Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

851.51/10–2447

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

confidential
No. 9801

Paris, October 24, 1947.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a summary of the conversation between Foreign Minister Bidault and members of the Senate Appropriations Committee and of the Revercomb Sub-Committee, on October 17, 1947.¹

Respectfully yours,

Jefferson Caffery

[Enclosure]

Summary of Conversation Between Foreign Minister Bidault and Members of the Senate Appropriations Committee and of the Revercomb Sub-Committee

france’s two problems

(a) The Immediate Financial Crisis:

Mr. Bidault said that he was the first to deplore the lateness of France’s SOS appeal to the USA, and that it had not been possible to give more warning. “Nevertheless,” he added, “it is essential that we not be allowed to be asphyxiated.” He said that, while he had “no signed documents or positive promises” to this effect, he was “morally certain” that the United States would find means to assist France during the immediate crisis, and thus permit her to reach the second stage when Congress shall decide on the nature and extent of long-term assistance, based on Secretary Marshall’s proposals and on the findings of the 16-power conference.² “At the present time,” said Bidault, “we are being literally strangled, and I am very specially grateful in this emergency to all the Americans of both political parties whom I saw in Washington, and who were kind enough not to make me feel the humiliation of my position as a beggar for my country.”

(b) Longer Term Assistance to Cover the Three or Four Years Necessary for France’s Rehabilitation:

Mr. Bidault said that the fundamental situation in Europe could be compared to a huge wager between the Communist and anti-Communist forces. The non-Communists, including France and himself, have bet that the Marshall Plan will succeed, and that it will not mean “Germany first”, Germany of course to be included but “not first”. On the other hand, the Communists have wagered that Germany would “come first” and that the overall plan would be a failure. “I am sure we will win”, said Bidault, “but, of course, we can’t do so alone.”

Referring to the long-term assistance which France will need and to the important sums which this will involve, the Foreign Minister reminded the Senators that France in the past had made considerable loans to other nations and that she had not been repaid. Without giving any assurances of repayment, he said: “This time I hope the United States can make their effort with complete peace of mind that we will do our best.” Referring to the plan of European cooperation as an integral part of any long-term United States plan of assistance to Europe, Mr. Bidault declared that France had agreed on her own behalf to the necessary “production commitments”, as well as to the other commitments necessary to European and to her own rehabilitation. He mentioned in particular France’s efforts to arrive at a customs union with Italy and added: “We and the other 15 nations (of the CEEC) have done what we could and we shall continue to do so.”

The Economic Rehabilitation of Germany and Its Achievement “hand in hand” with Europe’s

Mr. Bidault said that he understood full well the necessity of rehabilitating Germany’s economy “which was an essential part of Europe’s”. Nevertheless, he said he could not quite subscribe to the “hand in hand” theory. Germany has coal, France has iron ore. “I think it more appropriate that Germany’s coal come first to France’s iron ore rather than vice versa.” He pointed out that the granting of a priority to Germany’s blast furnaces would make it necessary for the Germans to purchase iron ore abroad, be it French or Swedish, and that this will be either a commercial (foreign exchange requirement by Germany) or a sentimental detriment (unfavorable effect on French public opinion). Mr. Bidault begged his listeners to trust the French and “not assimilate them to Germans”.

With stop-gap assistance, together with eventual Congressional action on interim funds, can France maintain herself in a sound position free of Communist domination, so that she would be able to participate actively in any Marshall Plan?

The Foreign Minister answered that he wanted to be completely frank, and that the Senators “had come at the worst possible moment”. Without wanting to minimize the Communist peril in any way, he did, however, express his personal conviction that regardless of the means which they might have to employ, the anti-Communist forces in France were bound to come out on top: “I don’t know what will happen. I have no idea as to the form which coming events shall take. I don’t know whether I will long be at this desk. As a matter of fact, I don’t think it will be for very long, but, of one thing I am certain, and that is that France shall not be governed by the Communist Party. With reasonable assistance from the United States, and with the help of the mistakes which the Communists make on the internal French level as well as on the international plane, the French anti-Communist forces shall triumph.”

Are not the campaigns waged by France in Indochina and Madagascar serious drains on France’s manpower, as well as on her national economy?

