840.50 Recovery/7–2047: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State
2885. For the Secretary, Lovett and Harriman. I am forwarding by air pouch a record of conversation, which Bidault had with Secretary Harriman and myself on July 16.29 Many of his observations were [Page 998] parallel to those made to Mr. Clayton, Duff-Cooper and myself and previously reported to the Department.
Bidault remarked that the Paris conference work was going well but that he was very alarmed about developments in Germany. He said that France was now faced with the following prospects:
- 1.
- Measures had been taken to centralize Germany.
- 2.
- They have been taken or will be taken to reestablish the Germans in the mines.
- 3.
- The immediate raising of the steel production level is contemplated.
With reference to this situation, Bidault said: “We have 180 Communists (in the Assembly) who say: ‘the Marshall Plan means Germany first.’ If something permits them to say this again, whether with ostensible or real reason, I tell you the government will not survive.
“I am not in a position to overcome the simultaneous opposition of General De Gaulle, the Communist Party, and a not negligible fraction of my own friends. Besides, I don’t want to. All this has to do with Germany, of course. We know how things are going to come out. It is perfectly clear that we must accomplish the fusion of zones, that the Germans must be permitted to live and to produce, and that the categorical positions which we had defended at the beginning will have to be modified. But I repeat, if this additional burden is thrown on my shoulders in such conditions that I could not offer a valid answer, I would be in absolutely no position to confront the situation, after everything I have already done.
“Within a few days from now, I shall have to defend, before a Parliament in which there are 180 Communists and 120 Socialists, the matters of Greece, the Paris conference, and the outright breaking with the Soviets. If, in addition, I must explain the agreement contemplated among you with regard to the Ruhr and German production, I shall not succeed.”
Mr. Harriman in reply pointed out that our policy in support of federalization remained unchanged: that the question of ownership of the Ruhr mines had not been determined and that we felt that this problem could be set aside for a certain period, say five years: but that we believed that coal output could be increased by making Germans responsible for production subject to supervision by the military authorities.
I confirmed Mr. Harriman’s remarks and remarked that Mr. Bevin said he intended to “put the nationalization question on ice”.
On the question of the level of steel production, Bidault challenged both the quantity to be permitted and the necessity for making a decision at this time. He ventured that a year from now actual production [Page 999] would not reach 7.5 million tons, “yet today one speaks of 11 million”. “Eleven million tons would represent a considerable argument for the Communists who will say: ‘there is three times as much steel in Germany as there is in France’”.
Mr. Harriman in reply pointed out that an agreement on level of industry was necessary, and he mentioned the excessive cost of dismantling and transferring factories. Bidault said that reparations received to date had been helpful in raising French production “only to a small extent”. He added that it was the other three occupying powers who had invented reparations by plant transfer.
Mr. Harriman in reply emphasized the fact that operations in Germany were now costing US 700 million dollars per year: that it was extremely difficult for the two combined zones to be self-sufficient, and that the point had been reached where measures had to be taken. The Foreign Minister, in closing, emphasized the following two points:
- 1.
- “In France we are not producing (steel), by far, what it is proposed to promise to Germany. That is why I would be compelled to protest.”
- 2.
- “I tell you again that I and the government are in danger of being placed in a tragic situation.”
Sent Department 2885, repeated Geneva for Clayton 104, London 563, Berlin 265, via air pouch to Rome and Moscow.
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The record of conversation between Harriman, Caffery, and Bidault was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 9273, July 21, from Paris, neither printed (840.50 Recovery/7–2147). In telegram 2847, July 17, from Paris, Caffery reported as follows on the circumstances in which this conversation was begun:
↩“I took Harriman to call on Bidault yesterday afternoon at six o’clock. A little after five Weir and Hall-Patch had begun explaining to Chauvel and other Foreign Office officials certain views of the US and Great Britain in regard to our zones in Germany. Alphand had come out of the meeting and had given to Bidault some of the first information imparted (some of this he gave erroneously or Bidault had misunderstood). We found Bidault in a hysterical condition.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1747)