853B.7962/7–1447: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
536. For Reber. My wife and I spent weekend motoring through northern Portugal as guests of Foreign Minister. After dinner Saturday night I informed him briefly of the recent visit to Lisbon of Colonel Warren and of the interviews Colonels Warren and Tibbets1 had with the Minister for War2 and General Cintra.3 The Foreign Minister was very interested and said he would immediately confer with Minister of War and would see Cintra upon latter’s return from Azores where he now is; the Foreign Minister would then see me.
I told Foreign Minister that we had certain practical problems in the Azores that I would like to work out in principle with him, namely, certain repairs were needed in connection with gasoline storage installations, arid that it was very desirable during the few remaining summer months to bring in and store the winter’s supply of gasoline because of weather conditions in the Azores after October 1. The Foreign Minister seemed slightly upset about this and referred to the great Portuguese susceptibilities and the need of finding a “formula”. I was able, I think, considerably to reassure him. He promised also to discuss the question with me shortly.
The following day, Sunday, seated in the back of the car, the Foreign Minister raised the Azores question at great length with my wife. He insisted on his great desire to consolidate Portuguese relations with the United States. He is convinced that war is inevitable and that in this critical period collaboration of all nations sharing the same moral aims is indispensable. He thought that in foreign relations there were issues that must be kept above the bargaining level. There were many with small minds everywhere who considered international agreements as purely business propositions and thought only of what they could derive therefrom in a material way. Happily, however, Dr. Salazar was in complete agreement with him that concessions Portugal might grant to the US in the Azores should not be on the basis of a quid pro quo.
Dr. Salazar, he went on to say, wanted very much to see me as soon as possible. He, the Foreign Minister, was anxious to have this interview take place while he was still in Lisbon. (He departs the twentieth for Paris by motor.)
[Page 1028]Foreign Minister then discussed colonial questions: Macao means nothing in a material sense to Portugal; it is a small, inconsequential spot that is an economic outlet to nothing and is in no sense a political bulwark. Yet the historical tradition in Portugal is such that if Portugal’s precarious position there is worsened the repercussions in Portugal would be very great. Exactly the same situation applies to Goa and the two other Indian colonies. Moreover, there was much importance attached in Portugal to the role of the Patriarch of the Indies now in Portugal on the eve of returning to his ecclesiastical duties. On the subject of the Indian colonies he had made, a month ago, very strong representations. He considered the matter so delicate that he was keeping them entirely secret so as not arouse public opinion or popular emotion in Portugal. He showed great concern over the foregoing.
I am reporting this since it is tied in so closely with our Azores conversations. The coincidence is unfortunate that Portuguese colonial alarm should be so aroused at this particular moment since it makes their susceptibilities just so much more acute. It is obvious that we shall be obliged to use the utmost tact in every step in order to achieve our essential objectives.