Mr. Bidault answered that, of course, these campaigns were painful in every respect. “However”, he added, “if France’s pacification efforts do not succeed, Indochina will have a Communist government, and perhaps Madagascar as well.” He added that the Madagascar campaign was, “finished” but did not attempt to minimize the difficulties facing France in Indochina, “where we will be very generous with those who deserve it but where it is difficult to be generous with assassins”. He concluded with the following statement: “Don’t forget, gentlemen, that it is our main desire to finish with these costly and distasteful campaigns.”

What incentive is there for the workers to produce as much as possible?

The Foreign Minister answered that in France, as elsewhere, the workers’ output was not wholly dependent on governmental decisions. He did, however, point out that, to his knowledge, France was the only “truly democratic country with a 48-hour work week”. He added that other conditions were necessary, such as confidence in the national currency and confidence in general. Concerning short-term confidence, this was dependent on the internal political situation which “is rapidly coming to a climax. Concerning long-term confidence, this is largely dependent on foreign aid and on the willingness of foreign friends to help pull France out of a temporary quagmire. With confidence re-established, the time might come when France might have the wherewithal to pay back.”

As one of France’s major difficulties seems to be due to the farmers’ lack of confidence in the currency, what is the French Government doing to induce the farmer to part with his surplus crops? Are goods being offered instead of cash?

Mr. Bidault said that while “farmers always complain”, this year their complaints were justified in view of an exceptionally bad crop year (see Mr. Ramadier’s full explanations on this point). He added that the black market had “probably shocked his visitors”, but asked them to remember that during the long years of German occupation, non-compliance with the laws of the land had been preached as a patriotic duty: [“]We disobeyed the laws upon advice from London and from the United States. To re-establish a reign of law is difficult when people have become used to disobedience and to do so rapidly we would need a dictatorship”. As to payment for farm produce in kind, Mr. Bidault said that it was difficult, in view of the general shortage “of everything”. He also pointed out that often “when 10 percent is lacking, it is just as if everything was lacking”. Nevertheless, he said that the French Government had made a great effort to earmark as large a percentage as possible of consumer goods for the peasants and that, as a matter of fact, industrial workers and the white-collar classes were jealous of the peasants, feeling they were unduly favored.

Is it correct that, if the United States agrees to help France now, France would be willing to work out conditions leading toward repayment?

Mr. Bidault agreed that he had said “something of the kind”, but did not answer the question directly. He indicated that there should be “a business basis for the deal which would be mutually advantageous for both parties”. He, furthermore, asked that in making this deal, i.e.—aid to France, “which of course would have political implications”, there be no political conditions imposed in view of the unfavorable psychological reaction of the French public.

if Italy goes Communist, what effect will it have on France?

The Foreign Minister refused to admit that Italian political developments could have influence in France. “On the contrary”, he said, “I believe that political events in France will have an influence in Italy.” “In any event,” added Bidault, “I have reasons to believe that the fate of the Communist Party will be the same in both countries.”

With the world divided into two blocs, shouldn’t Germany be rehabilitated, so that instead of joining the Russians, she will join the Western bloc?

Bidault answered that we should have a better idea of German developments towards the end of 1947, after the London conference³ and said: “After all, when you think of the numerous times we have been invaded by the Germans, we haven’t treated them so badly.” He stressed the fact that, because of these invasions and of the Frenchman’s traditional fear of Germany, France “needed to be reassured on this point”.

What consequences do you think the recent re-establishment of the Comintern will have?

Bidault answered that, in his opinion, this development was only superficial and that, in fact, “it changes nothing”.

Would France be satisfied if American aid was in the form of goods instead of an unrestricted loam, in dollars?

Mr. Bidault answered that France only wanted dollars to spend in the U.S., and that these dollars would “not stick to France’s fingers”. He said: “As long as we can have the goods which we need, it doesn’t matter what form the transaction takes.”

Mr. Bidault concluded not only with an expression of thanks for the Senators’ interest but also with the plea that his frankness should not be misunderstood: “I am convinced that ours is a just cause, and it is whole-heartedly that I entrust it to you.”

1. Chapman Revercomb, of West Virginia, was chairman of a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, to study problems of immigration and displaced persons.
2. For documentation relating to the Marshall Plan and to the 16-power conference held in Paris in July to draw up a cooperative program of European recovery, see pp. 197 ff.
3. The reference is presumably to the 5th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, at London, November 25–December 15, 1947.