862.6131/9–1247
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)64
Subject: Wheat Allocations to Germany
With regard to the proposed letter65 to be sent jointly by the War and State Departments to the Secretary of Agriculture regarding [Page 1163] wheat allocations to Germany, I would like to make the following comments.
I understand the letter to mean that the State Department supports the necessity of making an allocation to Germany for the current crop year of 3,600,000 tons of product weight from the United States, that the recommendation that this allocation be made is not conditioned upon the attainment of any specific total of shipments from the United States and that, if the War Department is able to procure corn in the Argentine, such corn would be in addition to the 3,600,000 tons.
As I understand the significance of the product weight aspect, it means that to the extent that flour is shipped, more than 3,600,000 tons of wheat would be devoted to the German requirement. I understand the War Department would prefer to have wheat but that some flour may be shipped. The absence of any link between the figure of 3,600,000 and the total United States exports appears to mean that we support this amount even though the total amount of American exports turns out to be less than what was estimated at the time when this figure has previously been discussed. This appears to give the German claim a priority over the claims of other areas. General Draper in his telegram to General Clay (CM OUT 8582466) of September 8 states “in effect this (decision) gives reasonable priority to Germany.”
It is my understanding that it has been the standard practice in grain allocations in the past to count any procurement of Argentine corn against other grain allocations if such procurement had not been anticipated at the time the allocations were made. The change in this particular instance would constitute a preferential treatment for the bizonal area as against all other claimants for grain.
Present prospects for grain from the United States to France indicate that French imports may be insufficient to maintain the present French bread ration of 200 grams a day which Ambassador Caffery considers below the “minimum required to prevent greatly increased social and political unrest.” Mr. Clayton’s and Ambassador Caffery’s cable of September 9 states “To prevent a runaway situation this winter we recommend thorough exploration all possible means increasing availabilities bread grains in amount required for 250 gram ration.” Ambassador Caffery had also cabled on September 8 “I see no possibility however of continuing it (present ration level) through the winter without the likelihood of serious social disturbances”.67
Ambassador Dunn from Rome has urged that we provide monthly shipments of 220,000 tons per month to Italy. Present allocations are about 115,000 tons. The present allocations presuppose continuation [Page 1164] of Italian rations at their present level. The Italian Government, however, feels that it must raise the ration during the winter.68
I am advised that it is the considered opinion of the experts in this Department and in the Department of Agriculture that the assurance of 3,600,000 tons of wheat equivalent to the bizonal area from the United States entails a serious risk that, during the winter, the calorie level in the bizonal area will exceed that in Austria, Italy and perhaps France. This risk will be increased if product weight instead of wheat equivalent is used to measure the tonnage. It is even more greatly increased if the War Department is authorized to buy additional corn from the Argentine without having any such purchase affect wheat shipments from the United States. The political situation in France is so critical that the emergence of either a Communist-controlled government or a virtual dictatorship under de Gaulle is a distinct possibility. The tendency towards both these alternatives will be strengthened by inadequate food in France particularly if the United States is giving preference to Germany. French reactions to United States policies in Germany are already a matter for very serious concern and are being played up by the extremists of both the Eight and Left. The political situation in Italy is no less precarious and an inadequate ration level coupled with preference to Germany will greatly strengthen the hands of the Communists.
On the basis of the foregoing I feel I must urge that the Department not approve the proposed letter to the Department of Agriculture and that we insist that it be so phrased as to preserve freedom of action to ensure that no undue preference is given to the bizonal area and that there remain sufficient flexibility to meet emergency situations which can be anticipated.
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A marginal handwritten notation on the source text by Philander P. Claxton, Jr., reads as follows:
↩“This was shown to Mr. Lovett by me Sept 12. He did not read it but asked what it said. I said it objected to [sending?] the WD letter and explained why. He said the decision was already made.”
- Supra.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Neither of the documents cited in this paragraph are printed. For documentation on the concern of the United States over the political, economic, and financial situation in France, see volume iii .↩
- For documentation on United States relief and economic assistance for Italy, see volume iii .↩