865.00/10–1047: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
3168. Our analysis of results of votes of confidence on October 4 fortified by information we have since obtained in conversations and from press is summarized as follows:
- 1.
- De Gasperi’s personal prestige was greatly enhanced more so than that of his party.
- 2.
- De Gasperi’s leadership within his party was strengthened. (During debate on no confidence motions it is reported that Gronchi,1 Demochristian, had approached Nitti proposing combination with him of “dissident” Christian Democrats to overthrow the government and presumably make use of Nitti’s prestige for formation of new government with Gronchi in prominent role. Nitti did not take to this maneuver as his attitude in debate showed and even it is reported informed De Gasperi of it.)
- 3.
- The extremist Marxian Parties emerged not only proportionately weaker, in parliamentary terms, but also somewhat discredited in absolute terms vis-à-vis the public. Three motions were voted upon: the further to the left the origin of the motion the greater the majority for the government (see despatch 1701, October 82). The total supporting votes remained virtually the same on all three counts while the votes against were (1) on the Nenni motion 178 with 63 abstentions; (2) on the Saragat motion 224 with 17 abstentions; and (3) on the Republican “order of the day” 236 with one abstention.
- Immediately upon the completion of the vote on the Nenni motion Togliatti withdrew the Communist motion; undoubtedly he preferred not to risk a greater defeat of the Communist motion than that suffered by the Fusionist motion.
- 4.
- The course of the vote should now strengthen De Gasperi’s bargaining position with the small moderate Leftist parties for admittance into the government to broaden its base (the Prime Minister in fact confirmed to me night before last that he planned to negotiate with these small parties after seeing results of Rome municipal elections October 12).
The most important result, however, of last week’s test may not come to light for a time although the new Communist manifesto setting up the Belgrade information bureau may hasten realignments and momentous decisions. (In accompanying telegram 3145, October 92 Lombardo’s program for Italian Socialism is amply reported. Present telegram should be examined jointly with that one.)
[Page 989]In a meeting a few days ago with members of the Smith-Mundt Committee the Prime Minister, commenting on the present situation, averred that the next big undertaking on his program is the breaking up of the Fusionist Socialists; the time and the tactics must be adopted to the end that segment remaining in Communist camp be as small as possible. (Again it should be mentioned that Communist tactics from Belgrade may influence De Gasperi’s and Lombardo’s timing.) It is surely not entirely coincidence that in the present Rome municipal campaign (see mytel 3117, October 73) the Communists are directing their violence against Saragat Socialist meetings only.
The reconstitution of single Socialist party aside from the problem of size of Left-Wing group which would merge with Communists is also, however, beset by problems of personalities. Saragat has advantage deriving from having split first but both in his group and in the center and right of Nenni group there are personalities with individual followings who may be expected to contend for leadership of reunited party.
There seems to be a move within bureaucratic circles in favor of getting Lombardo into the government soon as possible; but Lombardo himself notwithstanding his talent would not greatly strengthen government until he can speak for a mass following.
Despite the brighter prospects in Italy now of reunited moderate Socialist mass party allied with social democracy of Demochristians much if not all of progress toward moderation in Italy may be lost by election time, if this alliance is identified this winter with bread riots. This serves to point up the tremendous importance of continued support by us of forces of moderation; without promise of our long-term support and with ever present possibility of timely Russian shipment of wheat into Italy this winter the Communist party’s chances of gaining control of Italian Government through legal means would be immeasurably increased.
Sent Department 3168; repeated London 230; Paris 395; Moscow 160.