740.00119 Council/3–2547: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

confidential
urgent

1013. Delsec 1345. For the President, Vandenberg, Connally and Acheson from Marshall. 13 CFM, 25 March, Molotov presiding, [Page 288] opened with Ambassador Murphy presenting report of deputies on procedure for German peace treaty. They agreed on the title, on preparation of treaty by CFM composed of members of Council signatory to military surrender act in accordance with Potsdam Agreement, on consultation with allied states which participated with armed forces against Germany or are neighbors of Germany, on formation of four permanent committees as follows: (1) political and constitutional structure, (2) territorial adjustments and related problems, (3) economic organization and reparations, and (4) disarmament and demilitarization. The deputies further agreed on establishment of an information and consultation conference of the allied states, and on participation (of other allied belligerent states and ex-enemy states, who subsequently participated with armed forces on side of allies) through presentation of their views to deputies or CFM orally or in writing as latter may consider appropriate.62

The first point of disagreement was whether or not Albania should be consulted in preparation of treaty. Marshall and Bevin opposed.63 Molotov and Bidault supported.64 After all four had expressed their views, in which question of Iran and the American Republics was introduced, it was agreed that deputies would review the problem and report in light of new factors presented.65

As to whether or not peace conference should be held, Marshall proposed that CFM, with China as a member, should invite all states at war with Germany to a peace conference to consider draft of treaty as soon as its preparation is sufficiently advanced.66 After the conference, the four members of CFM should draft final text on basis of recommendations supported by ⅔ vote of conference, and considering the recommendations supported by majority, and then submit final text for signature by all states at war with Germany. Further, Marshall proposed that responsible representatives of Germany be heard at conference, but that in order to avoid signing the treaty by any particular group of Germany, the German constitution should contain a clause clearly providing that all powers thereunder shall be exercised subject to and in accordance with the peace settlement that may be agreed upon by allies.67

[Page 289]

Bidault was noncommittal about Marshall’s first points, but enthusiastic about incorporating treaty clause in constitution.

Bevin expressed doubt about legality, or efficacy, of latter proposal and asked time to study the matter closely. Bevin visualizes a gradual process of evolving a peace treaty, a provisional government, and then a German Government, for the purpose of developing a German state. He did not see how the four powers could well develop a democratic German Government while all the allied nations were collectively laying down a peace settlement based on protection of their own individual interests. He did not want another Versailles to be repudiated, but rather a working out together of a peace settlement and a German Government, the latter to be signatory to and accept the former for the German people. We must avoid, Bevin continued, any possibility of the one to sabotage the other.

He did not want to hold up peace discussions pending organization of an acceptable German Government, Bevin said, but that if one was in existence when peace treaty was ready, the Germans should have an opportunity to express their views before signing.

Molotov asked for more time to study proposals of Marshall, Bidault and Bevin. He restated Soviet position that peace treaty must be signed by the German Government, and that such government must be given opportunity to express its views at the Peace Conference.

Department pass to Paris as 84, Rome as 11 and Vienna as 13.

Repeated London 105; Berlin 158.

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Marshall
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  1. For the text of the Report by the Deputies for Germany to the Council, document CFM(47) (M) 60, March 24, see p. 397.
  2. For the text of the Secretary of Stated statement on Albania, see Germany 1947–1949, p. 197, or Department of State Bulletin, April 6, 1947, pp. 608–609.
  3. For the text of Molotov’s statement on Albania, see Molotov, Speeches and Statements at Moscow, pp. 46–47.
  4. See the United States Delegation Minutes of this discussion, supra.
  5. Regarding the desire of the Chinese Government to participate in the convocation of a conference to consider the German peace settlement, see the note from the Chinese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, March 24, 1947, p. 495.
  6. For the text of Secretary Marshall’s statement summarized here, see Germany 1947–1949, p. 195, or Department of State Bulletin, April 6, 1947, p. 607.