Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III

745.45F/12–3047: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of state

secret
us urgent

London, December 30, 1947—8 p. m.

6668. 1. Sir Archibald Carter permanent Under-Secretary CRO and Patrick showed Embassy officer today three documents regarding GOI–GOP dispute. (Embassy’s 6647 December 29).

2. First document is text December 28 message from Nehru to Attlee in which Nehru refers to fact talks with Liaquat December 22 and 23 “yielded no result”. He writes that to bring home Liaquat gravity situation he personally handed Liaquat letter briefly specifying aid which Kashmir invaders were deriving from Pakistan and restating GOI request such aid should be stopped. So far despite telegraphic reminder GOP has not replied. Meanwhile pressure invaders all along frontier Jammu Province has greatly intensified. GOI troops are under heavy attack at Jhangar where 6000 invaders attacked and GOI troops were outnumbered 30 to 1. Naushera has been scene severe fighting during last few days. 19,000 invaders are massed Uri area and GOI intelligence indicates approximately 100,000 tribesmen and Pakistan nationals located different districts West Punjab. Many are receiving military training preparatory joining battle against GOI.

3. Nehru writes that these developments have created military situation full of peril not only to Jammu and Kashmir state but to GOI. Unless Pakistan takes immediate steps stop all forms aid to attackers, operating from bases in Pakistan, and therefore strategically enjoying great advantage over GOI troops whose only hope of dealing with them effectively lies in striking at them at their Pakistan bases. This would involve GOI entering Pakistan territory. Such a step would be justified in international law as GOI is entitled to take this action in self-defence. What is now happening is definitely an act of aggression against GOI by GOP.

4. However, since GOI is most anxious to act in conformity with letter and spirit of UN Charter GOI is asking SC to repeat to GOP the request in Nehru’s December 23 [22] letter,¹ i.e., that GOP should take immediate and effective action to deny to raiders:

(a) Access to and use of Pakistan territory for operations against Jammu and Kashmir states;

(b) Military and other supplies;

(c) All other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong present struggle.

5. This request, Nehru writes, was without prejudice to freedom of GOI to take, at any time, such military action as it might consider necessary in exercise of GOI right of self-defence.

6. Nehru expresses hope GOP will respond favorably to this request since it is still earnest desire GOI to live on terms peace and friendship with GOP. However this relationship cannot be one-sided and Pakistan must reciprocate. Letter states text of GOI reference to SC will be telegraphed SC December 30 and is being communicated UK High Commissioner Delhi.² End summary Nehru message.

7. Second document is text GOI draft reference to SC which at some length gives account political developments and military operations in Kashmir since September 1947. It sets forth steps taken by GOI to reach amicable solution with GOP and failure of these efforts and then under Article 35 of UN Charter brings situation before SC as danger to international peace and security. Communication concludes with specific request that SC ask GOP:

(a) To prevent GOP personnel military and civil participating in or assisting invasion of Jammu and Kashmir state;

(b) To call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in fighting;

(c) To deny invaders access to and use of its territories for operations; military and other supplies; and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong present struggle.

8. Urgency of matter is stressed in communication because military operations in invaded area have in past few days been developing so rapidly that GOI must in self-defence reserve to itself freedom to take at any time when it may become necessary such military action as GOI may consider situation requires.

9. In body communication GOI cites as evidence it has not sought to take advantage Kashmir situation fact GOI has made it plain that once Kashmir has been cleared of invaders and normal conditions restored Kashmiri people would be free to decide their future by recognized democratic method of plebiscite or referendum which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices. End summary GOI communication SC.

10. Third document is message from Attlee to Nehru sent late December 30 [29] in reply Nehru message (Paragraph 2 above). In it Prime Minister makes following points:

11. Much as situation is regretted Attlee agrees “that it now seems that it is only under authority of UN that settlement can be achieved”.

12. It is important there should be no delay in handling matter by SC and HMG will do its best through Cadogan³ to assure very early consideration. “In meantime”, Attlee writes, “I beg you as a friend that whatever the provocation and whatever the immediate difficulties you should do nothing that, might lead to war and its incalculable consequences on the two dominions”.

