• “5. For the execution of this concession the Portuguese Government would like the Government of the United States to agree to: (a) Authorize the contracting by Portugal authorities of some American personnel which may still be necessary, and during the indispensable period, to serve on the base; and (b) to advise through the intermediary of its technicians the Portuguese Government regarding improvements which may be desirable to introduce in the field or in its services.
• “6. The concession granted to the Government of the United States under the new agreement will be extended for the same period to the British Government.
• “7. The Portuguese Government would appreciate it if the American Government would take under consideration the eventual competition which the airplanes of the ATC may be giving to private companies whose airplanes utilize the airdrome at Santa Maria.” Portuguese text follows by air pouch.

Dr. Faria in conversation amplified somewhat the text of the foregoing document. With regard to paragraph 2, he quoted the Minister of War as being definitely of the opinion that the Portuguese could take over all the technical services on December 2. I replied that I disagreed entirely with regard to the ability of the Portuguese to take over the aforesaid services. Dr. Faria pointed with pride to the operation of the Lisbon airport. I replied that the Lisbon airport was the cause of consternation to the American airlines; it did not even have equipment for a blind landing. ATC would never be satisfied with conditions like those in Lisbon. Concerning Paragraph 3 Dr. Faria stated that the Portuguese Government was willing to take over American equipment in the Azores either by purchase, loan or lease. With regard to 4, I expressed great doubt that the American Government had any civilian personnel that could be provided. Also I told him ATC would require its own personnel, maximum 677, minimum 382. They would have to be in uniform and could not and should not be disguised as civilians. With regard to 6, I expressed complete satisfaction that the Portuguese Government should extend whatever concessions it might wish to the British. With regard to 7, I denied that there was any competition worth mentioning between ATC and private airlines.

My interview with Dr. Faria lasted one hour and five minutes. I gave him all the orthodox arguments for Portugal’s collaboration with the US in the conformation of the American war effort in Germany and Japan. Since the explanation by Dr. Faria made it more than clear that the Portuguese concept is that everything in the Azores shall be completely Portuguese operated and controlled without any American military personnel or responsibilities, I told him that the formula, as tentatively proposed, would be in my opinion, utterly unacceptable. Indeed I was convinced that ATC would infinitely prefer to leave the Azores rather than to remain there on anything that even remotely resembled the present proposition. Dr. Faria talked about Portuguese susceptibilities. I told him we had susceptibilities too. I asked him why there was no reference to the suggestion of a mixed commission. He replied that this was approached indirectly in five ways. The approach seems very indirect.

After my reiterating the complete unacceptability of the present Portuguese formula, he expressed the hope that I would nevertheless communicate it to my government and in the meantime he would communicate my objections to the Prime Minister.

I think there are two schools of thought in the Portuguese Government with regard to the Azores problem. One, represented by the Foreign Minister and Teotonio Pereira, Ambassador designate to Washington, is conciliatory. The other, headed by Athias [Mathias] and probably by the Minister of War and perhaps with the legalistic and sympathetic support of Dr. Salazar, is one of most reluctant acquiescence to anything. The Foreign Minister left July 20 for Paris. Dr. Mathias, who is now Minister designate to Paris, was to have accompanied him. Apparently Mathias stayed behind and left only yesterday. I think the document and what Dr. Faria said were the fruits of his labor. It was understood between me and the Foreign Minister that the question of the Azores would be suspended until his return. Thus, this interview today came as a surprise. My suggestion is that as soon at Teotonio Pereira arrives in Washington the Department talk to him frankly and that any instructions to me be postponed until the return of the Foreign Minister, probably about the middle of August. I think we can proceed faster and better in this matter by making haste slowly.

Wiley