840.48 Refugees/6–1947: Telegram
The Ambassador in Denmark (Marvel) to the Secretary of State
405. While I appreciate Dept’s desire to keep Greenland problem separate and not involved with other Danish problems, nevertheless I feel situation referred to in mytel 403, June 19,1 could be employed to advantage. There is no obligation upon US to accept additional refugees into US zone. However, as pointed out my Top Secret despatch No. 182, June 6, one effective threat Russians can use in retaliation to Danish acquiescence to American activity in Greenland is refusal to remove refugees in Denmark. If they do so, public reason given by Russians will be failure of other allies to accept 50% of refugees and real reason regarding Greenland situation will not be mentioned.
However, result will be to saddle Denmark with burden of one dollar per refugee per day.
If basis of Russian refusal to accept refugees can be removed, Russians will be faced with difficulty of explaining refusal to carry out Stalin’s promise.2 Consequently, I am of opinion that consideration should be given to receiving additional refugees, say up to 12,000 into US zone when approach is made by Danes.
[Page 672]While Russian pretext for not accepting refugees would thus be removed, Danes would fear such retaliatory action on some other pretext until all refugees were actually evacuated. Hence, no announcement of agreement on Greenland bases could well be made before such covenant completed. However, gratitude toward US for aiding in solving this problem might well fail to outweigh other factors, e.g., fear of other Russian action, national pride, etc., militating against Danish acquiescence in our wishes unless our agreement to accept refugees were based on quid pro quo of Danish agreement to accept some settlement assuring our continued control Greenland airfields. Consequently, I believe any offer to accept refugees should be so conditioned.
With this as initial bargaining point, I believe we should emphasize to Danes that the airfields are necessary link in our communications with Germany just as continued Russian activity in Hungary and Rumania is defended as necessary to assure communication with her troops Austria. Moreover, I believe fact airports and alternates are needed for commercial air traffic, particularly in case of SAS as well as AOA, should be stressed, as in case of Iceland. Ultimate solution may then be US commercial aviation operation these fields which, on basis foregoing reasons, might be made palatable to Danish Govt, and which they might well have nerve enough to accept.
Refugees in Denmark present distinct problem from refugees in South Schlesvig, and while above thinking in some respects along lines expressed my Top Secret telegram No. 348, May 24, it does not involve British zone, peace treaty, and other factors which Dept has correctly pointed out might place barriers to effective performance of promises.
- Not printed.↩
- In June 1946, Generalissimo Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, promised the Danish Foreign Minister that 100,000 German refugees in Denmark would be accepted into the Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany provided the other three occupying powers agreed to accept a similar number of refugees. For additional documentation regarding the problem of the German refugees in Denmark, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. v, pp. 189–193, 196–197.↩