Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) for the Secretary of State 55
The present crisis with the French arose directly out of the statement of Secretary Royall at a press conference in Berlin on August 1st. According to the New York Herald Tribune, the Secretary stated that he knew
“of no agreement by the War Department or the State Department to consult with France before promulgation of the plan to raise the level of industry in Western Germany.”
The United Press reports his remarks as follows:
“He also claimed he had no knowledge of French protests on proposals to raise the level of German industry in the British and American zones. Royall said at a press conference that the United States feels free to boost German industrial production without consulting the French Government, which opposes any increase. ‘I would [Page 1015] feel free to take any action with reference to the military government that the War Department and State Department agree on,’ he said.”
The French Government interpreted these reported statements of Secretary Royall as a disavowal of the assurances which had been conveyed by you to M. Bidault in your telegram of July 21st.56
It is impossible to reconcile Secretary Royall’s statement to the press (if he has been correctly reported) with the fact that on July 19th, a message from you to Mr. Bevin57 proposing that M. Bidault should be informed by both Governments
“that the US and UK Governments will suspend further announcements on the agreed plan for revised bizonal level of industry in Germany until the French Government has reasonable opportunity to present its views for full consideration”
was personally cleared with Secretary Royall by General Carter and Mr. Bohlen. Secretary Royall not only approved the final text of this message but had made several suggested changes in the first draft, which were accepted by you.
Furthermore, the understanding that the French views were to be received and taken into consideration before further announcement is clearly reflected in point 4 of the memorandum of understanding initialled by you and Secretary Royall on July 29th.58 A further message was sent to Bidault on August 2,59 after being personally initialled by Assistant Secretary of War Petersen and after agreement with the British Government. This message gave the French Government the assurance that the US Government was prepared to give careful consideration to any French representations on the level of industry plan.
The French Ambassador informed me last night that the Royall press conference had produced a situation in France which was worse than that created by the first information regarding the level of industry plan. The last message to Bidault read in the light of Royall’s remarks, according to Bonnet, would only serve to confirm the impression fostered by the Communists in France that our agreement to consult meant nothing, since these events would be interpreted in France as demonstrating that although the US may have agreed to listen to the French Government it had every intention of going ahead with the level of industry plan without paying any real attention to the French views.
[Page 1016]Secretary Royall’s statement serves to demonstrate the unworkable and, indeed, dangerous nature of any such type of understanding with the War Department on matters affecting the US foreign policy. The Secretary of State with the responsibility for the conduct of American foreign policy by direction of the President, cannot be limited in foreign matters by any agreement with another Department of this Government without divesting him of the authority to carry out his responsibilities. There is an important matter of principle here involved.
It must be clearly established that any agreement reached on a technical level (in which category the Clay-Robertson agreement on the level of industry falls) cannot without serious harm to the conduct of American foreign affairs be regarded as superseding the right of this government to reconsider or modify such agreement in accordance with broader considerations. The British Government clearly takes the view that it has the right in so far as General Robertson is concerned and, in fact, proposes to reconsider this agreement in the light of present conditions. As the result of the understanding with the War Department of July 29th, this Government does not have any such free hand. While the War Department has a legitimate right to advise the Secretary of State in the formulation of policy decisions affecting our zone in Germany, it has no right whatsoever to attempt to limit in any way the manner in which the Secretary of State may wish to consult or discuss this subject with any government.
At the present moment, because of the attitude of the War Department, the United States is in an impossible position with regard to the conduct of its foreign policy. Furthermore, a dangerous impression of divided responsibilities and conflict within our government is given to the American public and the world. We are unable as a result of the present situation to live up to our assurances to the French and are exposing the United States in its relations with France to a justified charge of duplicity and dishonest dealing.
We feel that this latest incident shows there is no meeting of the minds and that we are now forced to ask for a reconsideration of our understanding with the War Department and to reassert the necessity that the Secretary of State have a right to modification of agreements reached on a technical level. The understanding with the War Department was a genuine attempt on the part of the State Department to arrive at a solution of our differences. The incident of Secretary Royall’s announcement to the press points up the impossibility of conducting our foreign relations in the present condition of the world on the basis of any such understanding.
- Source text included in the files of the Office of European Affairs, Division of Western European Affairs, Lot 53 D 246, file – US Policy Towards France.↩
- Ante, p. 1003.↩
- Ante, p. 997.↩
- The initialled memorandum of understanding under reference here has not been found. The substance of the understandings reached between the State and War Departments is set forth in the War Department messages to General Clay, July 26 and 28, pp. 1009 and 1010.↩
- The reference here is to the communication from Ambassador Caffery to Foreign Minister Bidault, August 4, infra.↩