Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

711.51/9–1847

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State ¹⁰

secret

[ New York ,] September 18, 1947.

Participants:	Secretary Marshall
	Willard Thorp
	M. Bidault
	Ambassador Bonnet

After a brief exchange of courtesies, I told Mr. Bidault that I understood that he had matters which he wished to lay before me and that I had taken the first opportunity to come to see him.

Mr. Bidault said that he first wished to talk about the problem of Germany. Looking forward to the November meeting of the CFM, he thought that there was more than a possibility that no agreement could be reached with the USSR. Although he did not wish to regard this as a certainty, nevertheless he did feel that it would be unfortunate not to be ready with a program, if there were a break. Obviously, it was not possible to have open negotiations, but he did have full authority to discuss this matter discreetly while in the United States. He felt that it was desirable to discuss the whole German problem—the Ruhr, the Saar, the Länder and all other matters. These discussions should be at a high level, where there is more flexibility, more ability to consider all factors, than by technical experts. He hoped that such discussions could begin in a few days.

I said that I was somewhat out of touch with the recent developments in connection with Germany because of my trip to Rio.¹¹ However, I understood that considerable progress had been made in our discussions with the British concerning the Ruhr. Mr. Thorp verified this statement. I indicated the great weight which we place upon coal, reminding both Bidault and Bonnet of our many conversations on the subject. I stated that the problem had many aspects—production, German organization, general European recovery, and security. As to these many problems, I felt fairly well aware of the preoccupations of the British and the French, but was not so sure about the Russians. I did not feel clear as to what they really require. We proceed on the basis that they have some overall difficult plan, and they undoubtedly have the same idea about us. But it may well be that neither of these notions is true, and that there is some intermediate or partial solution possible. At any rate, I said that I was searching for such a step, perhaps unity on certain economic matters which would immediately facilitate recovery. I stressed that this was an idea which had not yet been carefully studied. Mr. Bidault said that he had been trying to find such an answer for three years without success.

I said that I would be glad to have conversations, but I would wish to think a little about an agenda for our next discussion here. I suggested that we meet in Mr. Bidault’s suite, where we would be more likely to escape observation than in the Pennsylvania. I also said that we would need to consider the relationship of the British to our talks, and that I might wish to talk directly with them. Mr. Bidault agreed.

I then said that during the last few days I had become more hopeful for constructive results from the Paris Conference.¹² I wanted him to keep in mind my problem with Congress and the American people. I said that the United States opinion was more generally sympathetic than I had anticipated. I then told him of my experience with the Governors, and their indication of support. In this connection, I briefly outlined the argument for military training in the United States. This gave me the opportunity to speak of the Rio Conference, and the importance for Europe of a stable America. I mentioned briefly the problem of Greenland, but then said that our time was drawing short, since I had another appointment.

Mr. Bidault said that he had several other matters to take up and would try to cover them quickly. First were the related problems of wheat and credits.¹⁴ There already were evidences of food riots, and the situation was very critical. Ramadier was determined to put France’s financial house in order in 1948 and France was prepared to make a very serious commitment in this regard in connection with the Paris Conference. But no one could say what would happen if there is no relief in the food and dollar areas. I made no comment.

Mr. Bidault went on to say that he was planning to speak before the Assembly on Friday.¹⁵ In the meantime, he intended to make a careful study of my speech. His chief problem was as to what to say concerning Greece.¹⁶ The French representative on the Committee of Inquiry reported that he had little actual evidence of outside interference, although he did not doubt its existence. Mr. Bidault said that he had no problem concerning the principle involved and would try to be as helpful as possible. I told him that I would be greatly interested in what he would have to say.

10. The conversation was held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at 3:30 p.m. The Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Bidault headed the delegations of their countries at the Second Regular Session of the United Nations Assembly, meeting in New York, September 16–November 29, 1947.
11. The Secretary of State headed the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security at Quitandinha (near Rio de Janeiro), Brazil, August 15–September 2, 1947. For documentation on the United States role at the Conference, see volume viii
12. Conference of European Economic Cooperation, held in Paris, July 12–September 22, 1947. For documentation regarding this Conference and the development of the European Recovery Program, see volume iii .
14. For documentation on the concern of the United States over the political, economic and financial situation in France, including the problems of wheat and credits, see volume iii .
15. September 19. Foreign Minister Bidault actually addressed the General Assembly on September 20.
16. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the reports of violations of the Greek frontier, see volume v .