Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 96: Germany–Treaty VII

The Australian Chargé in the Soviet Union (Deschamps) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, 21st April 1947.

Dear Mr. Marshall: In your letter of 3rd April⁸⁷ you were kind enough to ask me to assure my Government of your continued interest in its views on the subject of the procedure to be followed in the preparation of the German settlement. I have now been asked to convey to you a personal message from the Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, the text of which is the following:

“While I appreciate your efforts for wider participation by middle and smaller nations in German peace negotiations, there are certain fundamental aspects of settlement to which I feel it my duty to call your attention.

“It would appear from proposals which both United States and United Kingdom Delegations have put forward for procedure that there has been a misinterpretation of the special responsibilities of the Four Powers in regard to the German settlement. Australia always loyally accepted the leadership of the great powers in time of war and I have often stated that there were important respects in which that leadership would also be loyally accepted in post-war years. Nevertheless, it has never been my understanding that the Four Powers would carry their insistence on leadership so far as to take upon themselves the responsibility for making the peace. This was never intended in the Potsdam Agreement. May I respectfully remind you of the statement made by Mr. Byrnes on this point in a broadcast on 5th October 1946: ‘At Berlin it certainly was never intended that the three powers present or the five powers constituting the Council should take unto themselves the making of a final peace. The Berlin Declaration setting up the Council begins with the statement: “The conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements.” The Council was not to make the peace settlement but to do necessary preparatory work for peace settlement.’ It is clear, therefore, that any special responsibilities which the Four Powers may have in regard to the peace settlement refer only to preparation. As you know, we have never accepted as either just or democratic the subsequent procedure laid down for the peace treaties with Italy and the satellite enemies at the conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945. This was based on a misinterpretation of Potsdam and its failure was fully proved by the experience of the Paris Conference when it was found that a prior agreement by members of the Council of Foreign Ministers not to accept any amendment to a proposal on which they had previously reached agreement made it impossible for many constructive proposals and amendments to be accepted. It was further proved by the manner in which many recommendations of the Paris Conference were altered or rejected by the Council of Foreign Ministers when drawing up the final texts of the treaties.

“The need for improvement on the methods adopted at Paris has been admitted by all Four Powers, notably at the Deputies’ meetings in London last January and February. But improvements now under consideration in Moscow appear to me to perpetuate the misinterpretation of the true functions of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a preparatory body only. At its best, the procedure under consideration treats the middle and smaller active belligerents as mere subordinates or consultants, a very different role to that which they were repeatedly led to expect when their assistance in war was required. Moreover, the peace conference with Germany is only to be permitted to make recommendations which the Council of Foreign Ministers is free to amend or reject at will.

“In view of this, I should like to make the following positive suggestions:

• “I. The United Kingdom and the United States should endeavour to depart from the pattern which Council of Foreign Ministers’ meetings have taken, namely, preliminary assertions of principle that there will be firmness about the rights of active belligerents to participation in the peace-making, but ultimate compromises due to the fact that Russia, largely supported by France, does everything possible to prevent such participation. I am convinced that if Russia was firmly told the procedure which had to be adopted, she would ultimately yield. The pattern tends to perpetuate itself because the Russians rely upon representatives of other countries yielding to pressure of fatigue and particularly to the fear of a so-called unsuccessful conference. A compromise reached under such circumstances involves sacrifices of the rights of belligerents.
• “II. The fundamental necessity is an attempt to call an unfettered conference of active belligerents and allow that body to assume final responsibility for the peace settlement. If that were agreed on, the conference could itself give authority to an executive consisting of the major powers and other selected countries to take charge of preparatory and drafting work. A suitable occasion for calling the first meeting of such a conference might be the next meeting of the General Assembly. Having appointed an executive and the necessary committees, which could remain in continuous session, the conference could adjourn and then meet again as required.
• “III. The Paris Conference was largely prejudiced by prior recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers in regard to voting procedure. This, in turn, led to a long struggle at Paris over voting. Voting procedure could be excluded altogether from consideration at a peace conference because ex-hypothesi the peace settlement when made requires unanimity. Unanimity, however, is not to be reached at Council of Foreign Ministers’ level prior to the conference but at the conference itself. In my view, there is a danger that the latest United States proposals on voting will merely reproduce the friction and misunderstanding of the Paris Conference.
• “IV. It is absolutely essential that there should be no agreement among the Council of Foreign Ministers that they will adhere to the terms of any draft unless all agree to an alteration. The fact is that no treaty in relation to Germany will be enduring if it is brought about by exclusive and undemocratic methods, such as were applied at the Paris Conference, and which are in danger of being perpetuated in the latest proposals on procedure”.

Yours sincerely,

Noël Deschamps

87. Not printed.