740.00119 Council/3–2247: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 47
confidential
963. Delsec 1336. The 12th CFM meeting, March 22, Bevin presiding, taken up by further discussion of the provisional political organization of Germany. At the conclusion of the meeting the Council accepted Marshall’s suggestion and appointed a special committee48 to coordinate and compare proposals made by the various ministers on points discussed by the Council during its consideration of the Allied Control Council’s report. To allow each delegation time not only to prepare any additional proposals or modify its proposals but also to study those of other delegations, the Council will not meet Sunday or Monday. Tuesday49 it will hear the Committee’s report which will list points of agreement and disagreement. CFM will then be able to discuss the issues and decide on the procedure to be followed in referring these matters back to the special committee.
[Page 277]Molotov began his discussion of the provisional political organization of Germany by stating that the USSR is not guided by a spirit of revenge but that its aim is the establishment of a democratic and peaceful Germany. He opposed “federalizing” Germany, which he said would result in a situation in which German militarists could assume the leadership of a popular movement to recreate a unified Germany, thus defeating the Allies policy in Germany. He foresaw other serious dangers in “federalization” but stated that if the German people voted in a free election for such a policy, the Allies should not oppose this decision. He urged the immediate necessity of creating central administrative agencies as well as a provisional German government in order that appropriate German organizations could be held responsible for carrying out Germany’s obligations to the Allies and in order to avoid further delay in achieving German economic unity.
Molotov proposed that ACC be instructed to draft a provisional German constitution after hearing the views of representative Germans. He suggested that ultimately the new German state be a republic with a two-chamber legislature which would draft a permanent constitution to be approved by the German people. The permanent constitution would contain civil and religious guarantees and provide for the popular election by proportional representation of an all-German Parliament. Laender constitutions would be similar to the all-German constitution. He urged the revival of the pre-Hitler form of Germany’s government and noted that there were many ideas in the Weimar constitution which might be useful in the new constitution.50
Bidault said that in order to avoid the recreation of a centralized and militaristic Germany, France desired to apply as much as possible the principles of political decentralization and the development of local governments. All governmental powers, he added, should be in the states which are members of the German federation. The central government would possess only those delegated powers which would be necessary to provide services for Germany as a whole. He said Germany must again serve an apprenticeship in democracy and its methods which could only be done at a local level. Stating that the new government of Germany must be developed by states, he said he favored organizing German states which would however, be given the largest [Page 278] possible number of political and economic powers. He said that if the Council reached agreement on the economic unity of Germany, France would agree to the creation for all Germany, except the Saar, of provisional central economic organizations necessary to provide service for all of Germany. He opposed the creation of a provisional government for Germany as being premature, but agreed to study proposals for both a provisional and a permanent government for Germany.51
Marshall said his impression was that there is much in common in the four proposals for the future political structure of Germany. He urged the Council to concentrate on the substance of the proposals and avoid disagreement over words. He said the differences were more than a question of degree than fundamental. Bevin said he agreed and hoped the Council would approach the problem practically and not get tied up with words. Molotov added that he also believed the various proposals contained much in common and agreed that German political development should be by stages.
The Council adjourned after adopting the Marshall proposal on procedure.
Moscow passes to London, Department and Berlin. Department please pass to Paris as Moscow’s 79, to Rome as Moscow’s 10 and Vienna as Moscow’s 11.
-
In telegram 922, Delsec 1326, March 21, from Moscow, not printed, Secretary Marshall directed Acting Secretary Acheson as follows:
↩“In order to keep our major Embassies informed of CFM proceedings, I am now having my daily reports written in third person and transmitted to the Department for the President and you, Vandenberg and Connally, and our Ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin and Vienna. These will continue to be completely factual without opinion or prognostication and most of information will, of course, subsequently appear in press under present full coverage procedures. Classification probably no higher than confidential. When I am ready to express opinions, look into the future, or request guidance, my messages will clearly indicate to whom and with what distribution they are addressed.” (740.00119 Council/3–2147)
- The Coordinating Committee, as it was formally designated, was constituted as follows: United States–Gen. Clay, United Kingdom–Gen. Robertson, France–Alphand, and the Soviet Union–Vyshinsky. At the end of March, Gen. Clay left the conference and returned to Berlin. His place on the Coordinating Committee was taken by Robert Murphy and James Riddleberger. Between March 24 and April 11, the Committee held fourteen meetings and submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers the following reports: CFM (47) (M)64, March 26, p. 401, CFM (47) (M) 74, March 28, p. 409, CFM (47) (M) 101, April 4, not printed, CFM (47) (M) 105 rev., April 8, not printed, and CFM(47) (M) 121, April 11, p. 436.↩
- March 25.↩
- For the text of Foreign Minister Molotov’s principal statement at this meeting, which was circulated to the Council as document CFM (47) (M)46, March 22, 1947, see Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 391–399. The major portion of Molotov’s statement is also printed in Documents on International Affairs 1947–1948, pp. 449–453. For the text of some additional remarks made by Molotov at this Council meeting, see Molotov, Speeches and Statements at Moscow, pp. 45–46.↩
- For the text of Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement summarized here, and circulated to the Council as CFM(47) (M)48, March 22, 1947, see Déclarations de Bidault, pp. 29–31.↩