13. Reverting to Nehru’s point in Paragraph 3 above Prime Minister states that he is disturbed by GOI assumption GOI will be within its rights in international law if GOI were to move forces into Pakistan in self-defence. Prime Minister doubts whether it is in fact correct juridically and is “afraid that it would be fatal from every other point of view” because in his opinion it would place GOI “definitely in the wrong in eyes of world and I can assure you from our experience on international bodies that it would gravely prejudice India’s case before UN if after appealing to SC she were to take unilateral action of this kind”.

14. Prime Minister makes point that GOI is being “very optimistic” in concluding that military action would bring about speedy solution because all military history shows how difficult it is to deal with NWF tribes even when operating from secure bases.

15. If peaceful settlement is brought about through SC it will redound greatly to credit GOI which laid matter before SC and will enhance international reputation already achieved by GOI.

16. HMG will do its best on SC to support any measures likely achieve peaceful settlement and if Nehru considers there is anything helpful which UK as sister member of Commonwealth can do to assist in ameliorating situation, Nehru can count on HMG.

17. Message ends with statement that GOP is not being advised of contents of Attlee message summarized above.

18. Carter and Patrick inquired whether, in view serious character GOI–GOP relations USG would be willing to instruct Am Embassy Delhi to approach Nehru immediately and without reference to Nehru-Attlee correspondence tell Nehru that USG is concerned by state GOI–GOP relations as outlined by Bajpai December 24 and that USG hopes GOI will rely upon UN to produce solution and not by any rash action such as invading Pakistan territory not only make UN aid more difficult but also prejudice irretrievably world public opinion against GOI case. In other words would USG at this juncture be willing to counsel Nehru generally along lines of Paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 of Attlee’s message? If so, earliest possible action is desirable. Emb officer undertook to put question to Department. Sources also expressed hope USG would, if and when question goes before SC, urge in concert with Cadogan expeditious SC action (see Paragraph 12).

19. Embassy was advised that similar approach with regard to comparable advice to Nehru may be made in near future to Dominions having representation Delhi and possibly to other friendly foreign governments. Which governments is still undecided but Canada was advised by Carter this afternoon.

20. Queried as to what sources thought SC might do about problem, sources said they visualized that first gain would be that GOI–GOP dispute would be placed sub-judice SC. This in itself might restrain GOI to some extent and at early SC meeting SC might formally freeze existing situation thus adding another deterrent. More long range might be steps by SC to investigate GOI complaint simultaneously with making arrangement for eventual Kashmir plebiscite when conditions make this possible. In view sources it is essential that SC couple these two aspects problem because “one hope is that both GOI and GOP have not abandoned plebiscite idea” (see Paragraph 9).

21. Queried regarding attitude GOP since December 23, sources said they understood GOP has been working since that date on draft reply Nehru’s letter (see Paragraph 2). Consequently if GOI files complaint with SC today GOP rejoinder should follow soon.

22. Asked whether there was any ground to hope for eleventh hour resolution difficulties without recourse SC sources said they were afraid not. On December 28 Bajpai told Stone [Shone?] terms and date of SC reference were “immutable”. GOI feels it may be on verge military disaster in Kashmir which would cause collapse Nehru government. Consequently GOI is desperate. HMG plans no démarche other than Attlee message (begins Paragraph 10).

23. Full brief situation is being telegraphed today to Cadogan. CRO is sending Curson next few days to assist Cadogan and other and higher officials may follow.

24. CRO is instructing UK High Commissioners Delhi and Karachi to make available to US missions full information as this question develops. It is suggested missions should keep in touch with High Commissioners.

Sent Department 6668, repeated New Delhi 151, Karachi 54, Moscow by pouch.

Gallman

1. The reference here is presumably to Nehru’s letter of December 22 to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, which is summarized in telegram 1151 from New Delhi, p. 183, and printed in Government of India, White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 74–75
2. Sir Terence Allen Shone.
3. Sir Alexander George Montagu Cadogan, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations.