740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–447
The United States Deputy for Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Murphy) to the Director, Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
Dear Doc: The present session of the Deputies for Germany is now at the half-way mark and it is high time that I attempt to fill in some of the gaps necessarily left by the formal reporting. I trust that the telegrams have been useful and that the official papers have been arriving in proper time.
By way of an introductory assessment I think it would be correct to say that, although we now have a fairly substantial dossier of the views of the non-occupying powers, our affairs have gone on in a somewhat stilted and perfunctory manner.
In line with my understanding of the Department’s views I had hoped that the meetings with the representatives of the invited countries might be the occasion for a fruitful exchange of ideas. Couve de Murville and Strang were equally intent on a profitable discussion. The latter particularly supported the propositions submitted by the Australians, viz., that the invited representatives attend all the meetings, that all matters be freely and fully discussed, that all the documents be circulated, and that the Deputies participate in the discussions with the invited representatives.
[Page 22]Gusev, however, was adamantly opposed to such an interpretation of our instructions as set forth in the New York “Decisions”.44 On the basis of a literal interpretation of Article IVa of that document he would agree to nothing more than hearing one by one the separate presentations of views and asking questions.
The consequence is that we usher in the deputations seriatim, heaving their statements (mimeographed copies of which are normally before us at the time), raise a few questions, and usher them out. The general character of the process is rather discouraging, I believe, to the representatives who appear before us. In the first place they perforce are exposing their own ideas without systematic knowledge of what the other governments, both occupying and non-occupying, are thinking about these same problems and they go away with no revelations other than those which they have to divine from the nature of the questions put to them.
More important, however, than the embarrassments of the formal sessions is the fact that virtually all of the invited governments had been expecting to play a larger role, a more tangibly effective role, in settling German affairs than is vouchsafed to them under our procedures. They are all now asking what next. Even the Yugoslavs, not distinguished for independent thinking in the presentation of their views, intimated that they would wish to say more at a subsequent date. The Australians, the South Africans and the Belgians have been pointedly precise in their ideas as to how both these present meetings and future relations between the two orders of Powers should be conducted. And, as you know, most emphatic criticism has come from the Canadians.
In the face of these insistent expressions Gusev has maintained his stand on the instructions emanating from the New York meeting. In his ex cathedra opinion hearing the views of the invited powers on “the German problem” is one matter separated from questions of procedure by the unbridgeable chasm which stands between paragraphs a and b of rubric IV. The non-occupying powers cannot presume to have views, and certainly cannot be allowed to express views, on procedural matters for this or for later stages of the German settlement; by the immutable law inscribed in this fourth rubric consideration of procedure is a reserved intellectual endeavor. So emphatic has my Soviet colleague been in this conviction that the evening before the Australian presentation he called up Colonel Hodgson and, in his capacity of chairman for the week, forbade reference to questions of procedure.45 [Page 23] Gusev’s attitude toward the Canadians, in turn, was even more severe. The first paper submitted by the Canadian High Commissioner related to matters of procedure. When he learned that no comments on substance would be in order the High Commissioner wrote a note asking “what assurances are the Special Deputies prepared to give to the Government of Canada” with respect to future discussions. It was perhaps ill-advised language which the Canadians used and Gusev construed it as impertinent and vetoed every suggestion for a written reply.46
The general problem of future relations between the occupying and non-occupying powers in the settlement with Germany has come forward as a matter of major concern in the preparation of the report of the Deputies. You will have seen the texts of the Soviet and French proposals which I sent by telegram as well as a summary report of the discussions.47 The former project will certainly receive no enthusiastic applause from the non-occupying powers who will see in it substantially a restatement of previous—and unsatisfactory—CFM practices. I find the French text confused and deceptive in its Byzantine complexity. The paper which Strang has promised has not yet appeared but it will go much farther in its proposals for the active participation of the non-occupying belligerents.
I assume that you will agree with me in my belief that the present hearings will neither meet our own ideas as to the role of the smaller allies nor satisfy their desire for more active participation. Also that you will concur in the view repeatedly stated in the Deputies’ meetings that the actual drafting and the final decisions should be vested in the CFM. The solution must be sought, then, in some form of group discussion and study eventuating in a recommendation or a vote which would be advisory rather than mandatory. Such a plan would, I take it, involve a certain number of committees and perhaps even field commissions composed of representatives of at least some of the non-occupying powers under the chairmanship of the CFM Deputies and their subordinates. You will note that the South Africans in their paper CFM(D) (47) (G)2648 make a suggestion which may merit further study as a basis for action.
We are mulling over these questions here and I hope that I can put some views up to the Department very shortly. We might find a resolution of the problem in concurrent discussions with the non-occupying powers and negotiations à quatre. If there is agreement that final [Page 24] decisions rest in the CFM I take it that there is some possibility of pulling the Russians along the road of systematic consultation.
As for the general outlook a month before the Moscow sessions I might refer to the contrast between the French and the British. The former, as you know, are turning out their proposals, three of which have now come to me, while the latter seem to be at a loss for ideas as to what to do next. I get the impression that they may regret the Moscow meeting and are making no very substantial preparations for it. Certainly they will not wish the CFM to go so far in making decisions as to embarrass them in their present support of thorough discussion of German questions with the non-occupying powers in all future stages of the settlement.
Our third ally is in the position of asking things—and particularly reparations out of current production—while “not always” seeking political objectives identic with ours. We should perhaps not be in too big a hurry with the final settlement hoping in the interval to strike a better bargain.
I hope [etc.]
- Document CFM(46) (NY)74, December 12, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 1557.↩
- For the report by Murphy on the presentation made by the Australian representative at the 6th Meeting of the Deputies for Germany, see telegram 531, Delsec 1140, January 25, from London, p. 9.↩
- Regarding the Canadian proposals and request under reference here, see telegrams 450, Delsec 1128, January 22, and 531, Delsec 1140, January 25, both from London, pp. 7 and 9, respectively.↩
- The references here are presumably to documents CFM(D) (47) (G) 22, January 28, and CFM(D) (47) (G)38, January 30, pp. 15 and 17, respectively.↩
- The document under reference here is not printed, but see footnote 26, p. 12.↩