845.00/10–747
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett |
| The Indian Ambassador, Mr. Asaf Ali |
| Present: | Mr. Mathews,1 SOA |
The Indian Ambassador called informally at 5:15 to express his appreciation of my statement to the press on September 242 and to give me his impressions of the Indian situation gained during his recent period of consultation in New Delhi.
Statement of September 24
The Ambassador said that he and his Government were very grateful for the sympathy and understanding of India’s problems shown in [Page 168] the statement of September 24, and that he believed that it had a salutary effect on the tone of American press reports and comments concerning conditions in India. I thanked him for his kind remarks.
The Recent Disturbances
The Ambassador sketched the history of communal disturbances during the past several years, and said that although localized and involving only some one and one-half percent of India’s (and Pakistan’s) peoples, the troubles in the Punjab since August 15 had been on a much larger scale than the leaders of the new Dominions had expected, and that the displacement of population which has resulted was not anticipated. These developments originated spontaneously among the people and have created very serious problems for the two newly-formed Governments.
In Delhi by the end of August, the Ambassador said, a potentially dangerous situation existed as some 250,000 refugees from the Punjab had assembled in the city. However, serious disturbances were avoided until the arrival in early September of a second influx of refugees. The Ambassador’s own investigations and those of his Government had convinced him that these refugees came prepared to make trouble. The instigators were the Sikhs, the militant Hindu organization Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, and “counter-revolutionary” elements. The last were certain rulers of princely states in the Punjab, notably Patiala and Faridkot who had stores of arms and ammunition. These rulers presumably hoped to discredit the new Government in New Delhi.
The Government of India has appointed a Minister of Refugees to handle the short-term aspects of the displaced persons problem and a Minister of Resettlement to develop long-term solutions. The Ambassador was not aware of the steps being taken by the Government of Pakistan, but he felt sure that it had a similar program.
International Repercussions of Recent Disturbances
The Ambassador referred to India’s strategic position in Asia and expressed the view that disturbed conditions in the subcontinent encouraged aggressive powers, citing the explosive Indian situation in 1941 and 1942 as having enticed the Japanese into ever-expanding adventures in the belief that India would fall to them without a struggle. He saw certain similarities in the present situation and suggested that the USSR had decided to open a diplomatic offensive against the US [sic] on the assumption that India was in chaos. He pointed out that India’s northernmost boundary lay only fifteen miles from Soviet territory (actually, this is a boundary of the domains of the Maharaja [Page 169] of Kashmir who has not yet acceded to India or Pakistan) and that the USSR had shown great interest in Indian developments. It was therefore unfortunate, the Ambassador felt, that press reports should emphasize the troubles of India. He implied that he was telling me this under instructions from his Government, and said that he had made his views known to Lord Mountbatten and to British officials in London. He added that he hoped to discuss these matters with the President when the latter was less occupied than at present.
I said that I found his analysis of the current position very interesting. I commented that the preoccupation of the press with dramatic events was an ever-present problem, and added that as long as Sikhs attacked Muslims and Muslims retaliated, the press would feature this news.
India’s Food Requirements
The Ambassador stated that India’s need for grain imports was still very great and had been increased by the disturbances in the Punjab (an important grain producing area). His country had spent one billion rupees ($300,000,000) for foreign food grains and must continue these large and burdensome disbursements. He hoped that the US would be able to increase its allocation to India, which would be a concrete evidence of the American desire to aid the Dominion. His Government had approached the USSR for grain, but had been refused.
I pointed out that the US grain position was very difficult owing to the failure of the corn crop, and that we were faced with the necessity of reducing rather than increasing export allocations.
I told the Ambassador that we were very glad to have him with us again, and I appreciated his frank and helpful review of conditions in his country. Some of us in the Department had found it difficult to understand certain of the aspects and ramifications of the partition of India, but clarifications such as he had just given were of great assistance to us.
The Ambassador departed at 5:45.
- Elbert G. Mathews, Assistant Chief, Division of South Asian Affairs.↩
- For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1947, pp. 748–749. This statement was the outcome of a request by Secretary-General Bajpai, in telephone conversation with Ambassador Grady September 13, that the Secretary of State make some form of statement supporting the Government of India in this difficult period when press despatches in American papers were showing an unfriendly tone (845.00/9–1447).↩