Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

740.0011 EW (Peace)/4–1147

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] April 11, 1947.

Procedure on Deposit of Ratification of Peace Treaties

The British Ambassador¹ called at his request and left with me the attached Memorandum. I told him that I could not answer the questions contained in the Memorandum without thorough study and discussion within the Department. This would be clone at once and I would be in touch with him very soon. I made the following interim observations:

1. As a practical matter it would be impossible for the Department, in advance of Senate action on the treaties, to agree to any date for the deposit of ratifications. This came from the obvious fact that we could not know whether or not the Senate would have acted by a particular date and that to attempt to predict the action of the Senate in a note to other Governments would cause resentment on the Hill.²

2. In response to a question from him as to the present intentions of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee regarding Senate action on the treaties, I said that my present information was that Senator Vandenberg intended to resume hearings on the treaties after he disposed of the Greek-Turkish bill which might be about the middle of next week. It was possible that, if the Committee considered the treaties and reported them, the Senate might take them up toward the end of April. There was also the possibility that if the House should pass the Post-UNRRA Relief Bill next week, the Senate might act on that Bill before taking up the treaties.

3. In regard to the comments contained in the memorandum on the Italian attitude, which, as I understood it, was that they could not wisely present the treaty to their Constituent Assembly until after our Senate had acted upon it, I had told the Italian Ambassador that I did not regard this attitude as unreasonable. Looking at the matter from the point of view of the Italian Government, it would be in a most serious predicament if it ratified the treaty only to have our Senate either postpone the matter or reject it. I told the British Ambassador that the Italian Ambassador had said that Italian action would be a matter of only a day or two following Senate action and that, therefore, I did not see that this would delay matters.

Dean Acheson

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

confidential
Ref:41/162/47

Memorandum

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are anxious to ascertain the views of the United States Government on two matters relative to the ratification of the Peace Treaties with Italy, Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria.

(a) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom think it desirable that the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and the United Kingdom should all deposit their ratifications at the same time. Subject to the concurrence of the United States Government, they wish to suggest May 1st as the date on which this should take place.

(b) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom wish to enquire whether the United States Government think that it would be advisable to inform the enemy governments that the Big Four will not deposit their ratifications until the enemy states have ratified the Treaties.

2. With regard to the first point, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom could technically deposit their ratifications of the Treaties concerned forthwith, but they prefer to postpone action until the Treaties of Peace Bill (which would make the provisions of the Peace Treaties binding in the domestic legislation of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom) has been enacted. This should take place by the end of April and His Majesty’s Government should therefore be able to deposit their ratifications on 1 May. It is believed that the French Government should be able to deposit their ratification of the Italian Treaty, in which alone they are concerned, by about the end of April. No indication of the Russian attitude has been received. In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government the present uncertain position is unsatisfactory because there is a risk that one of the Big Four may try to gain some political advantage either by ratifying in advance of the other Powers concerned or by holding up their ratification. Furthermore, in the case of Italy it is impossible at present for the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government to give the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and the British and American forces in Italy a definite date on which to start their evacuation. There would therefore appear to be great advantage in endeavouring to reach agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and the United Kingdom that they should all deposit their ratifications of the Peace Treaties in which they are concerned simultaneously and that they should agree as long as possible in advance on a target date when this should take place. They trust that the United States Government will agree to the principle of simultaneous deposit and invite them to name a suitable date. His Majesty’s Government for their part suggest that the date of 1 May would be appropriate.

3. With regard to the second point, there is always the danger that the enemy governments will not have ratified the Peace Treaties before the time comes for the Great Powers to deposit their ratifications. The Italian Government are hesitating to seek the approval of the Constituent Assembly to the ratification of the Italian Treaty and are maintaining that it would be easier for them to do so once the Big Four Governments, and in particular the United States Senate, had ratified. Other ex-enemy governments are believed similarly to be delaying matters, apparently in the mistaken belief that the United States Senate, when considering the Treaties, may be able to introduce into them certain modifications to the advantage of the enemy governments. His Majesty’s Government and, it is understood, the United States Government have already impressed on the Italian Government the importance of their taking early action to ratify the Treaty. His Majesty’s Government intend to continue to stress this point both with the Italian Government and with other enemy governments. In spite of these representations, however, it may be that these governments will not have ratified the Treaties before the Great Powers are ready to do so, nor can there be any guarantee that the enemy governments will in fact ratify once the Great Powers have done so. For internal parliamentary reasons they may well continue to avoid the issue. It is clearly highly desirable that the enemy governments should ratify the Treaties although such ratifications are not necessary to bring the Treaties into force. If they do not ratify, they may be tempted to claim later that their respective Treaty had been imposed upon them as a “dictat”, that they had no sanction from their own public opinion to carry out its terms and that they were therefore justified in trying to escape its obligations. Much might therefore be said in favour of the Big Four letting it be known immediately that they do not intend to deposit their ratifications and thereby bring the Treaties into force until the enemy states themselves have ratified. On the other hand, if, in spite of such a pronouncement, the enemy states still do not ratify, an embarrassing situation will arise. Either the Big Four will have to go back on their pronouncement or the Treaties will not come into force. This would obviously have the undesirable consequence of postponing the end of the state of war and the withdrawal of occupation troops from the countries concerned. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would be grateful for an early expression of the views of the United States Government on the foregoing.¹

4. A similar communication is being addressed to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of France.

Washington , 11th April, 1947.

1. Archibald John Kerr Clark Kerr, Lord Inverchapel.
2. In a memorandum addressed to the British Embassy on April 24 the Department explained that this Government would not be in a position to agree on a definite date for the deposit of instruments of ratification until after the Senate had given its consent to ratification of the treaties; and that it did not consider it necessary to require prior ratification by Italy or other ex-enemy states before ratification by the four Powers (740.0011 EW (Peace)/4–1147).
1. See footnote 2, p. 537.