Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

840.6362/10–847

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

secret

[New York,] October 8, 1947.

Participants:	Mr. Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister;
	Mr. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the U.S.;
	Secretary of State Marshall;
	Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor, Department of State

Mr. Bidault said he wished to give the Secretary a resume of the French position in regard to the Ruhr which had been the subject of informal and private discussions here in New York.¹⁷ He said in setting forth the French views he hoped that the Secretary would bear in mind the previous French positions which had been successively abandoned. He said he had in mind the original French proposal for the territorial separation of the Ruhr, a special political regime for the Ruhr, and the plan for international ownership and operation of the Ruhr industries. He added that the present French positions were in the opinion of his Government “sufficient but essential”; in other words, a minimum. He stated that he did not expect me to give an answer at the present time to these questions, but merely hoped they would be considered as representing the views of the French Government on the subject and in anticipation of a future French position to merge its zone with that of the British and American. He handed me a copy of an informal paper in French setting forth French views on the administration of the Ruhr both during the actual occupation and the final post-occupation regime (attached).

I told Mr. Bidault that there could be no implied commitment or even understanding based on these informal discussions in view of the fact that the British were directly involved in the matter and also because the French had not yet taken a decision to merge their zone.

Mr. Bidault said he completely understood this consideration and stated that although no decision concerning the views of the zones had been taken, he had nevertheless had authority from his Government to discuss the French attitude in the event of such a contingency.

I told Mr. Bidault that we would, of course, study most carefully the views of the French Government on the subject of the Ruhr. I said that we would be prepared to provide a more definite clarification of the relationship between the Control Board and the German Director but that our experts felt that it would be less efficient to have two Directors for the coal industry, one for the Ruhr and one for the Aachen basin as the French had suggested.

Mr. Bidault observed that the suggestion for two Directors was not of any great importance. I then said that as to the permanent regime of the Ruhr to be incorporated into the peace settlement, it was obviously difficult at this time to state any opinion and that we felt it would be wiser to reserve judgment until experience had been acquired in the operation of the Ruhr during the occupation period. I said, however, that we were agreed in principle that the Ruhr should not be under the exclusive control of any German Government but should be operated for the benefit of both Europe and Germany and should be integrated into the general European economy. I told Mr. Bidault that we must be determined but not too pessimistic in advance as to the outcome of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in November and that we must not fail to bear in mind the possibility that the Russians might come forth with some apparently conciliatory measures which would have to be scrutinized very carefully because of their effect on bizonal or possibly trizonal arrangements for Germany.

Mr. Bidault said that speaking realistically he did not see much hope for a success at London. He thought that the Russians would concentrate their attack on the level of industry agreement between Great Britain and the U.S.¹⁸ with, as he put it, all the brutality which the decadence of their political thinking permits. Another possible alternative might be a Soviet proposal to hold all German elections for a central Reichstag.

I told Mr. Bidault that in my experience as a military man that it was always darkest just before dawn and that when a situation looks its blackest one was apt to be on the eve of victory. I said that we would, of course, study most carefully the views of the French on the Ruhr as set forth in the document he had handed me.

[Annex]

Informal French Government Proposals on the Ruhr¹⁹

[New York,] October 8, 1947.

I—The question of the international property of the mines and steel mills of the Ruhr is reserved.

II—Regime of the present period of occupation.

In the recently concluded agreement on the subject of the organization of coal production in Germany, the appointment of a German Director General has been provided for and also the creation of an allied control group. These arrangements would be modified or completed in the following way:

1) There would be two directors general instead of one, one being responsible for the Ruhr, and the other for the Aachen basin.

2) The powers of the allied control group should be more precisely defined. In general the group would have the functions and the responsibilities of a board of directors which would include:

a) The approval of the over-all production of the investment programs and of financial policy.

b) The general rights of communication, verification, and investigation.

III. The permanent regime.

1) The aim of the allied governments is to see to it that on the one hand the Ruhr can no longer be used as an instrument of aggression and on the other hand that the Ruhr be integrated into a reorganized European economy, being considered not as a German asset but as a European asset.

Consequently, the production of coal and coke from the Ruhr must be equitably divided between Germany and the European countries which need it. In addition, it is necessary to make sure that Germany uses the quantities of coal, coke and steel which are allocated to her for peaceful purposes.

2) In order to obtain the above objectives, and independently of agreements which could be concluded regarding the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, an international authority would be set up in the Ruhr.

This international authority would have as its first task the repartition of the coal and coke production between the interior German consumption and export in accordance with the agreements which have been made or are to be made regarding this repartition.

The international authority would also have such powers of the occupation authorities and of the allied control group as would appear necessary to give to it in order to obtain the objectives mentioned above.

The international authority would be composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and of Benelux. A German participation could be provided for.

3) The permanent regime shall be established at a date which would be determined by common agreement based on experience and without waiting for the end of the regime of occupation.

17. No record has been found of the informal and private discussions under reference here. For documentation regarding proposals for an international regime for the Ruhr, see pp. 977 ff.
18. For documentation on the American-British agreement for a revised level of industry plan for the United States-United Kingdom zones of occupation of Germany, see pp. 977 ff.
19. The source text appears to be an American translation.