740.00119 Council/3–2647

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State68

secret

Mr. Bevin called at the Embassy to see me today and brought with him a transcript of an interview he had had with Generalissimo Stalin on March 24.69 He went over the statements one by one, amplifying them with explanations of detailed remarks he had made which were not recorded complete in the brief summary he had furnished me.

Regarding the Polish Western boundary, he expressed the opinion that the Soviet position would be very firm against any change.

Regarding the Four Power Treaty, he stated that he purposely brought up that issue before mentioning the possible revision of the British-Soviet treaty. He did not comment at any length regarding [Page 290] the Four Power Treaty because he felt that that fell more properly to my position, but he wished me to know that he had given it precedence in the discussion in order to avoid any implication that he was attaching more importance to the revision of the British-Soviet treaty.

Regarding the Ruhr, Mr. Bevin commented that Stalin’s statements indicated that he had not been following very closely what had occurred in recent months regarding the Ruhr.

Mr. Bevin then turned to an explanation of the British position regarding reparations. He stated that while he himself was not entirely clear as to whether or not some form of reparations from production might not be necessary, he was perfectly clear that the British Government could not admit any procedure which would increase the cost to the British taxpayer. He went into considerable detail in explaining the British situation. He explained the situation regarding the American loan, whereby the increase of prices, particularly as to wheat, had confronted the British Government with a very serious dilemma.70 He went further in explaining the situation with regard to rice from Siam, in relation to the Indian situation71 and other British governmental commitments. He stated that because of the bad weather, the worst in ten years, British exports had fallen 60 million pounds below the estimated totals. He stated that the British Labor Government was determined to stand by its agreements and for that reason was taking very firm position regarding any actions which increased the cost of government.

He thought the dominating issues before the present Conference were those of reparations and political organization.

Regarding the possible inclusion of the French in the British-American zonal unification, he felt that that would be highly desirable, providing it did not increase the cost to the British. In commenting on the possible complications that might result from such a union, in view of the Communist influence in France, he stated that “however much a Frenchman might be a Communist, he would always remain a Frenchman.”

Regarding the statement which he and his government had made that the British military mission in Greece would be maintained for the “time being”, it was made clear to him that this was an unfortunate statement with regard to political consideration of the United States for the appropriation of the necessary funds for Greece. He explained that this was in answer to a parliamentary question and [Page 291] he was quite certain that what Mr. Attlee really meant was that the mission was not to be maintained in Greece permanently, but was to be removed when its services were no longer needed—that is, as soon as the Greek Army organization had been developed to the point of managing its own affairs. He agreed to take this up with the Government and see if another statement might not be made explanatory of this view.72

G[eorge] C. M[arshall]
  1. The conversation took place on March 26, 1947, from 12:30 to 1:30 p. m. Secretary Marshall sent copies of this memorandum to President Truman and Acting Secretary Acheson.
  2. Ante, p. 278.
  3. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the exchange position of the United Kingdom, see volume iii .
  4. For documentation on United States relations with India, see volume iii .
  5. For additional documentation on the program of American aid to Greece, see volume v .