851.00/4–1147: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
1493. De Gaulle’s recent political activity, particularly his Strasbourg speech1 and the threat of more to come, have served further [Page 698] to agitate the already troubled French political waters and have created acute uneasiness in all political parties of the Center and Left. This “malaise” stems in large part from the fact that every party (except the Communists) realizes that De Gaulle represents a powerful role of attraction to a substantial part of its membership, and that De Gaulle is actually out to divide and destroy the individual parties as now constituted. (The MRP is particularly vulnerable to De Gaulle’s attack because of the basic cleavage between pro-Gaullist and pro-Bidault factions. The Rassemblement des Gauches is equally vulnerable because whereas the leadership of the UDSR is ardently Gaullist, a majority of the Radical Socialist elements would at present probably only support De Gaulle in the event they were given a choice only between him and the Communists). Furthermore there is anxiety concerning the steps by which he intends to seek to return to power and the possible “chain-reaction” his activity may cause.
De Gaulle has not yet decided on his strategy but his general aim is, as indicated above, to destroy the hold of the political parties on their followers so that large parts of their membership, including their parliamentary representatives, will transfer their allegiance to him. Counting on the disintegration of the political parties and his own very considerable public prestige, De Gaulle apparently believes that in the ruins of the present political party system he can rally a substantial majority and construct a strong coalition grouping all anti-Communist forces.
While such a plan of campaign may appear sound to De Gaulle’s ardent supporters, its practicality at this particular juncture is open to doubt. In the first place, in order for De Gaulle to succeed in forming a broad and successful anti-Communist coalition, he must have the support of working class elements and particularly of substantial elements of the vitally important trade union movement. As things now stand only Socialists can bring such support to De Gaulle. But the latter by his Bruneval2 and Strasbourg speeches has served notice on them that he is out to destroy the present government, which is, of course, essentially Socialist (my 1415, April 33). To defend themselves against this onslaught even strongly anti-Communist Socialists who under certain circumstances would work with De Gaulle have felt obliged for the present at least to make common cause with the Communists (who are determined to fight De Gaulle tooth and nail) on this issue. Thus the Communists who three weeks ago were isolated because of their stand on Indochina (and had in fact pushed the Socialists toward the center parties) now find the Socialists have been driven back into their embrace by De Gaulle’s action.
[Page 699]Certain Socialists and a few political leaders of the Center who have been working to establish a strong anti-Communist coalition are unhappy over the results of De Gaulle’s recent activity and believe it premature and ill-considered. They think it may set back their work of uniting anti-Communist forces and point out that actually De Gaulle’s activity may serve to divide anti-Communist opinion thus strengthening the relative position of the Communists who are not only united but can count at this time on Socialist support on at least this issue. They also fear that if De Gaulle accentuates his present activity the present Communist line of “moderation” may undergo brusque change and the Communists may react forcefully when anti-Communist forces will be not only still unprepared for a final showdown but (as a result of De Gaulle’s drive) will be perhaps more divided than ever. They point out that given De Gaulle’s deep hostility to both the French Communist Party and the Soviet Union the interests of both would best be served by doing everything possible to prevent him from again taking up the reins of government.
Sent Dept 1493; repeated Moscow for the Delegation 234 and London as 287.
- Speech made at Strasbourg on April 7, 1947, commemorating the second anniversary of the liberation of Alsace. In the speech de Gaulle appealed for national unity and spoke on the political, economic, and external problems facing France. The speech was followed by formation of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF).↩
- The speech at Bruneval on March 30, 1947, marked de Gaulle’s return to the political arena in France.↩
- Not printed.↩