865.20/10–1047: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
3185. Re Deptel 1863, Sept 27. Colonel Bathurst and his associates called on me and members of my staff October 8 and we had most useful exchange of views. In view of confusion which has arisen re aid to [Page 990] Italian army, I was particularly glad to see how thoroughly AGSI [ ASGI ?] has gone into matter, and believe their trip will prove well worth while.
In our discussion, I told Colonel Bathurst that my comments would be restricted to political aspects of question, on assumption that General Jaynes’ staff at MTOUSA had covered purely military aspects, on which I did not in any case feel competent to speak. I said that I considered it of utmost importance that we continue our efforts to assist Italy to establish and maintain a balanced army which would be capable of insuring both internal security and local defense of frontiers against guerrilla incursion or attack incident to an operation less than formal war. Colonel Bathurst agreed, and also agreed that the balanced force to which we refer should be as recommended by SAC and approved by CCS.
I also emphasized that Italy in its present state is not economically or politically able to provide required materials for itself, nor are the British able to assist. Colonel Bathurst pointed out that some of equipment considered necessary to establish balanced force is not available from US Army surpluses, and that legislation would in all probability be required to permit War Dept make such equipment available. He also noted difficulties of procurement in US at this time.
Re military mission, I said I consider such a mission highly undesirable from political viewpoint, in that its presence in Italy under present circumstances would, I believe, be source of embarrassment to and consequent weakening of present Govt. I added that my objections to military mission do not extend to possibility of assigning a few specialist officers to Military Attaché to instruct Italians in care and use of US equipment which we may make available to them.
In any case, any project for mission would have to have concurrence of Italian Govt; of course, if Italian Govt itself should unexpectedly ask for mission, situation would be materially changed. Colonel Bathurst said he believed that mission could be set up under President’s emergency powers, but that when these expire, legislation (as contemplated in military mission bill now before Congress) would be required.
Colonel Bathurst and I agreed that immediate consideration should be given to inviting Italian officers to attend staff, technical and tactical schools in US, possibility in which Minister of Defense and Chief of Italian Army Staff have already expressed great interest. Colonel Bathurst felt, however, that legislation would be required to permit any significant number of Italian officers to attend our army schools in US.
We discussed together question of Congressional approval in three matters mentioned above, and I expressed view that it would be most undesirable at this time to initiate debate in Congress confined to our [Page 991] military policies in Italy. Such debate might well upset the trend toward stability which De Gasperi Govt is beginning to show and might well defeat the very purposes it was intended to fulfill. Of course, if general legislation, without specific reference to Italy, were to be introduced and debated in Congress, this objection need not apply.
Throughout the discussion I emphasized both that my views are based entirely on present political circumstances, and that any program of military aid must be considered as part of an overall program of aid, of which AUSA now forms the most important and most obvious part. I said I do not believe the situation in Italy today is now analogous to that in Greece or Turkey but that of course crucial period will come during the winter. If De Gasperi Govt is unable to get over hump of winter distress, we may well be faced with serious deterioration of Italian political climate, necessitating a complete revision of our plans and procedures. AGSI pointed out that considerable time must elapse between initiation of emergency military planning and its implementation; accordingly, we agreed that it is desirable for our planning staffs at Washington to begin now to study and formulate plans including active military assistance, should need arise in Italy next winter or spring.
Colonel Bathurst also asked my views on possible desirable revisions of the peace treaty. I said that I do not believe it necessary or desirable in view of economic situation to seek at this time modification of the treaty limitations on Italian ground forces, although an upward revision might later become necessary if, for example, trusteeship of any of the colonies is assigned to Italy or aggression from outside were threatened. As regards air force limitations, I expressed view that present ceiling of 200 fighter planes is inadequate for minimum requirements of air defense and support of army, a situation which is both intrinsically bad and which may well adversely affect the morale of the army and air force. Accordingly, I believe we should sponsor modification of treaty designed to permit Italy additional fighter aircraft and to remove completely limitations on training planes. Air force personnel ceilings would have to be revised upward appropriately, and the US would, as in the case of the army, have initially to provide material assistance.