711.51/7–3047
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Reber)
I asked Mr. Penson to call this morning in order that I could explain to him our proposal as to the procedure to obtain French views in regard to the German level of industry plan and management and control of the Ruhr coal industry and gave him the substance of the proposed telegram to Paris53 which had been agreed with the War Department yesterday, explaining to him that we envisaged obtaining the views of the bi-zonal authorities but that the US Government did not think that tri-partite consultation on this subject should take place. Mr. Penson promised to telegraph this proposal immediately to London.
This afternoon Mr. Penson called to say that in the interim a telegram had been received from Mr. Bevin giving his views as to the proposed approach to the French. Up to a certain point these were in harmony with us as Mr. Bevin suggested that the two governments should now inform the French government that we would be very glad to receive and consider any representations that the French government might care to make to us with regard to the level of industry plan and the coal management plan. Mr. Bevin further believed that it was important once these views had been received that the conversations should take place between the two governments so that the US and UK could establish a common line with the French. At this point, however, the British position differs from ours in that Mr. Bevin considers it equally important, in view of what has already been said to the French, to go further than simple consultation and to be prepared to have tri-partite discussions, provided that these were on an entirely informal basis and at the official level.
When I again explained that we were not prepared to agree to tripartite consultations, Mr. Penson said that in view of the extreme importance of this problem and its relation to the future of European economic recovery Mr. Bevin feels that no procedural difficulties should be placed in the way of reaching an understanding with the French. He appreciates fully the importance of not allowing the French to think that they have a veto in this matter and of avoiding getting ourselves in the position of not being able to make further progress in the implementation of the plan. He does, however, consider [Page 1014] that the French should be given the opportunity of discussing this vital problem with both the US and UK Governments. I promised to bring this explanation of Mr. Bevin’s views to the attention of the Secretary.
As a result of our conversation Mr. Penson is sending a telegram this evening to London urging that his Government agree to a communication along the lines I had proposed this morning and of reserving the question of tri-partite consultation until the two Governments had had an opportunity to consider and study the French views. He feels that the British Government will wish to raise this point again at that time at the latest.54
I said that of course I appreciated that if the British Government felt that overwhelming considerations should make it necessary at that stage to raise the question again, we should be prepared to hear their views. I did not now anticipate, however, that even at that time would we be ready to accept the necessity for holding such tri-partite conversations.
- The draft telegram under reference, subsequently sent as 2868, August 2, to Paris, not printed, transmitted the substance of the communication addressed to Foreign Minister Bidault by Ambassador Caffery on August 4, p. 1017. (711.51/7–1747)↩
- Penson informed Reber on the morning of August 2 that the British Government agreed with the procedure outlined by Reber for securing French views on the level of industry plan and management of the Ruhr coal industry. Penson stated that Foreign Secretary Bevin reserved the question of referring French views on the management of the Ruhr coal industry to the proposed American-British coal conference. Bevin also felt that at a later stage it would be necessary to envisage some discussions with France. Memorandum of conversation by Reber, August 2, 1947 (862.60/8–247).↩