Subject: Minimum Strength of U. S. Forces in Europe
[Enclosure]
War Department Staff Study
secret
[Washington, undated.]
the problem
1. To outline War Department views on minimum U.S. forces which
should be authorized for the accomplishment of occupation missions
in Europe as of 1 July 1947 and 1 July 1948.
facts bearing on the problem
2. a. As of 1 February 1947 the following
armed forces were on foreign soil in Europe: (See Tab “A”44 for detailed
tabulation)
| United States |
202,000 |
| British |
247,000 |
| French |
80,000 |
| U.S.S.R. |
1,110,000 |
b. The following factors in connection with
U.S. troop strengths are pertinent:
- (1)
- U.S. forces in Italy will be withdrawn when the Italian
Peace Treaty comes into force. A total of 5000 troops will
remain in Trieste for an indeterminate period.
- (2)
- U.S. forces in Austria totalling 11,500 should not be
reduced until after the conclusion of an Austrian peace
treaty.
- (3)
- Of the present 150,000 U.S. troops in Germany,
approximately 38,000 are in AAF units. General McNarney, AAF and the War Department concur that this air
strength could be reduced to between 8,000 and 12,000
without jeopardizing the occupation mission. The State
Department, considering the overall situation in Europe, has
been reluctant to see such a major removal of U.S. forces
from Germany for fear it might be interpreted as partial
abandonment of the U.S. occupational commitment and thus
adversely affect the U.S. negotiating position in the
conferences on Germany. Action is in progress to request the
State Department to reconsider its position on this
matter.
c. In connection with U.S.S.R. troops on
foreign soil in Europe the War Department Intelligence Division
estimates that some sizeable reduction will be effected by 1 July
1947. These reductions should be viewed with reserve because of the
Soviet practice of retaining demobilized soldiers in civilian and
quasi-military capacities in countries where Soviet troops are
stationed.
d. Consultation between the War Department
and the State Department in November 1946 during discussion of the
question of reduction of Allied forces in Europe in the Council of
Foreign Ministers resulted in the following U.S. proposal for troop
ceilings: (See Tab “B” for War Department study furnished Mr.
Byrnes and Mr. Cohen)
|
Germany
|
(Allied Occupation) |
| U.S. |
— |
140,000 |
|
| U.K. |
— |
140,000 |
|
| France |
— |
70,000 |
(approximate existing forces not
subject to reduction in 1948) |
| U.S.S.R. |
— |
200,000 |
|
|
Poland
|
(Protection of Communication Lines) |
| U.S.S.R. |
— |
20,000 |
|
|
Austria
|
(Aid for re-establishment of
Independence) |
| U.S., U.K., France, and U.S.S.R. |
— |
10,000 each |
|
|
Hungary
|
(Protection of Communication Lines pending
Austrian Treaty) |
| U.S.S.R. |
— |
5,000 |
|
|
Rumania
|
(Protection of Communication Lines pending
Austrian Treaty) |
| U.S.S.R. |
— |
5,000 |
|
discussion
3. During the past several months, War Department concern over budget
and manpower restrictions has caused a concentrated effort to reduce
U.S. forces in occupation areas to a “bed-rock” minimum which is
consistent with the accomplishment of occupational objectives. In
[Page 180]
November 1946, General
McNarney advised the War
Department as follows: “The occupation forces must be such as to
provide the small amount of leeway to permit our governmental
authority to operate in the event of a refusal or failure of the
German people or quadripartite agencies to function, rather than be
completely at their mercy. The ground strength (117,000 other than
air for Germany and Austria) presently authorized for 1 July 1947 is
the minimum which can accomplish the missions in the areas
assigned.” It is the view of the War Department that this force
might be unable to maintain order in the event budgetary
restrictions force a drastic reduction in the food which is supplied
the German people. Assuming that conditions continue to be most
favorable, however, some reductions in troop strength might be
possible by abandoning or reducing such activities as:
-
a.
- Commitment to displaced persons.
-
b.
- Occupation of Austria.
Reduction of air strength in Europe will also reflect a minor saving
in service type personnel.
General McNarney reaffirmed
his position in a message to the War Department on 20 February 1947
that reductions in resources available to him below those presently
planned could not be absorbed without jeopardizing his occupational
mission.
4. Troops in Italy must be withdrawn within 90 days after the Italian
peace treaty comes into force. It is assumed that the treaty will be
ratified by the signatories and no discussion is believed necessary
except to note a maximum of 5,000 troops from each the U.S.,
Britain, and Yugoslavia will automatically be available to the
Governor in Trieste for a period of 90 days after he assumes office.
These forces must then be withdrawn unless the governor requests
their retention through the Security Council of the United
Nations.
5. War Department Intelligence reports an increase in the Soviet
practice of retaining demobilized soldiers in foreign countries in
civilian or quasi-military capacities. These former soldiers are
recruited into the Russian Secret Police, put in charge of
cooperative farms, placed in responsible positions in industrial
concerns, etc. All of these activities are largely controlled by the
Kremlin and give the Soviets a degree of control disproportionate to
the troop strength in such countries as Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria,
Finland, Austria, and Poland.
6. It is considered that Russia will correctly appreciate U.S.,
French, and British difficulties in maintaining sizeable occupation
forces during peacetime. This appreciation will probably cause
Russia to view troop ceilings as a stratagem on the part of the
Western Powers to force a material reduction in Russian military
strength in Europe,
[Page 181]
while
at the same time resulting in no real reduction in planned strengths
on the part of the Western Powers. Another important factor is the
Russian capability for rapid mobilization which puts her in a
position to upset any agreed balance of force in Europe practically
overnight.
7. This analysis is premised on continued occupation of Germany for a
considerable period or until a treaty is concluded along the lines
of the text of the U.S. Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and
Demilitarization of Germany announced on 30 April 1946 and Mr.
Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech
of 6 September 1946. It is considered that if such a treaty were
concluded the troop strengths shown herein will still apply during
the interim period until the treaty takes effect.
conclusions
8. a. Conditions have not changed to allow a
reduction in the troop ceilings for 1 July 1947 which should be
provided for the Allies in the various European countries since the
U.S. view was transmitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers in
December 1946.
b. In the absence of unforeseeable
difficulties these forces might be reduced by one quarter to one
third by 1 July 1948. This reduction is subject to such earlier
withdrawal from Austria, Rumania and Hungary as may be required by
an Austrian treaty, and in the case of the U.S. would consist mainly
of Air Force troops.
recommendations
9. It is recommended that: A copy of this study be furnished to the
Department of State for guidance in the forthcoming Moscow
Conference.
