859B.20/6–1747
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Danish Ambassador, Mr. Kauffmann |
| The Secretary of State | |
| Mr. Hickerson |
The Danish Ambassador came in to see me at 12:30 p. m. today. He said that he had asked for an appointment with me to say goodbye before leaving tomorrow to return to Denmark for about six weeks. The Ambassador added that he wished also to discuss briefly with me the Greenland situation.
Ambassador Kauffmann recounted the circumstances in connection with the conclusion of the 1941 Agreement. He said that one of the first acts of the Danish Parliament on the liberation of the country had been to approve that Agreement unanimously. He said that there is now a general feeling in Greenland that the war is over and that the time has come to terminate the 1941 Agreement. It was that state of [Page 670] mind, he said, that led to his being instructed about ten days ago to send us a note proposing consultation in accordance with Article 10 of the 1941 Agreement looking to a termination of that Agreement.
The Ambassador went on to say that he understands fully the American position: That Greenland is physically a part of the Western Hemisphere and that its defense is a matter of vital concern to the United States and the Western Hemisphere. He said that he had been discussing this whole matter realistically with Mr. Hickerson in the Department and that it was his hope that it would be possible to work out a satisfactory solution of the matter. He said that he intended while in Copenhagen to discuss the whole question in detail with his Government and that it was his hope that he would receive instructions which would enable him actively to discuss the problem with the U.S. Government on his return to Washington in August.
Ambassador Kauffmann said that he had been much gratified at the assurances given him by Mr. Hickerson of the State Department, General Norstad and Admiral Sherman of the War and Navy Departments, that the U.S. interest in Greenland was exclusively in defense and that any U.S. installations in Greenland would be of a defensive character. He added that it would be easier for Denmark to deal with the Greenland question along the lines desired by the U.S. if Canada and perhaps the American Republics were to the extent possible brought into the forefront of any new agreement. He said that he had been assured that consideration would be given to this.
I told Ambassador Kauffmann that I had had a good bit of personal experience with the Greenland question and that I could tell him that it is of fundamental importance to the security of the U.S. to keep an enemy state out of Greenland. I told him that we had faced the problem of driving the Germans out of Greenland in World War II, adding that the weather information which they obtained in Greenland had been a material factor in German offensive operations in Europe against us and our Allies. I added that I had had some anxious moments over British naval losses on the Murmansk route and the possibility that the Germans might again be enabled to get into Greenland. I said that relations between the U.S. and Denmark are of course excellent and that our apprehension would be met if we could be sure that our friend, Denmark, was in a position adequately to defend Greenland. I added that the Ambassador would doubtless agree that Denmark is not in such a position. Ambassador Kauffmann readily assented.
I told the Ambassador that I was gratified at the satisfactory nature of his preliminary conversations with U.S. officials on the subject. I said that the U.S. Government would, of course, be glad to endeavor [Page 671] to conclude an agreement along lines which would make it as easy as possible for the Danish Government to answer critics, some of whom would of course denounce whatever action was taken for their own selfish reasons. I said that we would gladly explore any ideas that might contribute to a satisfactory solution. I mentioned an idea which I had advanced for dealing with the Manus situation under which the U.S. would pay a certain sum of money annually to Australia and receive in return rights to use facilities maintained by Australia; the rights would include the rights to conduct maneuvers in peacetime and of course unlimited use in wartime. I said that I did not know whether this would be suitable at all in the Greenland situation.
I expressed my best wishes to the Ambassador for a pleasant trip and said I would look forward to seeing him in August.