Office of the Historian

745.45F/12–2947: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

secret
us urgent   niact
Washington, December 31, 1947—6 p. m.

817. Reference Bajpai’s statement urtel 1162 Dec 29 that “GOI troops might be compelled enter Pakistan” notwithstanding expected reference Kashmir problem by India to UN, please convey urgently in person to FonMin Nehru by formal note following views US Gov’t (London’s 6668 Dec 30):

“The US as a firm friend of both India and Pakistan regrets that they have been unable by direct negotiation to solve the Kashmir problem. It now appears that the UNSC will soon be seized of this [Page 193] issue. USG will respond fully to its obligations as a member of SC to assist in the attainment of an early and peaceful settlement. We are certain that such a settlement can be achieved only if, during the critical period when this question is under SC consideration, the GOI and GOP will not only refrain from taking any provocative action but will also restrain those irresponsible elements on both sides who are not alive to the grave consequences of their actions. We fear that precipitate action by either Gov’t at this stage would seriously jeopardize the international good-will and prestige which it now enjoys.

For your information an identic message is being delivered to the (GOP) (GOI).”

Karachi to present identic Note to GOP FonMin and cable urgently all available info GOP this subject.

Karachi and Delhi requested inform Brit colleagues in confidence of action taken.1

Lovett
  1. Telegram 817 was repeated to New York as 624, Karachi as 221, and London as 5405. On January 1, 1948, in telegram 1 from London, Gallman informed the Department that the note to the GOI and GOP was characterized by Dening, Superintending Under-Secretary of the South-East Asia Department of the British Foreign Office, as “admirable and likely to be great help”. Gallman added that Garter and Patrick were equally pleased with the Department’s prompt and “very helpful” action, Carter remarking that the “US note coming at this critical moment may very possibly save situation” (745.45F/1–148).↩