851.00/4–1847: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
1623. Mytel 1601 April 171 Discussing the Cabinet session day before yesterday at which the Communists were reported to have walked out because of opposition to rest of Cabinet’s stand on the Malgache deputies who were arrested for implication in Madagascar revolt a high Interior Ministry official stated his belief that “although the Malgache are not tied to Moscow as is the Viet Nam in Indo China,2 there is not the slightest doubt that the Communists prior to the revolt urged the Malgache representatives to resort to illegal insurrectionary action”.
My informant said that in leaking to the press what transpired at the Cabinet meeting yesterday “certain Cabinet Ministers including Teitgen”3 exaggerated somewhat the “menacing” attitude of the Communists with the view of placing the latter in the most unfavorable possible light before French public opinion. For example, the press [Page 700] story implied that the Communists walked out in the middle of the meeting threatening quit the government. My source says this not strictly accurate. When the meeting was almost over they withdrew with veiled but not open threats, but Thorez subsequently attended the restricted Cabinet meeting in the afternoon.
Nonetheless it is now clear that the Madagascar problem has become an issue which could lead to the fall of the Ramadier government. While Interior Ministry does not expect a ministerial crisis before the Assembly reconvenes on April 29 it believes that matters will rapidly come to a head immediately thereafter when the debate is opened on the status of the arrested Malgache deputies. My informant believes that if Communist deputies (in opposition to the other parties) do not actually vote against withdrawal of Parliamentary immunity of Malgache deputies they will, as in the case of Indo China, at least abstain. In light of behavior of Communist Cabinet Ministers day before yesterday he believes it possible that they also may abstain or even vote against the government. Such action could entail collapse of Ramadier’s government should either the Communists refuse to accept the majority’s will or should Ramadier or any of governmental parties refuse to remain in government because of this further violation of the principle of ministerial solidarity. In many respects there is therefore a close analogy between the new impending crisis and that which occurred recently over Indo China.
Speaking of the Communists present tactical position resulting from their stand on the arrested Malgache deputies my informant said that “they are in the difficult position in which they always find themselves when Moscow’s orders force them to adopt an anti-nationalist line”. He recalled that when Malgache deputies were arrested the Communist Cabinet Ministers did not protest and that for several days thereafter and “pending instructions from Moscow the Communist press played this whole story down and contended itself with simple announcements of the arrest. Subsequently when they received their orders openly to attack the government’s stand they obeyed loyally if somewhat unhappily since they know it will hurt them with the French public.” He explained their position as follows:
On the one hand Moscow, one of whose cardinal policies is the disintegration of existing colonial possessions not only so that Communists can fill the vacuum but also because it enfeebles the colonial power and makes it an easier prey to ultimate Communist domination, has ordered them to support at all cost colonial independence movements etc., which lead to unrest and weaken France’s hold on her overseas empire;
On the other hand by obeying these orders Communist Party (French) tends to isolate itself from the other parties which are firmly behind the present government’s policy and weakens its position [Page 701] with the average Frenchman, who although generally apathetic is nonetheless a flag waver insofar as the French Empire is concerned. Furthermore, in this particular instance since the present colonial policy is directed by Socialist Minister Moutet4 attacks against his policy tend to force the Socialists away from Communists at the very time when the latter have drawn closer on the De Gaulle issue. Such action of course strengthens De Gaulle’s hand since the latter has always maintained he is the only one who can save the French Empire.
In summarizing my informant expressed opinion that in the light of this most recent development re Madagascar and the possibility of other important developments in the colonial field (for example when the Algerian statute is debated next month) it is impossible to predict how the internal situation will evolve. This will depend largely on whether or not the French Communist Party receives orders (as he believes it will because of vital importance to Moscow) to support independence movements in French overseas areas even if it means breaking with the government. He said that while the French Communists have a certain liberty of action in choosing tactics to be employed in dealing with internal French problems, “on colonial questions they must follow Moscow’s orders to the letter regardless of the immediate damage it may do them with the French public”
I concur with the foregoing estimate of the broad lines of Communist strategy which is shared by other qualified observers (including a former Comintern agent) having intimate knowledge of Communist policy and strategy.
Sent Dept 1623, repeated London 308, Moscow for delegation 257.
- Not printed.↩
- For documentation on the situation in Indochina, see vol. vi, pp. 51 ff.↩
- Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Vice-President of the French Council of Ministers.↩
- Marius Moutet, Minister for Overseas France.↩