740.00119 Council/4–247
British Record of a Conversation at the Kremlin, March 24, 1947, 10:00 p.m.–11:15 p.m.52
| Present: | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Zarubin | |
| Mr. Troyanovsky (Interpreter) | |
| Mr. Bevin | |
| Sir Maurice Peterson | |
| Mr. Dixon | |
| Mr. Paton Smith (Interpreter) |
Introductory
Mr. Bevin, after enquiring after the Generalissimo’s health, said that he was sorry not to be at home to welcome the Soviet Parliamentary Delegation.
[Page 279]Generalissimo Stalin said that the Secretary of State could still be home in time to see them.
Mr. Molotov agreed. He hoped we should finish our work here by the end of March.
Germany: Reparations from current production
Mr. Bevin pointed out that there were several difficult questions still to be settled, for example the question of reparations from current production.
Generalissimo Stalin said that Russia was not asking for a great deal.
Mr. Bevin said that we could only agree that reparations should be paid at Germany’s expense and not at ours. We must get a balanced economy in Germany.
Generalissimo Stalin said that we must not allow Germany to build up a new war potential.
Mr. Bevin thought it was the Allies themselves who had allowed Germany to build up a war potential after the 1914–18 war by fixing reparations which caused developments beyond peace-time requirements.
Generalissimo Stalin pointed out that after the first world war, the Allies had not occupied Germany. In his view the aim should be to develop a peace-loving Germany having a balanced economy, as Mr. Bevin suggested, and a reasonable amount of metal, coal and chemicals for export.
Polish Western Frontier
The Secretary of State asked what the Generalissimo’s views were on the problem of the density of the German population and the provisional Polish frontier. He thought we had fixed the provisional frontier between Germany and Poland too far to the west, and this might create an explosive situation in the future.
Generalissimo Stalin observed that a great many Germans had already been killed in the war. In Belgium the density of population was higher than in Germany.
Mr. Bevin thought that an irredentist movement would be fostered if the frontier was fixed so far to the west.
Generalissimo Stalin answered that there were now not many Germans left in the territories which had been taken from Germany. He thought that Germany could be prevented in the future from any attempt to recover territories of which she was deprived.
Economic Unity
Mr. Bevin asked whether the Generalissimo thought that we should be able to agree on a settlement providing for a sound economic unity for Germany.
[Page 280]Generalissimo Stalin said that it would be well to reach agreement on that.
Mr. Bevin thought that agreement was possible if a balanced economy for Germany could be decided on, providing for recovery by us of our expenditure.
Generalissimo Stalin said that that was what he too was striving for.
Mr. Bevin recalled that at Tehran the idea of the Generalissimo and Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had been that Germany should be broken up, though the British Cabinet had never formally endorsed the proposal. At Potsdam the Russians had reversed their attitude and had suggested the idea of central administrations. For our part we thought it a mistake to go too far in the direction of centralisation, for reasons of our security.
Generalissimo Stalin said that he thought that the draft proposals for the future of Germany which had been tabled by Mr. Molotov were not in contradiction with Mr. Bevin’s ideas. The Russian idea was that there should be centralisation of power and decentralisation of administration in Germany, as before the Hitler regime. Hitler had only been able to seize power after first annulling the Weimar constitution. He thought that the Weimar constitution could be restored in the main, although he was against some of its provisions, for example, the provision regarding the power of the President to suspend the constitution.
(The Secretary of State interposed that he had himself pointed this out at the Council table.)
Continuing, Generalissimo Stalin said that under the Russian proposals, administration would be in the hands of the Landtags, the rights of the Länder would be fully protected and the central German authority would not control the military departments. He saw no dangers for security in this. In any case, he agreed that the administration of Germany should be less centralised than that of Italy or Japan.
Mr. Bevin observed that he had tabled proposals on Friday last, while Mr. Molotov had tabled his on Saturday, and that there seemed not to be much difference between the Russian and the British proposals.
Generalissimo Stalin said he thought so too. It would be good to come to an agreement.
The Ruhr
Mr. Bevin said that at earlier conferences the Russians had several times raised the Ruhr. We were strongly in favour of the Ruhr receiving similar treatment to any other part of Germany, but it would be very difficult if the Ruhr was taken away, leaving the British Zone as [Page 281] a little rump. In our view, all German industry, including industry in the Ruhr, should be under Allied control, and we would submit to the Allied authority there. To make it clearer he would put it this way: if agreement on economic unity was reached and German central administrations were set up, we would allow the production and allocation of all materials in the Ruhr to be dealt with by the German central administrations, under Allied supervision, in the same way as the production and allocation of all other materials throughout Germany as a whole.
Generalissimo Stalin said he would have to think this over. Perhaps Mr. Bevin was right, but he could give no definite opinion as this was a new position to him. At Potsdam the suggestion had been that the Ruhr should be a separate region. At all events he would not wish to do anything in the Ruhr which would do harm to Great Britain. That he could say definitely.
Four Power Treaty
The Secretary of State asked the Generalissimo for his views about the American proposed Four Power Treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. We had thought it over and considered that it would be beneficial to have such a treaty in the interests of cooperation between the Powers in the future.
Generalissimo Stalin at first thought the proposal was for a treaty with Germany. When he had been corrected on this point and after consulting Mr. Molotov, the Generalissimo recalled that at Paris the Soviet Delegation had made certain criticisms of the treaty which Mr. Byrnes had apparently said that he would consider. These concerned democratisation, reparations and the duration of the treaty. If these criticisms were taken into account, the Soviet Union would in principle like to have a treaty of that sort. They would probably also have other amendments to propose.
Revision of Anglo-Soviet Treaty
The Secretary of State said that he thought that it would be good, during his present stay in Moscow, if the Treaty could be revised in accordance with his correspondence with the Generalissimo.53
Generalissimo Stalin said: “Very good. We want it also”.
