740.00119 EW/1–3147
The Lithuanian Minister (Zadeikis) to the Secretary of State 14
Sir: On March 10, 1947, the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and U.S.S.R. will meet in Moscow to discuss the Peace Settlement with Germany. To prepare the ground for these discussions preliminary deliberations of the Deputies of the said Ministers have already begun in London. In connection with this I have the honor to bring to your attention the following:
- (1)
- Eventual settlement of the eastern frontiers of Germany must necessarily interest and affect Lithuania, regardless of her neutrality, as a State having a common pre-war frontier with Germany;
- (2)
- The Potsdam Agreement proposed to cede to the U.S.S.R. the city of Koenigsberg and the northeastern corner of East Prussia situated, approximately, between the Baltic Sea and the Lithuanian frontier—a territory which for centuries was inhabited by the Lithuanian race and which, in spite of colonization by Germans in recent times, still retains its Lithuanian character. This decision, if carried out, would gravely affect the entire future of Lithuania: the Lithuanian nation, thus surrounded by Soviet Russia, would be condemned to isolation and extinction;
- (3)
- As a result of German aggression, Lithuania was deprived of her possession of the Memel Territory, including the Port of Klaipēda (Memel), in 1939, which legally, economically, and ethnographically was an integral part of Lithuania;
- (4)
- During the last war Lithuania was under German occupation for over three years and, as a result, sustained very grave losses.
It will be seen from the above that Lithuania has a vital interest in the final settlement of the eastern frontiers of Germany and is also [Page 151] entitled to claim just compensation for the losses resulting from Germany’s aggression and occupation.
Owing, however, to the fact that Lithuania was forcibly occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and still continues to be under foreign domination, there is no possibility for the lawful National Government to exercise its functions on the territory of Lithuania at the present time.
Although the Government of the Soviet Union repeatedly attempted to speak, or act, on behalf of Lithuania and to represent her at international conferences, either directly or through the puppet administration, the Lithuanian people will never recognize their right to do so. Such a prerogative rests solely with the lawful representatives of the Republic of Lithuania.
In this connection it should be emphasized that the Lithuanian people repose their confidence in the Western Democracies, who, true to their sense of fairness and justice, have refused to recognize the situation created by Soviet aggression against the Lithuanian people. The Lithuanian people are, therefore, confident that the Government of the United States will continue in this attitude during the present meeting in London, and later in Moscow, or at any subsequent international conferences, and will not agree to the Soviet Union’s claims to Lithuanian territory, or accept her assumed right to speak or act on behalf of the Lithuanian people, or be a party to any act prejudicial to the sovereignty rights and other vital interests of Lithuania.
In these circumstances I deem it my duty to reserve formally, in the name of the Lithuanian people and their legitimate Government, all their rights and claims in connection with forthcoming settlement of the German problem, and I hope that lawful representatives of the Lithuanian people will be accorded an opportunity in due course properly to present their just claims and to defend the legitimate interests of their country.
Accept [etc.]
-
This note was acknowledged by Under Secretary of State Acheson on February 5, 1947.
In the course of a conversation with Llewellyn E. Thompson, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, on February 11, 1947, Minister Zadeikis stated that he would like to call on the Secretary of State prior to his departure for the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. According to his memorandum of the conversation, not printed, Thompson responded as follows:
↩“I told the Minister that in my personal opinion it would be unwise to attempt to see the Secretary at this time since the gesture to which he referred would probably provoke a counter gesture from the Soviet Government, possibly in connection with the Moscow Conference, and I was sure the Minister would agree that it would be desirable to avoid this if possible.” (711.60M/2–1147)