851.00/10–2447: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France
us urgent
4071. Personal for the Ambassador from Armour1 and Hickerson. We are dismayed by implications Palewski’s2 remarks contained your [Page 791] 4576 Oct 24.3 We appreciate that Palewski may in this conversation have been expressing only his own views but should these represent the motivating forces underlying any return of de Gaullist group to power in France, we fear the consequences. The press comment in this country while welcoming the anti-Communist polarization of political forces in France has nevertheless expressed extreme concern lest dictatorial methods imputed to de Gaulle will mean the substitution of a dictatorship of the Right for parliamentary methods. Should de Gaulle insist on constitutional changes and concentration of executive powers in his hands alone under the form of full powers as a condition to return to the govt, this will be interpreted here as the first step in this direction, gravely increasing the dangers of civil war and be so reflected widely by the American press thus further complicating the question of assistance to France.
The following represent our preliminary views with regard to the situation created by the municipal elections in France. You may use these in your discretion to persons close to Gen de Gaulle including André Malraux4 who we hope may be helpful in this connection.
It is vital to the interest of the US that the non-Communist polarization which may have to be centered around Gen de Gaulle succeed. While it is too early to determine the parliamentary and constitutional devices by which the Gen can translate his plurality at the municipal elections into the leadership of a govt, there is little doubt that he will be under increasing pressure from his adherents to return to power in the near future. Assuming the Gen takes power, it is well to review the principal obstacles to his governing effectively.
- 1.
- The first and most important of these is French organized labor, which is Communist dominated and even whose non-Communist elements have been in the past flatly anti-de Gaulle. It is not yet known here how many working class votes went to the Gen, but he has made no overtures to that class. A great deal depends on his success in persuading or as a last resort compelling French organized labor, which holds the key to France production and hence to the success or failure of the European Recovery Program. The position of the Socialist Party in this connection is of the greatest importance.
- 2.
- To French Communists, whose assigned target is the sabotage of the European Recovery Program, inflation represents a means to that end less dangerous than, if not an alternative to, a halt in production. [Page 792] The Communist dominated CGT has just announced demands for a new round of substantial wage increases for labor, which can only give new impetus to the inflationary spiral, and yet which in less extreme terms all French labor must regard as legitimate in the face of a retail price rise of 26 % since July.
- 3.
- The promise to maintain public order is one of Gen de Gaulle’s strongest appeals, yet production stoppages arising out of Communist inspired or supported strikes for increased wages may bring about disorders not easily suppressed and which if seized upon by either the Communists or Gen de Gaulle as a signal for a showdown, may lead to bloodshed.
It has been clear since the liberation that the isolation and ostracism of the French Communists was essential if France was to remain in the Western orbit. It was equally clear that politically speaking the break must come to the left of or at the very least in the middle of the Socialist Party. Translated into labor terms, the healthy elements of organized labor must be kept in the non-Communist camp. Otherwise the tiny production margin of the fragile French economy would vanish and the ensuing civil disturbances would take on the aspects of class war.
De Gaulle’s plurality reflects a thirst to be governed which has caused many of his new followers to abandon their moderate leaders. This thirst undoubtedly penetrates deep into the Socialist and labor union camp but has not been translated into downright adherence because of traditional and doctrinal reservations concerning basic social and political rights. It would seem clearly the part of wisdom for the Gen in the first instance to allay the susceptibilities and suspicions of this vital section of the French public by accepting power, if power is offered him, within the imperfect framework of the present constitution, leaving for the future the decision to insist on constitutional reform in the event that pressures for such reform do not spontaneously develop.
It seems certain that public and congressional opinion here will judge the Gen in the above light. [Armour and Hickerson.]
- Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.↩
- Gaston Palewski, member of the RPF and close associate of General de Gaulle.↩
- Not printed; it reported that Palewski had stated that if de Gaulle were asked to form a new government he would insist that the Assembly vote him “full powers” for a specified period to allow him to proceed immediately with the administrative, financial, and economic reforms that were necessary for the welfare of France (851.00/10–2447).↩
- Chief of the press section in the de Gaulle movement.↩