The Secretary of State remarked that everybody was very busy with the Conference, but perhaps Mr. Molotov or Mr. Vyshinski could discuss the question with the Ambassador.
Mr. Molotov said that Mr. Vyshinski had already told the Ambassador he was ready to open conversations.
Sir Maurice Peterson said that Mr. Vyshinski had promised to fix a day for opening discussions soon but had not done so.
[Page 282]Generalissimo Stalin said that the Russians would try to expedite this matter as far as they could.
Egypt
The Secretary of State recalled that the last time he had seen the Generalissimo they had spoken about Egypt.54 He now wanted to make it clear that we could not accept the position that a bilateral treaty could be denounced by one of the parties. We held to our Treaty of 1936 with Egypt. We considered that the Middle East, which was an important area for our communications, was one of our spheres of influence, and we thought that we should remain there unless matters were altered by regional arrangements under the United Nations. In two wars we had defended the Allied cause from that area. It was a vulnerable area.
Mr. Bevin explained that we were trying to make a mutual defence arrangement with Egypt. It would be apparent from this arrangement that the area was not being used for offence against any of our Allies. We adhered to that policy.
Generalissimo Stalin said that he understood. He recalled that he had once said that if Great Britain had not been in Egypt, the Egyptian Government might well have turned Nazi.
(Mr. Bevin interposed; “I agree”.)
Generalissimo Stalin said that the Soviet Union had no intention of interfering in the carrying out of British policy in Egypt.55
Persia
The Secretary of State said that there was no truth in certain Press stories that we were attempting to prevent a Soviet oil concession in Northern Persia. In fact, we would, if occasion arose, advise the Persian Government to live up to their agreement with the Russians.
Generalissimo Stalin said that he was very grateful.
Mr. Bevin continued that we for our part had our interests in Southern Persia and had no intention of interfering with the normal independence of the country.
Generalissimo Stalin said: “We hold the same position”.56
Mr. Bevin said that he was sorry to take up so much of the Generalissimo’s time but he would like to mention another country which they had discussed when they last met.
[Page 283]India
Mr. Bevin said we were trying to settle this difficult problem in the interests of world-peace in such a way as not to prevent India having friendly relations with us and our Allies.
Generalissimo Stalin interrupted the interpreter to say that there were so many subjects for them to discuss because they had not met for so long. India was a very difficult question.
Mr. Bevin said that he foresaw dangers when the Indians obtained their independence unless all acted with great care.
Generalissimo Stalin said that Russia was not interfering “and we wish success to Great Britain in the enterprise she has started in India.”57
[Here follow exchanges between Stalin and Bevin on the questions of Anglo-Soviet trade, possible reciprocal air service between London and Moscow, proposed cultural exchanges, the status of Soviet wives of British subjects, and a site for a new British Embassy in Moscow.]
Questions by Generalissimo Stalin
Mr. Bevin asked whether there was anything that the Generalissimo would like to ask him.
Generalissimo Stalin asked whether the coal crisis in England was serious or was it merely a noise in the Press.
Mr. Bevin said it was serious, being caused mainly by two reasons. Firstly, during the war we had shipped to some of our Allies much electrical machinery. Owing to the war we had not been able to build new machinery and thus when after the war the consumption went up the capacity was deficient. Secondly, between the wars we had not pursued a policy of encouraging the miners to remain in the pits. When he became Minister of Labour the miners had been 84th on the Wages List. He had remedied that, but after the war we had been left short of labour for the mines. We were now modernizing the pits and improving housing conditions for the miners, but it would take about two years for us to get sufficient production for home and export.
Generalissimo Stalin said that Russia had had the same difficulties. The men did not want to work underground. The Soviet Government similarly had raised miners’ wages and they were now more highly paid than qualified metal workers. Was the crisis in England now over? Was it still serious?
The Secretary of State said that, though the situation was still serious and we should have to be careful next winter, we were confident that we could surmount our difficulties.
Generalissimo Stalin suggested that we ought to take coal out of [Page 284] the Ruhr as reparations from Germany. Why could we not get more Ruhr production?
The Secretary of State said that we felt that Ruhr coal after satisfying German needs should be left for France, who needed it. He explained that the reason for low production was that the overhead machinery had been largely destroyed by Allied bombing.
Generalissimo Stalin observed that the Germans should be forced to repair the machinery and made to mine more coal.
Generalissimo Stalin said that he had no more questions to put. All the questions he had thought of asking had been raised by Mr. Bevin.
Mr. Bevin told the Generalissimo on leaving that we really wanted our relations to be cordial and happy. If the Soviet Government was concerned about our actions, he hoped that they would send for Sir M. Peterson or instruct their Ambassador to enquire of him (Mr. Bevin), who would do the same. We did not want unfriendly feelings on either side. We would do our best to work with the Russians, as he felt sure they would with us.
Generalissimo Stalin said that he was very glad that he and Mr. Bevin thought in the same way. He too wished for the two countries to work together.
- At their meeting on March 26, Foreign Secretary Bevin went over this record in detail with Secretary of State Marshall; see the memorandum of that conversation, p. 289. Secretary Marshall sent copies of this record to President Truman and Acting Secretary Acheson.↩
- For additional documentation regarding the proposed revision of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942, See volume iv .↩
- The reference here is presumably to the Stalin–Bevin meeting on December 19, 1945, during the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. For the text of a portion of the British record of that meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 688.↩
- For documentation on the interest of the United States in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, 1936, see volume v .↩
- For documentation on the question of a Soviet oil concession in northern Iran, see volume v .↩
- For documentation on the interest of the United States in the emergence of the Dominions of India and Pakistan, see volume iii .↩